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Several thinkers in the field of science and theology have categorised the 
various views on the relationship between science and Christian theology in 
typologies. These typologies are often descriptive and are intended to make 
describing the positions of individual thinkers and/or schools of thought easier 
and simpler. One typology is that of Neil Messer and is unique in that it 
categorises different views on the relationship between science and theology in 
terms of the relative importance given to science and theology by that 
thinker/school of thought. In this thesis, I shall look at three of the five Types on 
Messer’s typology with the aim of discerning which is the most satisfactory 
formulation of the relationship between science and Christian theology in the 
context of the contemporary West. 
I shall undertake this this task by focusing on one of the three chosen Types in 
each chapter and investigating how satisfactorily an example of that Type 
formulates a relationship between science and Christian theology. This 
investigation shall be facilitated using analogies from works of speculative 
fiction which portray a relationship between magic and electronic/mechanical 
technology – relationships which will be compared and contrasted with the 
relationship between science and Christian theology as it is presented by the 
thinkers/schools of thought. 
Ultimately, I shall conclude that of the three Types I have discussed from 
Messer’s typology (Types 1, 4.5, and 3 respectively), Type 3 as is the most 
satisfactory formulation of the relationship between science and Christian 
theology in the contemporary West. This is because it provides an account 
where science and Christian theology both exist within and contribute to our 
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“Blasphemer! How dare you bring logic into God’s house?” 
- Reid Harrison, “Faster, Princess! Kill! Kill!” Disenchantment. Directed by Ira 




“I’m sick of magical worlds with no technology. I want fairy run 
coffee shops where you can get a latte with a shot of charisma, 
because you’ve got a big presentation you’re worried about, or 
witches working at Apple selling phones that automatically 
appear in your pocket if you accidentally leave it somewhere, or 
psychics running hair salons who always know how you want 
your hair to look, or aura reader therapists. I just really want 
normalized magic in modern society” 












This thesis will be situated in the field of science and Christian theology. In the 
three chapters of this thesis, I shall be discussing the relationship between 
science and Christian theology with specific focus on three schools of thought. 
My research question is: What is the most satisfactory formulation of the 
relationship between science and Christian theology in the contemporary 
West?1 
The science-religion debate contains some voices who would choose to forsake 
all Christian doctrine and maintain that science is the only truth, and some who 
would forsake all science and maintain that Christian doctrine is the only truth. 
These are extreme examples, and most cases are much more nuanced than 
that. Indeed, there are many positions that may be held on the relationship 
between science and Christian theology, and many have put forward ways to 
categorise these positions. In this Introduction I shall survey six of these 
typologies and indicate why my chosen typology, that of Neil Messer, is 
particularly suited to the task.  
In 1991, Ian Barbour developed one of the most influential of these typologies, 
one he would go on to reiterate in 1997. Barbour’s typology consists of four 
Types: conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration.2 
The conflict model concerns those positions where religion and science are not 
only seen as incompatible with each other but in direct competition with each 
other. Barbour claims that such a model is often seen in the public eye because 
it lends itself well to media coverage.3 The conflict model has two opposite 
extremes: scientific naturalism and biblical literalism. 
Scientific naturalism is on the science side of the conflict model coin. Those 
who adhere to this position value science above any other form of discovering 
truths about the world. In this view, says Barbour, “Science alone is objective, 
open-minded, universal, cumulative, and progressive. Religious traditions, by 
 
1 ‘Satisfactory’ is here taken to reference the accuracy of the representation of both sides of the 
relationship: the science side and the Christian theology side. 
2 You can find Barbour’s discussion of these four Types in: Ian G Barbour, Religion and 
Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (New York City, New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 
77-105. 
3 Barbour, Religion and Science, 77. 
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contrast, are said to be subjective, closed-minded, parochial, uncritical, and 
resistant to change.”4 Barbour discusses E.O. Wilson as an example of a 
scientific naturalist, citing Wilson’s argument that religions and religious 
traditions are the product of evolution and that, once we realise that this is all 
that religion is, we will jettison it from our society.5 
Barbour is dissatisfied with this view on the grounds that it does not portray 
science fairly or accurately, an argument he also uses to dismiss the other side 
of the conflict model coin: biblical literalism.6 
Barbour gives creation science as an example of biblical literalism, a topic to 
which we shall return in Chapter 2. He refers to the attempts made in America 
throughout the twentieth century to have creation science taught in schools 
alongside evolutionary theory, and a law passed in Arkansas in 1925 which 
allowed for such teaching to occur. The law was, however, Barbour notes, 
overturned some decades later for several reasons, including that creation 
science was deemed to be unscientific. The court used as evidence for this the 
fact that no creation science papers had ever been submitted to a peer-
reviewed scientific journal, let alone published in one, while evolutionary theory 
had been upheld in peer-reviewed literature across many scientific disciplines.7 
Barbour accuses both creationists and anti-creationists of viewing evolutionary 
theory as inherently atheistic; the former using the argument to dismiss 
evolutionary theory and the latter using the argument to dismiss creation 
science. A further transgression in both positions on creation science is that 
they do not communicate with each other sufficiently to properly enter 
constructive dialogue. They are mostly ignorant of the people with whom they 
disagree and the discourse suffers because of this.8 
Another group of thinkers, Barbour says, have attempted to avoid conflict by 
separating science and religion entirely. This is the independence view.9 As with 
 
4 Ibid, 78. We shall see in Chapter 1 how Richard Dawkins espouses a similar view to that 
which is portrayed here, although Barbour does not name Dawkins as an exponent of this 
particular view. He does however, name Dawkins as a scientific naturalist (81). 
5 Barbour, Religion and Science, 80. 
6 Ibid, 78. 
7 Ibid, 83. The notion of creationism as unscientific has been explored by Abby Hafer, whose 
arguments will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
8 Ibid, 84. 
9 Ibid, 86. 
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the conflict model, Barbour identifies two different ‘strands’ of the independence 
view. 
The first is ‘contrasting methods’. This view holds that the methods of science 
and religion differ so drastically from one another that they do not impinge on 
each other. Science can conduct its scientific method and religion can conduct 
its ‘religious’ method, and never the twain shall meet.10 
The other iteration Barbour gives of the independence model is the ‘differing 
languages’ view. In this view, science and religion perform completely different 
functions in human life and so cannot be lumped into the same Type: “Science 
and religion do totally different jobs, and neither should be judged by the 
standards of the other”.11 A classic example of such a view would be Stephen 
Jay Gould’s Non-Overlapping Magisteria (NOMA), where religion and science 
are said to have different foci which do not overlap: religion can provide moral 
teaching, while science can provide new knowledge about the natural world.12 
Barbour thinks that the independence view is a good starting point, but nothing 
more.13 From here, he moves on to the next Type on his typology: dialogue. 
A key aspect of the dialogue view is the existence of what Barbour describes as 
‘limit questions’: “ontological questions raised by the scientific enterprise as a 
whole but not answered by the methods of science”.14 
Like previous Types on Barbour’s typology, the dialogue view can be split into 
two: methodological parallels15 (where the methods of science and religion are 
seen as parallel to each other, as opposed to separate as in the contrasting 
methods variant of the independence view), and nature-centred spirituality. 
Barbour says that those who adhere to nature-centred spirituality are often 
discussing “the sacred in nature”;16 and, in this way, are very similar to the 
 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid, 87. 
12 Gould defines and illustrates NOMA in: Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and 
Religion in the Fullness of Life (London: Vintage, 2002), 49-89. 
13 Barbour, Religion and Science, 88. 
14 Ibid, 90. Barbour notes that limit questions are sometimes referred to as ‘boundary questions’, 
but he believes that the latter term is open to misinterpretation and so prefers the term ‘limit 
questions’. 
15 Ibid, 93. 
16 Ibid, 95 (sic). 
11 
 
Romantic poets.17 Barbour also identifies New Age movements as forms of 
nature-centred spirituality.18 
The final Type on Barbour’s typology is integration, which Barbour splits into 
three: natural theology, theology of nature, and systematic synthesis.  For 
Barbour the natural theologian infers the existence of God from evidence 
provided by the natural world. The theologian of nature considers the way in 
which scientific discoveries may “affect the reformulation of certain [religious] 
doctrines”. Finally, “In a systematic synthesis, both science and religion 
contribute to the development of an inclusive metaphysics”. Barbour cites 
process philosophy as an example of a systematic synthesis.19 
From the terminology used, Barbour recognises that there can be difficulty in 
seeing the difference between the dialogue view and the integration view. The 
distinction Barbour offers is that the integration view begins its arguments from 
considering named scientific theories, whereas the dialogue view does not.20 
Barbour finds natural theology unsatisfactory and feels that David Hume has 
successfully critiqued it to the point where one can invoke his arguments to 
justify rejecting natural theology.21 
Theologies of nature are the opposite of natural theologies in several ways. 
Barbour says that where the latter start from the available science, the former 
begin from a given religious tradition and look to where and how certain aspects 
of that tradition need reformulation considering scientific discoveries.22 
Finally, “Process philosophy is a promising candidate for a mediating role today 
because it was itself formulated under the influence of both scientific and 
religious thought, even as it responded to persistent problems in the history of 
Western philosophy (for example, the mind/body problem).”23 
In 2014, Elizabeth Johnson discussed and expanded Barbour’s typology. She 
describes adherents of the conflict view as ‘fundamentalists’, both those on the 
side of scientific naturalism and biblical literalism, saying that “Each contends 
 
17 Ibid. Barbour does not denote Romantic with a capital letter. 
18 Ibid, 98. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, 90. 
21 Ibid, 100. Hume’s arguments against teleology are further discussed in Chapter 2. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, 104 (sic). 
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that only one position is legitimate, namely theirs, and rejects insights offered by 
the other”.24 She accuses biblical literalists of relating to the Bible in a way that 
is alien to most modern Biblical scholars, who would not claim that the Bible is 
attempting to teach scientific truths nor that the Bible can only be legitimately 
interpreted if interpreted literally.25 
Johnson names Richard Dawkins as a scientific naturalist and discusses his 
position in more detail than Barbour. She accuses Dawkins, along with other 
scientific naturalists, of “operating from a different kind of fundamentalism [than 
biblical literalists in] … seek[ing] to demolish religion with the guns of 
evolutionary theory”:26 
“The fundamentalism here consists in taking natural explanations as the 
last and only word on all reality, including the phenomenon of mind. But 
spiritual realities, if such do exist, cannot be measured by precision 
instruments. Whether or not God exists cannot be resolved by scientific 
method, according to the definition of both God and scientific method.”27 
Johnson describes the independence Type as giving science and religion the 
opportunity to ignore each other and carry on with their own individual 
businesses. Unlike Barbour, Johnson does explicitly place Gould’s NOMA in the 
independence Type, though criticises it for its pastoral difficulties.28 The 
independence view is impractical, according to Johnson, for very few can 
successfully compartmentalise science and religion in their lives and as a result, 
“the need for a coherent worldview becomes pressing”.29 
The dialogue view, according to Johnson, sees science and religion 
acknowledging both their differences and their similarities, especially in their 
shared interest in discovering more about the reality which we inhabit.30 While 
science and religion cannot necessarily answer each other’s questions, they 
can provide additional insight which can bring thinkers closer to answering their 
 
24 Elizabeth Johnson, Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014), 7. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, 8. Johnson acknowledges that evolutionary theory is not the only gun which scientific 
naturalists have used to demolish religion, though she notes that it is a particularly contentious 
one. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, 8-9. 




respective questions.31 Johnson warns, however, that such a conversation is 
only possible if one sees reason as an ally rather than an enemy of faith.32 
Integration, says Johnson, is very much like the dialogue view but it takes the 
dialogue view a step further. She, too, describes the formation of a “deep 
synthesis of scientific ideas with religious belief”, and attributes such a synthesis 
to process theology and philosophy, as Barbour does.33 
Johnson, however, proposes a fifth Type: that of practical cooperation. Rather 
than a philosophical consideration of the relationship between the 
methodologies or truth claims of science and religion, the practical cooperation 
approach is tied to ethics. Johnson specifically uses the ecological crisis as an 
example, taking E.O. Wilson’s more recent stance that if the ethical 
considerations of religion and the scientific knowledge of the changing climate 
come together, then a real difference can be made regarding the ecological 
crisis.34 
Johnson, then, begins with Barbour’s typology and mostly accepts it as it is, but 
adds a fifth Type to the typology, that of practical cooperation, with particular 
reference to the ecological crisis. She describes her five-part typology 
consisting of conflict, separation, dialogue, integration, and practical 
cooperation thus: “Enemies, strangers, good friends, married partners, or co-
workers”.35 
Ted Peters, too, has expanded upon Barbour’s typology. Writing in the same 
year in which Barbour reiterated his typology, Peters takes a different approach 
to expanding upon it from Johnson. 
Peters expands further than Johnson, doubling the number of Types in 
Barbour’s typology rather than adding a single Type to the possibility pool.36 
The eight Types on Peters’ typology are as follows: scientism, scientific 
 
31 Ibid, 9-10. 
32 Ibid, 10. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid, 11. 
35 Ibid. 
36 It should be noted that Peters does not believe his typology can be neatly mapped onto 
Barbour’s; he claims his typology is “more nuanced” than Barbour’s and that while there are 
overlaps, one should remain wary of equating them outright. See: Ted Peters, “Theology and 
the Natural Sciences.” In The Modern Theologians: An introduction to Christian theology in the 
twentieth century, ed. David F Ford (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1997), 665 [footnote 1]. 
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imperialism, ecclesiastical authoritarianism, scientific creationism, two-language 
theory, hypothetical consonance, ethical overlap, and New Age spirituality. 
Scientism can be neatly described as naturalism or secular humanism. 
Scientism would be part of Barbour’s conflict model, on the side of scientific 
naturalism, in that it seeks complete victory of science over religion. This 
atheistic ideology is “built upon the assumption that science provides all the 
knowledge that we can know” and reduces the knowledge which religion can 
provide to nothing more than “pseudo-knowledge”.37 
Scientific imperialism is like scientism, says Peters, though it is a milder form. 
Rather than wishing to march into religious territory and eliminate the enemy 
completely, scientific imperialists wish to conquer the land, allowing religion to 
live but under science’s rule. Scientific imperialism is theistic, though maintains 
that we can only really gain knowledge – including knowledge of the divine – 
from scientific investigation as opposed to religious revelation.38 
Peters’ third Type is ecclesiastical authoritarianism, which he claims can be 
found exclusively in the Roman Catholic church: “theological dogma is here 
ceded authority over science on the grounds that it is founded on God’s 
revelation”.39 Here we see a respect in which Peters’ typology diverges from 
Barbour’s. 
In his fourth Type, Peters returns to a position closer to Barbour’s, with scientific 
creationism. Barbour gave creationism and creation science a place in his 
biblical literalism version of the conflict Type. Peters, however, gives it its own 
Type on his typology. Contrasting it with ecclesiastical authoritarianism, Peters 
claims that creationism is not merely a Protestant version of the Roman 
Catholic position he previously described. This is because “Today’s creation 
scientists are willing to argue their case in the arena of science, not biblical 
authority”.40 
Peters’ fifth Type is what he calls two-language theory, which he claims is the 
most common academic position among those he includes in his typology.41 A 
 
37 Peters, “Theology,” 650. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, 651. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, 649. 
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distinction between science and Christian theology which will rear its head at 
several points in this thesis is the distinction between the kinds of questions the 
two disciplines are asking. After Langdon Gilkey, Peters describes the two-
language theory as a belief that science and theology are asking different kinds 
of questions: science is asking ‘how’ questions, while theology is asking ‘why’ 
questions.42 Yet rather than science and theology asking different kinds of 
questions about the same thing, Peters says, two-language theorists speak of 
science and religion as moving in two different directions: one toward God, and 
the other toward religion. Perhaps this is where Peters might place Gould’s 
NOMA. Peters expresses distaste for this kind of solution, as it merely “gains 
peace through separation”.43 
So, Peters moves onto his sixth Type: that of hypothetical consonance, where a 
harmony exists between science and theology but that harmony is hypothetical. 
He claims to be situated in a position dealing with weak consonance, where we 
are looking for harmony between science and theology in terms of which 
questions are similar between the two, and where the questions they ask share 
the same domain.44 
Peters’ seventh and penultimate Type is that of ethical overlap. This is very 
similar to the fifth Type Johnson would go on to add to Barbour’s typology, 
where she describes science and religion as ‘co-workers’. In an ethical overlap, 
Peters says, theologians recognise their responsibility to reflect ethically on the 
developments of science. Like Johnson, he explicitly mentions climate change 
as one of the areas in which theologians can interact with scientists.45 
We have seen Peters’ final Type within Barbour’s typology, namely as an 
example of Barbour’s nature-centred spirituality within the dialogue model. 
While Barbour speaks of New Age holism as an example of nature-centred 
spirituality, Peters gives it its own Type in his typology. Whereas Barbour 
speaks of New Age holism, Peters speaks of New Age spirituality, the “key” to 
which is holism.46 Peters argues that there are three main aspects to New Age 
spirituality: “(1) discoveries in twentieth-century physics, especially quantum 
 
42 Ibid, 652. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 




theory; (2) acknowledgement of the important role played by imagination in 
human knowing; and (3) a recognition of the ethical exigency of preserving the 
planet from ecological destruction.”47 Peters expresses sympathy for the ethical 
elements of New Age spirituality, but finds its “metareligious naturalism” 
“contrived and uncompelling”.48 Peters situates himself within the sixth Type in 
his typology, that of hypothetical consonance. In this view, he holds, we do not 
have to compromise the integrity of either science or religion and we are not 
limited in the way that the two-language theory is. 
I would agree with Peters that it is important to retain the integrity of both 
science and religion, but I would rather seek a position where the consonance 
between the two is actual rather than merely hypothetical. 
A year before Peters, Willem Drees devised a typology in an entirely different 
format from what we have previously seen. Barbour’s, Johnson’s, and Peters’ 
typologies have all been lists of various possible positions to hold on the 
relationship between science and religion. Drees, however, produced a table-
like typology expressing a 3x3 system, with various ‘characters of religion’ 
(labelled 1-3) on the x axis and various ‘challenges’ (labelled a-c) on the y axis. 
Each Type on Drees’ typology, then, is a result of the intersection of a 
‘character of religion’ and a ‘challenge’, denoted with its corresponding number 
and letter as to where it falls on the x and y axes. 
Fig 1.0 Drees’ typology, adapted from Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism, 
45. 
 
47 Ibid, 654. 
48 Ibid (sic). 
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Type 1a denotes the intersection between cognitive claims in religion and new 
knowledge about the world, such as that which has been ascertained by the 
sciences. Drees cites such historical events as the Darwin and Galileo Affairs 
as examples of where this intersection has played out. Drees argues that these 
events were just as much about a conflict between different religious 
interpretations as they were conflicts between science and religion.49 
1b concerns the intersection between cognitive claims in religion and the nature 
of knowledge. Nancey Murphy, who will be discussed particularly in Chapter 3, 
attempts to integrate science and religion with respect to their methodologies 
and this, for Drees, marks her as a 1b exponent.50 
The final entry in the first column, 1c, is the intersection between cognitive 
claims and the meaning of the universe. Drees puts teleology here, citing Fine-
Tuning arguments.51 
The second column moves away from cognitive claims about religion to 
religious experience. 2a seeks to relate religious experience with changing 
knowledge of the world. Here again we see New Age holism and other 
experiential religions given their own Type in contrast to how Barbour 
categorised such worldviews on his typology.52 
2b concerns religious experience and the nature of knowledge. Drees notes that 
Murphy, to an extent, can be placed in this Type by virtue of her argument that 
data (for Murphy provided by communal discernment) from religious 
experiences can be used in the study of theology in much the same way as 
sense data can be used in the sciences. Drees identifies Richard Swinburne as 
a 2b thinker.53 
2c also deals with how experiential views of religion relate to an appreciation of 
the world. Such thinkers, Drees says, use divine ambiguity to avoid the need for 
an inaccessible realm beyond space and time (i.e. heaven and/or hell).54 
 
49 Willem B Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 46. 
50 Ibid, 46-47. 
51 Ibid, 47. 
52 Ibid, 47-48. 




The final column concerns religion as a tradition. 3a evaluates religious 
traditions using new knowledge gained about the world and concludes that 
religion is a product of evolution and nothing more.55 3b, where religious 
traditions are evaluated using new views of knowledge, draws heavily from the 
later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and reduces religion to a ‘language-game’ 
such as the philosopher would describe one.56 3c, the ninth and final Type on 
Drees’ typology, considers religious traditions in light of views of appreciation of 
the world. 3c borrows from 3a, says Drees, in respect to 3a’s evolutionary view 
of religion, but seeks to move forward from a functional view of religion to truth 
by making claims “which transcend any local context”. Drees believes that 3c 
thinkers are unsuccessful in this attempt.57 
Mikael Stenmark, too, has developed a typology with direct reference to 
Barbour’s. Stenmark believes that Barbour’s typology has become “standard”, 
so widespread is its influence. As such, Stenmark lays out his typology in terms 
of how it relates to Barbour’s.58 He does, however, give an alternative view to 
Barbour’s typology; Stenmark believes that there should be three ways of 
looking at the relationship between science and Christian theology: overlap, no 
overlap, and union. This account, Stenmark says, has advantage over 
Barbour’s four-Type typology as ‘overlap’ language leaves more nuance for the 
various Types; it is not necessary to explain how large or small an overlap 
needs to be to place a Type on his typology.59 
Stenmark’s main issue with Barbour’s typology is that Barbour has not defined 
his Types sufficiently. For example, Stenmark takes issue with Barbour’s 
dialogue Type, saying that this word is inaccurate to describe the position. Most 
of the theorists who fall into various Types on Barbour’s typology are engaged 
in a conversation between theology and science in some fashion, and so to 
exclude an entire Type as being typified by their dialogue ignores other parts of 
the field.60 Similarly, Stenmark does not believe that seeing the conflict between 
scientific and theological ideas should automatically put someone in Barbour’s 
 
55 Ibid. Drees does not mention E.O. Wilson as an exponent of this view, though we have seen 
Johnson describe Wilson’s position in much the same manner as Drees describes 3a. 
56 Ibid, 49. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Mikael Stenmark, How to Relate Science and Religion: A Multidimensional Model (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2004), 250. 
59 Ibid, 251. 
60 Ibid, 253. 
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conflict model; in this way, he sees little difference between Barbour’s conflict 
model and his integration model.61 The key issue with Barbour’s typology, 
according to Stenmark, is that there is too much overlap between the four 
Types. This does not allow for easy description of various positions and 
thinkers.62 
An example Stenmark gives for this difficulty is Barbour’s placement of Richard 
Dawkins on his typology. Barbour would put Dawkins in the conflict model, but 
Stenmark believes that it is not obvious that this is where Dawkins belongs 
considering the definition Barbour has given of the conflict model. The criteria 
for being in the conflict model, and arguably each of Barbour’s four models, are, 
for Stenmark, “ambiguous”.63 
Overall, Stenmark believes that “if both science and religion are evolving and 
changing practices then no a priori or once-and-for-all answer can be given 
about how science and religion should be related”.64 In light of this belief, 
Stenmark gives a five-type typology: overlap; union; complete separation 
(where there is no overlap at all); science is a subset of religion; religion is a 
subset of science.65 
The final thinker I shall discuss, Neil Messer, developed his typology in his 2007 
book, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics, revealing that he owes much of his 
development of his typology to Hans Frei.66 He later reiterated, updated, and 
confirmed his typology in a 2018 article, ‘Evolution and Theodicy: How (Not) to 
do Science and Theology’.67 His typology takes on a different structure than the 
ones we have seen so far. One such difference is that Messer clearly identifies 
and defines what kinds of ‘science’ and what kinds of ‘religion’ he is talking 
about; the former having a focus on biology over physics or chemistry, and the 
latter being Christian doctrine which, for this purpose, he defines as “the central 
convictions of the Christian Church”.68 So Messer is answering the narrower 
 
61 Ibid, 254. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid, 255-256. 
64 Ibid, 268. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Neil Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and Ethical Reflections on 
Evolutionary Biology (London: SCM Press, 2007), 49. 
67 Neil Messer, “Evolution and Theodicy: How (Not) to do Science and Theology.” In Zygon: 
Journal of Religion and Science 53 no. 3 (2018): 821-835. 
68 Messer, Selfish Genes, 49 [footnote 18]. 
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question: what is the appropriate relation between Christian theology and the 
natural sciences, and draws his test cases mainly from biology. Note too that 
his method is prescriptive rather than descriptive – he asks not what is or has 
been the relationship, but what it should be. This is also the approach of this 
thesis. 
Like Johnson and Stenmark, Messer gives a five-Type typology. His first Type 
is: “Only science contributes to the account, and the contribution of Christian 
doctrine is dismissed”.69 He gives Daniel Dennett’s biological reductionism as 
an example of this Type, though also briefly mentions Dawkins as a further 
example. Messer finds this Type to be lacking in terms of portraying a 
Feuerbachian God who is radically different from the God in which Christians 
believe.70 
His second Type is: “Both science and Christian doctrine contribute to the 
account; its shape is determined by the scientific contribution, and the input 
from Christian doctrine must be adjusted to fit the outlines determined by the 
scientific contribution”.71 The example Messer gives of this Type is Arthur 
Peacocke.72 
His third Type is: “Both science and Christian doctrine contribute, and neither 
has sole control over the shape of the account”.73 For this Type, Messer refers 
to John Polkinghorne, though he admits that Polkinghorne’s categorisation is a 
little difficult to pin down as solely Type 3.74 This is because Polkinghorne’s 
Gifford Lectures are structured according to the articles of the Nicene Creed, 
and so in these works Polkinghorne could be considered to be veering towards 
Type 4:75 “Both science and Christian doctrine contribute; the shape of the 
account is determined by Christian doctrine, and the scientific contribution is 
critically appropriated to that doctrinally shaped account”.76 
Messer similarly believes his example for Type 4, Karl Barth, is a slightly more 
ambiguous and tricky positioning. Barth is not taken very seriously in the field of 
 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid, 50-53. 
71 Ibid, 49-50. 
72 Ibid, 55. 
73 Ibid, 50. 
74 Ibid, 58 [footnote 58]. 
75 Ibid, 60. 
76 Ibid, 50. 
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science and theology, and while his systematic theology has been profoundly 
influential throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, it is not generally 
thought to contribute much to the science and theology debate.77 
Messer’s fifth and final Type is: “Only the contribution of Christian doctrine is 
admitted, the scientific contribution being denied or dismissed”.78 For this fifth 
Type, Messer identifies creationism – “as that term is commonly understood” – 
as a useful example.79 Though this, too, is problematic in a sense due to 
creationists making “apparently scientific claims” which are themselves not 
science in any conventional sense,80 an issue we have already seen Peters 
acknowledge. 
So far, I have discussed six typologies of the possible views on the relationship 
between science and religion: those of Ian Barbour, Elizabeth Johnson, Ted 
Peters, Willem Drees, Mikael Stenmark, and Neil Messer. Of these six 
typologies, I shall favour Messer’s in this thesis, and use it for the structure of 
my chapters. For the purposes of this thesis, Messer’s typology is to be 
preferred over the others I have discussed for several reasons. 
Peters’ and Johnson’s typologies both explicitly mention ethics, both regarding 
the ecological crisis. As I shall not be discussing questions of ethics, or religious 
responses to scientific developments such as stem cell research or GM crops, 
or, indeed, the ecological crisis, Peters’ and Johnson’s typologies are less 
appropriate frameworks for this thesis. 
Each of the typologies we have discussed so far, with the exception of 
Stenmark’s and Messer’s, have had clearly defined Types. The conflict model is 
the conflict model and no other model; similarly for the other models. This is 
problematic when a thinker does not fit completely into one of those Types. 
Barbour, for instance, is unable to neatly fit his own position on his typology, 
instead advocating a ““Theology of Nature” position, coupled with a cautious 
use of process philosophy”.81 The result of such defined Types is that a thinker 
then has to explain which parts of ‘this Type’ and ‘that Type’ they agree with, 
 
77 Ibid, 60-62. 
78 Ibid, 50. 
79 Ibid, 54. Messer attributes the ‘common understanding’ here referenced to Henry M Morris. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Barbour, Religion and Science, 105. 
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making the process of placing any one thinker on any of these typologies an 
unnecessarily ponderous affair. 
Another indication of this ambiguity is that a single position can be placed in 
different Types on different typologies. New Age holism, for example, has been 
placed in three different Types on three different typologies. The work of 
Nancey Murphy, too, has been the subject of disagreement with regards to 
categorisation. If the purpose of these typologies is to make more sense of the 
scope of the field and the positions therein, then I do not consider that they 
have done this well. 
Messer’s typology, contrastingly, allows for more determination when describing 
various positions on the debate, because Messer’s Types describe how 
important science and Christian doctrine are, relative to each other, for each 
thinker or school of thought. Where the other thinkers I have discussed had to 
brand themselves as a mix of two or more of their own Types, such a thing is 
not possible with Messer’s typology: if you believe that Christian doctrine has no 
importance in the account but that science does, you cannot simultaneously 
believe Christian doctrine and science have equal importance in the account.  
This is not to say that a position must fall neatly into the five Types Messer has 
described. Messer’s typology is much more of a spectrum, so that a position 
can exist between two of the Types Messer identifies. One could, for example, 
be Type 1.5, depending on the level of importance one gives to science over 
Christian doctrine. In Chapter 2, I shall discuss Intelligent Design theory as 
being a Type 4.5. Such non-integer Types are not possible on the typologies of 
any of the other thinkers I have discussed. Only Messer’s is flexible in this way. 
These non-integer Types are dissimilar to a mixing of Types which we have 
seen in the other typologies. To exist between two of the defined Types on 
Messer’s typology is not to define oneself as a mixture of those two. This is 
because of Messer’s focus on the relative importance of Christian theology and 
science. One does not need to borrow from Types 1 and 2 to be Type 1.5; one 
merely has to say that one believes that science is the most important 
contributing factor to the account and that Christian theology does contribute a 
very small amount to the account, but the contribution from Christian theology is 
not as large as it is for those in Type 2. If we imagine a double pan balance 
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scale, where one pan holds Christian doctrine and the other holds science, we 
can illustrate the mechanics of Messer’s typology. Type 1 on Messer’s typology 
would be where the Christian doctrine pan is as high as it can possibly be 
(being completely unimportant and therefore lacking in any weight) while the 
science pan is as low as it can possibly be. Type 5 would be the opposite. Type 
3 would be where the pans are at equal heights to each other. Types 2 and 4 
see the pans at the halfway points between their positions in Types 1 and 5. Yet 
these are not the only positions the pans can be in; they can be in a near infinite 
number of positions between each of those positions prescribed as Types on 
Messer’s typology, depending on the given thinker/school of thought’s beliefs 
about the relative importance of science and Christian doctrine. 
In contrast, the other typologies I have discussed cannot be illustrated in this 
way. The other typologies are more like pieces of fruit which might go on those 
double pan scales. For example, imagine we have two pieces of fruit 
representing two positions on Barbour’s typology: one represents the dialogue 
view and one represents the integration view. Those pieces of fruit are those 
pieces of fruit: they are divisible but there is no ‘middle ground’ between one 
piece of fruit and the other piece of fruit. To have a position which is not neatly 
described by one of Barbour’s Types would mean cutting a piece off one of the 
pieces of fruit and another piece off the other piece of fruit and making a fruit 
salad of them. Yet this is not a distinct position in its own right; it is merely an 
amalgamation of two pre-described positions. With Messer’s typology, however, 
there can exist distinct positions which do not fall neatly into the Types Messer 
has described; rather, the pans can swing between the prescribed Types as far 
as the outer limits (Types 1 and 5) allow them. 
In 2018, Messer updated his typology in his article ‘Evolution and Theodicy: 
How (Not) to do Science and Theology’.82 There are small but evident changes 
in this new configuration. Messer’s 2018 typology still consists of five Types and 
they are broadly the same, in that they each deal with the relative importance of 
science and Christian theology to each other. One important distinction between 
the two is that Messer has changed how he describes the theological side of the 
debate: in 2007, his typology described the relationship between science and 
 
82 Messer, “Evolution.” See especially: 823-824. 
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Christian doctrine; in 2018, his typology describes the relationship between 
science and Christian tradition. 
Messer also lays out five “caveats” for his typology: limitations which should be 
considered when working with his typology. 
1. He acknowledges that his typology is a simplified view of the field,83 
though I would say that this is probably true of all typologies – something 
must be sacrificed for the sake of convenience, and in this case it is a 
certain level of nuance. 
2. These discussions are not limited to science and Christian tradition, but 
in practice often include inputs from various other sources; Messer notes 
that philosophy often plays a particularly important role in at least some 
of these discussions.84 Indeed, I shall engage with philosophy in areas of 
this thesis, particularly in Chapter 3. 
3. There are two questions which must be answered when analysing a 
thinker’s position on the relationship between science and Christian 
theology. The first question is how much weight the voices of science 
and Christian theology are given in that position; the second question is 
what kind of contribution each are making to the position. Messer’s 
typology only answers the first question.85 Yet, as I have already 
mentioned, I believe that this is one of its strengths, as it allows more 
fluidity along the spectrum of views when identifying a particular thinker 
or school of thought. 
4. My methodology in this thesis differs slightly from Messer’s. Messer 
says: “I am not using the typology to classify authors, but only particular 
arguments, moves, or approaches.” He acknowledges that it is difficult to 
fit individuals into neat Types such as those which are present on his 
typology.86 I shall be using his typology to classify authors, with the 
possible exception of Chapter 2 when I shall be classifying two authors 
as examples of a wider approach to the relationship between science 
and Christian theology, namely Intelligent Design theory. Furthermore, I 
believe that the inability to fit individuals into neat Types is, again, related 
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to the strengths of Messer’s typology; a thinker need not be placed into a 
neat Type at one of the five points which Messer has identified along the 
spectrum of his typology. Rather, one can be placed somewhere in the 
spaces between those five Types. 
5. Messer acknowledges that his use of his typology “is not purely 
descriptive or neutral. … I regard some ways of approaching the science-
theology dialogue as clearly preferable to others.”87 This is certainly an 
aspect of academic discourse which cannot be avoided and one of which 
I will be no doubt be guilty throughout this thesis. 
I would add a further distinction between my use of Messer’s typology and 
Messer’s original intentions for his typology in that Messer specifically identifies 
biology over physics or chemistry as the scientific concern when discussing the 
various positions on the relationship between science and Christian theology. I 
will, however, not be limiting the science side of the discussion to biology but 
also widening the discussion into physics. Physics will play a larger part in the 
discussion in Chapter 3. 
In my investigation into the relationship between science and Christian 
theology, I shall use Messer’s typology as it is laid out in Selfish Genes and 
Christian Ethics, rather than as it is laid out in ‘Evolution and Theodicy: How 
(Not) to do Science and Theology’, to search for a satisfactory account of the 
relationship between the two. I shall focus on Messer’s earlier iteration for 
several reasons. 
A minor reason is that Messer has a different view on the strengths and 
weaknesses of his 2018 iteration from what I would ascribe to his 2007 iteration. 
As I have already discussed, the main strength of Messer’s typology, 
particularly over other typologies, is that it is more of a spectrum. There is more 
flexibility in Messer’s typology than in, for example, Barbour’s. Messer has 
identified those aspects of his 2018 typology which afford it this spectrum-like 
quality and has said that they are weaknesses. As these are the strengths 
which I would ascribe to his 2007 typology, it is more pertinent to use the 2007 





The biggest reason for my use of the 2007 iteration over the 2018 iteration is 
the shift in focus in the latter from Christian doctrine to Christian tradition, and 
thus there is a shift of focus on the Christian theology side of the table in terms 
of what is being related to science. 
Daniel J Treier has noted that there is a duality with regards to doctrine. While 
doctrine is always “teaching”, as in the contents of that teaching rather than the 
act of teaching itself, doctrinal teaching can come in two forms: “a 
communicable proposition or … a church activity”. In this way, he says, doctrine 
is cousins with theology, tradition, and wisdom.88 John E Theil defines tradition 
in the same volume: tradition “in its Christian use refers to a body of 
authoritative beliefs, teachings, or practices that, in the faith of believers, 
conveys the gospel message of Jesus Christ”.89 
Taking these two definitions into account, I would say that tradition contains the 
central ideas and beliefs of Christianity while doctrine develops the worldview in 
which that tradition is based. Understood this way, Christian doctrine has more 
to say in dialogue with science than does Christian tradition. Christian doctrine 
describes a worldview which can speak to a scientific worldview. Contrastingly, 
there are no central ideas of science, no equivalent of the salvific nature of the 
Resurrection. Science tells us that the world is ordered and can be understood, 
but I would say that this resembles doctrine more than tradition. The idea that 
the world is ordered and can be understood does not depend on transmission 
from person to person and/or generation to generation. Scientific ideas which 
may depend on this transmission are individual theories, such as relativity and 
quantum mechanics. 
These scientific ideas are constantly being developed and investigated, and as 
such I do not think that there is an ‘easy’ way to define a specific scientific 
tradition, using the definition of tradition which Theil provides, which can be 
used analogously with Christian tradition. Doctrine, on the other hand, when 
understood as per Treier’s definition, can be found in both Christian theology 
and science. Thus, a focus on the relationship between Christian doctrine and 
 
88 Daniel J Treier, “Doctrine,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology, eds. Ian A 
McFarland et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 146. 
89 John E Theil, “Tradition,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology, eds. Ian A 
McFarland et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 510. 
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science over the relationship between Christian tradition and science is more 
pertinent for this thesis, and in turn so is a focus on the 2007 iteration of 
Messer’s typology over the 2018 iteration. It should also be noted that I will be 
using Messer’s typology to describe the relationship between science and 
Christian theology as opposed to science and religion more widely. 
Methodology 
In each chapter of this thesis, I shall be looking at one of the five Types on 
Messer’s typology. In each case, I provide an example of that chapter’s Type 
and evaluate that example in terms of how satisfactory its formulation of the 
relationship between science and Christian theology is. A distinctive element in 
the methodology of this thesis is that I shall draw on analogies from the science 
fiction and/or fantasy genres (hereafter speculative fiction) to illustrate these 
discussions, particularly focusing on the relationship between magic and 
electronic and/or mechanical technology in those analogies. This will enable me 
to engage with the literature from a new angle and with a fresh lens. 
Both the thinkers on science-theology relations and the creators of the fictions 
are describing the same world as it is understood by humans – it is merely the 
case that the fictions are one step removed compared to the thinkers. The 
thinkers themselves are describing the world as they understand it; the fictions 
are representations of their creators’ understanding of the world. The creators 
have a certain level of freedom when exploring issues of compatibility in the 
magic/technology relationship, as compared with our thinker when exploring 
issues of compatibility in the science/Christian theology relationship. The 
creators can frame their viewpoints in fictional worlds which do not necessarily – 
and in the case of the analogies I shall be using, do not – follow the rules which 
the world described by the thinkers follow. This freedom gives them the 
opportunity to explore further, deeper, and in different ways. The differences 
between the rules of the fictional worlds and the rules of the real world allow the 
analogies to highlight certain points and areas which our thinkers cannot 
necessarily cover themselves. 
A common trope within speculative fiction is the incompatibility of magic and 
electronic/mechanical technology. In many cases, magic outright blocks 
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technology from working.90 In many other cases, fantasy is set in medieval or 
pseudo-medieval settings, where the magic extant in the world has no 
electronic/mechanical technology with which to interact.91 Similarly, in many 
science fictions, electronic/mechanical technology is rife but the world is devoid 
of magic.92 
The strained relationship between magic and technology in speculative fiction 
has interesting parallels with the (supposed) strained relationship between 
science and Christian theology outside of these fictions. As Barbour has noted, 
the conflict model receives much attention outside of academia due to its 
marketability. In the public eye, a non-conflict relationship between science and 
Christian theology is often questioned and seen as unusual. Similarly, 
speculative fictions where magic and technology are in any kind of non-conflict 
relationship with each other is often seen as an unusual occurrence. As we 
shall see in our first two analogies, where technology and magic are related to 
each other in speculative fiction there is often a sense that either one must 
completely give way for the other or one must be redefined to keep the two 
separate from each other. Yet as we shall see in our third analogy, this does not 
necessarily have to be the case. The use of these analogies will highlight 
(Chapters 1 and 2) and challenge (Chapter 3) the assumptions made by some 
of our thinkers that science and Christian theology either need to be kept apart 
from each other or in some way redefined to fit with each other. 
With respect to why I have chosen the particular analogies which I use in this 
thesis, the debate between magic and technology in these fictions is, as I shall 
show, treated similarly to how the interaction between Christian theology and 
science is depicted in the discussions I shall be entering. While they are not 
 
90 One notable example of this is in the Harry Potter book series, where it is explicitly stated that 
Hogwarts is such a magical place that ‘Muggle technology’ cannot work within the grounds of 
the school. 
91 The analogy in Chapter 1, the video game series The Elder Scrolls, portrays a pseudo-
medieval world where electronic technology does not exist and mechanical technology is 
unusual and impressive. Other examples of this type of fantasy include Lord of the Rings; A 
Song of Ice and Fire and its television adaption Game of Thrones; and The Chronicles of 
Narnia, where advanced technology is limited to Earth and the world of Narnia exists in a 
pseudo-medieval state. 
92 Science fictions which focus exclusively on electronic/mechanical technology at the expense 
of magic include Star Trek; Proxima; and Portal. 
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exactly alike, the similarities are deep enough that there is a benefit to the 
discussion. 
In Chapter 1, I shall be discussing Richard Dawkins’ ‘brand’ of New Atheism as 
an example of Type 1 on Messer’s typology. I shall focus on Dawkins’ argument 
that science can give us all the necessary knowledge about the world but can 
still afford us a sense of wonder because it contains within it an inherent ‘poetic 
wonder’. I shall argue that Dawkins has, perhaps inadvertently, created a 
pseudo-religion in doing so, and, furthermore, that this was inevitable 
considering Dawkins’ positioning on Messer’s typology.93 
I shall contrast Dawkins’ New Atheism with the Dwemer society from the video 
game series The Elder Scrolls. The Dwemer society are a remarkably 
technologically advanced race who favour science, technology, and logic over 
magic. Despite this, they end up creating their own god – the Numidium – 
powered by the magical heart of a god. Both Dawkins and the Dwemer have 
similar relationships to the organised religions of their respective realities. This 
similarity is limited in the sense that there is objective proof of the existence of 
the gods in the world of The Elder Scrolls and so Dawkins’ arguments that a 
creator God has been proven unnecessary by evolutionary theory could not be 
used by the Dwemer to discredit the existence of the gods in their world. Yet the 
derision with which Dawkins regards organised religion is analogous to the 
derision with which the Dwemer regard the religions within the world of The 
Elder Scrolls. I shall compare Dawkins’ construction of his New Atheism to the 
Dwemers’ construction of the Numidium to highlight how Dawkins’ argument 
leads him to the inadvertent creation of a pseudo-religion. 
In Chapter 2, I shall discuss the Intelligent Design Movement and its attempts to 
scientifically legitimise teleology. I shall focus on the arguments put forward by 
William Dembski and Michael Behe – those of the design inference and 
irreducible complexity respectively – and evaluate them. I shall conclude by 
 
93 It is perhaps interesting to note that Yuval Noah Harari has argued that Homo sapiens may 
be in the process of using science to upgrade themselves into gods: “In seeking bliss and 
immortality humans are in fact trying to upgrade themselves into gods. Not just because these 
are divine qualities, but because in order to overcome old age and misery humans will first have 
to acquire godlike control of their own biological substratum.” (Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: 
A Brief History of Tomorrow, [London: Vintage, 2017], 49). 
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accusing them of both that which I shall call the traditional God of the Gaps and 
of what I shall call the Ultimate God of the Gaps. 
I shall compare the work of Behe and Dembski as members of the Intelligent 
Design Movement with a discussion of magic, technology, and deity in the Thor 
franchise of the Marvel Cinematic Universe. Throughout the three Thor films, 
there is clear use of God of the Gaps arguments (although the phrase is never 
used by any of the characters). In the first film, secondary protagonist 
astrophysicist Dr Jane Foster explains the magic of Thor’s home of Asgard 
using Arthur C Clarke’s Third Law.94 Similarly, Asgard is home to a device 
called the Bifrost which affords the Asgardians faster-than-light travel; Dr Foster 
studies the Bifrost and declares it to be an Einstein-Rosen Bridge. There are 
many similar examples of where Asgardian technology is viewed by various 
characters as indicative of magic and deity, and thus something analogous to a 
God of the Gaps argument is being framed. This gives a new angle on 
instances in which Intelligent Design thinkers such as Michael Behe and William 
Dembski put forth their own God of the Gaps arguments. I shall also show how 
they transcend the traditional God of the Gaps (which is the kind of God of the 
Gaps which we see in the Thor franchise) and commit the Ultimate God of the 
Gaps fallacy. 
Chapter 3 contains the main thrust of my argument: that there is a way to hold 
both science and Christian theology authentically in the same worldview. I shall 
focus on the works of John Polkinghorne, who argues for a synthesis of science 
and Christian theology. 
My analogy for Chapter 3 is the video game Final Fantasy XV, though I shall 
also reference its midquel movie, Kingsglaive: Final Fantasy XV. The events of 
the Final Fantasy XV universe take place on the world of Eos, where the four 
main countries, Lucis, Accordo, Tenebrae, and Niflheim, have all experienced 
Industrial Revolutions but magic is still a part of the universe. The universe is 
built in such a way that magic and technology are compatible with each other 
and have a healthy relationship with each other. In some cases, they even 
complement each other. The almost seamless synthesis between magic and 
technology which can be found in the world of Final Fantasy XV will be shown 
 
94 Thor, directed by Kenneth Branagh. (2011; Hollywood, California: Paramount Pictures), Film. 
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to be analogous to the portrayal of the relationship between science and 
Christian theology which Polkinghorne puts forward. 
This use of analogy does, however, have its limitations. Science is not the same 
as technology, and technology does not necessarily function the same way in 
the worlds of my analogies as science does in the world which the thinkers I 
shall be discussing are describing. More problematic is the analogy of religion 
and Christian theology as magic. Considering that I shall be focusing solely on 
Christian theology, which has a negative view of magic, the analogy of the two 
could cause issues. Furthermore, all the fictional worlds I shall be using as my 
analogies contain religion, theology, and deities alongside magic – or, at least, 
the idea of religion, theology, and deity, as is the case with the Thor franchise. 
By my use of such analogies, I do not wish to equate Christian theology with 
magic; magic is a different ontological reality from religion and theology in both 
the fictional worlds I shall be discussing and in the world which the thinkers I 
shall be discussing describe, just as science is a different ontological reality to 
technology on both sides of my analogies. Yet this is not to say that magic and 
religion or Christian theology share the same relationship as science and 
technology do. Technology as I shall be discussing it is a product of science, 
but magic as I shall be discussing it is not a product of religion and/or theology. 
Magic and religion/theology are not connected in the same way as science and 
technology are on either side of my analogies. My purpose in this thesis is to 
investigate the two relationships on either side of my analogies in contrast to the 
other: on the side of my fictional analogies, the relationship between technology 
and magic; on the other side, the relationship between science and 
religion/Christian theology. Science and technology are not meant to be taken 
as identical to each other in respect of which side of the analogy they are being 
discussed, nor are magic and Christian theology. They are analogous to each 
other, but not identical to each other. 
In my conclusion, I shall sum up all three of my chapters and reveal that just as 
there is no necessary tension between magic and technology in speculative 
fiction, there is no necessary tension between science and Christian theology. 
Ultimately, I shall propose that Type 3 on Messer’s typology offers the most 
satisfactory understanding of the relationship between science and Christian 
doctrine in the contemporary West and will agree with Polkinghorne’s iteration 
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Chapter 1 – Richard Dawkins’ 
Numidium 
Introduction 
Neil Messer identifies five Types along his spectrum, ranging from where one 
trusts science completely and dismisses Christian doctrine, to where one trusts 
Christian doctrine completely and dismisses science.95 In this chapter, I shall be 
discussing the first of these five Types, which Messer identifies with two of the 
key members of the New Atheist movement: Daniel Dennett and Richard 
Dawkins.96 
As Stephen Bullivant notes, two types of atheism can be identified: positive 
atheism and negative atheism. Negative atheism is where the atheist does not 
dispute the existence of a personal God, but rather maintains that she has no 
faith. Positive atheism is where the atheist does not believe in the existence of a 
personal God at all.97 While the most influential atheist thinkers can be found 
among the canon of the nineteenth century, those which John F. Haught 
describes as the ‘old atheists’,98 a newer atheistic movement has made itself 
known in that decade affectionally referred to as the ‘Noughties’.  
The term ‘New Atheist’ first appeared in 2006, following the publication of 
Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion,99 in which he argued for a form of positive 
atheism.100 Nearly a decade and a half later, it remains the most influential New 
Atheist text. Thus, while Messer focuses on Dennett’s work as an example of 
Type 1 and only uses Dawkins to illustrate his points, the superior influence of 
Dawkins’ work over Dennett’s makes him more pertinent to this chapter’s 
 
95 Neil Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and Ethical Reflections on 
Evolution and Biology, (London: SCM Press, 2007), 49-50. 
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97 Stephen Bullivant, “Defining ‘Atheism’,” in The Oxford Handbook of Atheism, eds. Stephen 
Bullivant and Michael Ruse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 14-15. See also: Stephen 
Bullivant and Michael Ruse, “Introduction: The Study of Atheism,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
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question: Does Dawkins’ New Atheism provide us with a satisfactory 
formulation of the relationship between science and Christian theology in the 
contemporary West? 
I should at this point make some clarifications. Throughout this chapter, and 
indeed throughout this thesis, I shall be referring to science and religion without 
much further explanation of the terms. In his Faraday Paper, Denis Alexander 
offers definitions for both.101 For the former, he maintains that when 
contemporary writers use the word, they are referring to experimental science. I, 
too, shall use this definition. On the matter of religion, he gives the following 
definition: “‘a system of beliefs relating to transcendent realities concerning 
purpose and meaning in the world, expressed in social practices’”.102 I shall 
follow this definition, with the following amendment: that such a system of 
beliefs has the potential to be expressed in social practices. A cult with 
‘members’ who adhere to the cult’s ideology but who do not meet (either 
virtually or physically) as adherents to the cult’s ideology is still, I would argue, a 
form of cult.103 
Second, I shall be referring to self-transcendence throughout this chapter, which 
I shall be using to describe the effort to elevate oneself to the position of full 
appreciation of the cosmos. Joann Conn distinguishes between philosophical 
self-transcendence and religious self-transcendence. The philosophical self-
transcendence makes a distinction between the material and the spiritual, “the 
spiritual being understood as that capacity for self-transcendence through 
knowledge and love which characterises the human being as a person”, so that 
self-transcendence in a philosophical respect need only consist of a 
transcendence beyond the material to the spiritual. Religious self-
transcendence denotes self-transcendence as inherently relational, particularly 
in respect of the individual’s personal relationship with God, so that religious 
 
101 Denis R Alexander, “Models for Relating Science and Religion.” Faraday Papers no.3 
(2007), Accessed October 24, 2017. URL: https://www.faraday.st-
edmunds.cam.ac.uk/resources/Faraday%20Papers/Faraday%20Paper%203%20Alexander_EN
.pdf. 
102 Ibid, 1. 
103 I am using the word ‘cult’ here to refer to religious ideologies, though it is conceivable that 
other forms of cult which can be described using this definition are possible (such as political 
cults). Indeed, Yuval Noah Harari has argued that political ideologies such as communism and 
Nazism can be considered religions, particularly when using the definition of religion which he 




self-transcendence consists of a developing relationship between and individual 
and God, the deepening of which is the process of self-transcendence.104 For 
the purposes of this chapter, I shall be referring to philosophical rather than 
religious self-transcendence. Where the seekers of self-transcendence in this 
chapter, Dawkins and the Dwemer, are conducting their attempts to this end, 
they are not seeking to improve their relationship with any god or deity; rather, 
they are attempting to ‘rise above’ the material and enter the ‘spiritual’ (or 
supernatural) domain. Of course, in Dawkins’ case, he perceives no spiritual 
domain for him to enter, and so Dawkins’ self-transcendence is more 
psychological than literal, whereas the opposite is true for the Dwemer. 
Dawkins’ self-transcendence is that which Mark E Koltko-Rivera reminds his 
readers as being the oft overlooked sixth tier of Maslow’s famous Hierarchy of 
Needs, whereby the individual “Seeks to further a cause beyond the self and to 
experience a communion beyond the boundaries of the self through peak 
experience”.105 This remains a form of philosophical self-transcendence for two 
reasons: a) this type of self-transcendence lacks the relational element of 
religious self-transcendence as described by Conn; and b) this type of self-
transcendence is concerned with a transcendence from the material to the 
physical, which is typical of philosophical self-transcendence as Conn has 
defined it. 
Finally, I have described New Atheism as a ‘movement’. This is debated, as the 
other three key texts of New Atheism – God is Not Great by Christopher 
Hitchens (2008), The End of Faith by Sam Harris (2006), and Breaking the Spell 
by the philosopher Daniel C Dennett (2007) – were referred to as New Atheist 
texts because of The God Delusion.106 Furthermore, at no point do these writers 
claim to be part of a movement. They are making their own, albeit similar, 
arguments, though the differences between them are enough to give one pause 
as to whether they are in fact consciously ‘working as one’. Indeed, it would 
seem clear by their own admission that they are not.107 This is in stark contrast 
 
104 Joann Wolksi Conn, “Spirituality,” in The New Dictionary of Theology, eds. Joseph A 
Komonchak, Mary Collins, Dermot A Lane (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1990), 981. 
105 Mark E Koltko-Rivera, “Rediscovering the Later Version of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: 
Self-Transcendence and Opportunities for Theory, Research, and Unification.” Review of 
General Psychology 10, no. 4 (2006): 303. 
106 Zenk, “New Atheism,” 251. 
107 Zenk references a debate held between the four ‘heads’ of the New Atheist ‘movement’, 
during which none of them used the term New Atheism (Zenk, “New Atheism,” 254). 
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to the Intelligent Design Movement, the focus of Chapter 2, where its members 
are explicitly working towards a single goal. Because of this, I shall refer 
throughout this chapter to Dawkins’ New Atheism, to distinguish it from the New 
Atheism of the other three writers. If one is to see Dawkins’ New Atheism as a 
distinct position, then its key text is The God Delusion. The work of decades 
comes to a head in this text, where all the atheistic arguments which have 
peppered Dawkins’ works since the 1970s are condensed into one. 
A friend of my mother was concerned when she discovered that I would be 
reading Richard Dawkins. She feared for my spirituality, that I would ‘lose my 
religion’. Indeed, this appears to be what Richard Dawkins wants: in The God 
Delusion he declares his hope that “religious readers who open it will be 
atheists when they put it down”.108 This statement would seem rather 
evangelistic, but such religious motifs are not uncommon in Dawkins’ New 
Atheism. Zenk describes two scholarly reactions to New Atheism: the first being 
that New Atheism is nothing more than a scientific critique of religion;109 the 
second being that New Atheism is itself a form of religion, albeit a pseudo-
religion.110 This is the view I shall take in this chapter. Perhaps then, my 
mother’s friend should have been less concerned that I would lose religion, but 
rather that I would lose my faith in Christian theology. 
I shall develop this idea that Dawkins in fact gives rise to a substitute religion by 
comparing Dawkins’ New Atheism to the Dwemer society from The Elder 
Scrolls video game series. I shall begin by providing the reader with the 
necessary information about the Dwemer to understand the analogy I am 
making; after this, I shall compare the narrative of the Dwemers’ history to 
Dawkins’ methodology, with the aim of revealing that just as the Dwemer 
created their own religion based on science, technology, and logic with their 
own god, called the Numidium, with the ultimate aim of achieving self-
transcendence, so too has Dawkins created his own religion, albeit perhaps 
inadvertently; finally, I shall discuss Dawkins’ New Atheism as a typical 
expression of Type 1 on Messer’s typology and argue that his construction of 
 
108 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, (London: Transworld Publishers, 2006), 28. 
109 Zenk, “New Atheism,” 252. 
110 Ibid, 253. 
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New Atheism as a pseudo-religion analogous to that of the Dwemer is 
inevitable. 
I shall be focusing on the following of Dawkins’ texts: The Blind Watchmaker 
(1986), River Out of Eden (1995), Unweaving the Rainbow (1999), A Devil’s 
Chaplain (2004),111 The God Delusion (2006), and The Magic of Reality 
(2011).112 
The Story of the Dwemer 
In this section, I shall compare the story of the Dwemer to Dawkins’ 
methodology. There are two main areas of the Dwemer’s story which I shall use 
to discuss Dawkins’ New Atheism: the discovery of the Heart of Lorkhan, and 
the construction of the Numidium. 
The Elder Scrolls series is a series of video games developed by Bethesda 
Game Studios and published by Bethesda Softworks.113 At the time of writing, it 
consists of five main titles and several spin-off titles. To understand the story of 
the Dwemer and why it is useful as an analogy in discussing Dawkins’ New 
Atheism, we must delve into the lore of The Elder Scrolls series. 
The games take place on the continent of Tamriel, on the planet Nirn, on the 
mortal plane of Mundus. Tamriel consists of nine provinces, though for the 
purposes of this discussion we need only concern ourselves with one, called 
Morrowind.114 Furthermore, Mundus is not the only plane of existence within the 
cosmology: there exist also Aetherius and Oblivion. 
 
111 A Devil’s Chaplain is a collection of essays, and as such I shall be discussing the arguments 
of each essay separately when appropriate. 
112 Alongside my academic sources, I shall refer to pages from the website The Elder Scrolls 
Wiki. This website is an online encyclopaedia of information relating to the world of The Elder 
Scrolls, and so has been useful in gathering the necessary information about the Dwemer. I 
shall also be using relatively similar sources for my other analogies in Chapters 2 and 3. 
113 Since I began work on this project, Bethesda Game Studios and Bethesda Softworks have 
been involved in several controversies surrounding their latest video game release, Fallout 76 
(November 2018) and merchandise relating to that release. In using an example from The Elder 
Scrolls series in my thesis, I am not endorsing or condoning anything that has been done by 
either the publisher (Bethesda Softworks) or the developer (Bethesda Game Studios) of both 
The Elder Scrolls series and of Fallout 76. For a comprehensive and detailed overview of the 
controversies surrounding Fallout 76, see: Coach Toolshed Gaming. “The Fallout 76 Saga.” 
YouTube. Video playlist. Accessed May 2019. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6uo6gGIUrcw&list=PLEb60ZWLR0hUQB131l-
BnGVRErrJ4bUPI). 
114 Later in the chapter, I will make a passing reference to events which occur in another 
province of Tamriel called Skyrim. 
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The creation of Mundus plays a vital part in the story of the Dwemer. Before 
Mundus existed, there were only immortal and celestial beings known as the 
et’Ada.115 One such et’Ada was Lorkhan, who made the initial decision to create 
a mortal plane which would become Mundus.116 Lorkhan persuaded other 
et’Ada to help him create Mundus. Yet it became apparent during the creation 
process that the et’Ada creating Mundus would have to give up some of their 
own power in order to form the new plane of existence.117 After this revelation, 
some abandoned the project.  
Many et’Ada were furious with Lorkhan for neglecting to inform them of this 
caveat of creation. They tried Lorkhan at an event known as the Convention118 
and executed him, ripping out his heart and throwing it down to Nirn. It landed at 
the base of Red Mountain, a volcano in Morrowind.119 
Once the creation of Mundus and Nirn was complete, life upon the mortal plane 
began to flourish. There are three ‘groups’ of races on Tamriel: the beast races, 
the Mer (elven) races, and the races of Man. The Dwemer were a Mer race.120 
Another elven race is important for this story: the Chimer, who resided in 
Morrowind with the Dwemer.121 
The Dwemer were a massively technological race. They were far more 
advanced in this respect than any other race on Nirn, and achieved much 
through their concentration on science and logic rather than magic and the 
gods, to the point where the Chimer believed that the Dwemer worshipped 
these things.122 Contributors to The Elder Scrolls Wiki theorise that the Dwemer 
sought self-transcendence for their entire race, with the aspiration of gaining the 
 
115 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors. “Et’Ada.” In The Elder Scrolls Wiki. n.d. Accessed 
December 12, 2017. http://elderscrolls.wikia.com/wiki/Et'Ada. 
116 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors. “Lorkhan.” In The Elder Scrolls Wiki. n.d. Accessed 
December 7, 2017. http://elderscrolls.wikia.com/wiki/Lorkhan. 
117 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors. “Dwemer.” In The Elder Scrolls Wiki. n.d. Accessed 
December 7, 2017. http://elderscrolls.wikia.com/wiki/Dwemer. 
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119 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Lorkhan.” 
120 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Dwemer.” 
121 Raptomeat. “The Definitive Guide to the Dwemer.” The Imperial Library. Accessed 
December 2017. https://www.imperial-library.info/content/definitive-guide-dwemer. 




immortality of the et’Ada: “Most of the Dwemer wished to ascend to the same 
level of divine power that the Gods had”.123 
The turning point of the Dwemer’s narrative was when Kagrenac, a Dwemer 
Tonal Architect124 with power, influence, and resources, discovered the Heart of 
Lorkhan within Red Mountain.125 He deduced that it was the heart of a god, and 
believed that it could serve the Dwemer in their quest for self-transcendence: 
“the Dwemer were pursuing the goal of attaining divinity through the combined 
effort of magic and science, and their High Priest Kagrenac believed that 
Lorkhan's Heart was the key”.126 Kagrenac built a golem known as the 
Numidium, “a massive artificial god” also known as the Brass God, which “was 
designed to help [the Dwemer] gain the divine power of immortality and 
transcend Nirn” and would be powered by the Heart of Lorkhan.127 He also 
created three tools, Keening, Sunder, and Wraithguard, as a means of 
manipulating the Heart.128 
When the Chimer received news of the construction of the Numidium, they saw 
it as an affront to their religious beliefs and went to war with the Dwemer.129 The 
war came to a head at The Battle of Red Mountain, during which Kagrenac 
used his three tools on the Heart of Lorkhan,130 and when he did so, the entire 
Dwemer race disappeared from the face of Nirn.131 
In the fiction, the disappearance of the Dwemer has been a much-debated topic 
by Tamrielic scholars in the thousands of years that have passed since The 
Battle of Red Mountain. Many theories have surfaced, both within the world of 
The Elder Scrolls and without, about what happened to the Dwemer and where 
 
123 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Dwemer” (sic). 
124 Dwemer Tonal Architects were mage-engineers and craftsmen (The Elder Scrolls Wiki 
contributors, “Tonal Architect.” In The Elder Scrolls Wiki. n.d. Accessed December 7, 2017. 
http://elderscrolls.wikia.com/wiki/Tonal_Architect.) 
125 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Dwemer.” 
126 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Lorkhan.” 
127 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Dwemer.” 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Dwemer.”; The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “War of 
the First Council.” In The Elder Scrolls Wiki. n.d. Accessed December 7, 2017. 
http://elderscrolls.wikia.com/wiki/War_of_the_First_Council; The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, 
“Disappearance of the Dwarves.” In The Elder Scrolls Wiki. n.d. Accessed December 7, 2017. 
http://elderscrolls.wikia.com/wiki/Disappearance_of_the_Dwarves; Gilvus Barelo, “Kagrenac’s 
Tools.” The Imperial Library. Accessed December 2017. https://www.imperial-
library.info/content/kagrenacs-tools. 
131 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Dwemer.” 
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they might be now.132 Whatever came to pass will likely never be fully 
discerned, but it is the events leading up to their disappearance, when the 
Dwemer attempted self-transcendence through manipulation of an old god by 
the tools of science, logic, and reason, that are most relevant to the task at 
hand. 
Dawkins’ Numidium 
The Dwemer rejected the gods of Nirn in much the same way as Dawkins 
rejects the gods of Earth’s religions. While he usually focuses on the Abrahamic 
God in his writings, it is clear that he abhors all forms of divine being and would 
almost certainly reject the gods of The Elder Scrolls were he to live on Nirn. The 
key difference between these two cases is, of course, that there is hard 
evidence and objective proof for the existence of the gods within The Elder 
Scrolls universe,133 as is a staple of the fantasy genre. As such, I shall be 
discussing the parallels between the Dwemers’ construction of the Numidium 
and Dawkins’ construction of his New Atheism. 
Discovering the Heart of Lorkhan 
The Dwemer had already begun their search for philosophical self-
transcendence by the time they discovered the Heart of Lorkhan within Red 
Mountain. The discovery of the Heart showed Kagrenac how the ambitions of 
his race might be realised. Similarly, Dawkins is already on a search for self-
transcendence when he writes Unweaving the Rainbow, and the book is a 
detailed explanation of how one might achieve such self-transcendence without 
God, religion, or theism i.e. through the wonders of science. It is this message 
that flows through the entire book, and to which he returns in The Magic of 
Reality. 
Dawkins is explicit and detailed about his views of the poetry of science, and 
laments that science is all too often accused of “barren desolation, of promoting 
 
132 For a detailed account on all the theories surrounding the disappearance of the Dwemer, 
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an arid and joyless message”.134 He argues that the opposite is in fact the truth: 
“Science is, or ought to be, the inspiration for great poetry”.135 The reason 
behind this is that science has the unique power to unravel mysteries in such a 
way that the solution is more beautiful – more poetic – than the mystery itself 
ever was.136 
Each chapter in The Magic of Reality is structured in much the same way: first, 
Dawkins explains what kind of phenomenon he will be tackling (for example, 
stars, extra-terrestrial life, the cycle of day and night etc.), then gives an 
example of a myth which attempts to explain that phenomenon. He then goes 
on to explain the science behind the phenomenon which ‘discredits’ the myth 
and concludes that the truth is more beautiful than the myth could ever be, 
simply because it is true. 
When the Dwemer discovered the Heart of Lorkhan in Red Mountain, Kagrenac 
realised that it would be the path to the Dwemers’ self-transcendence and 
worked on it to achieve that goal. In Dawkins’ case, the work has already been 
done – the rainbow has already been unwoven. What remains is for him to 
convince the rest of us that he truly has the path to self-transcendence. And so, 
he constructs his works: his ‘Numidium’. 
Constructing the Numidium 
The construction of the Numidium led to war between the Dwemer and the 
Chimer because the Chimer saw the Numidium as a blasphemous god.137 And 
also Richard Dawkins’ New Atheism presents to the world another god.138 
What, then, does Dawkins’ god look like? What is his Numidium? 
I would argue that Dawkins’ ‘Numidium’ is science itself. Where the Dwemer 
constructed their Numidium themselves and used the Heart of Lorkhan to power 
it, Dawkins has found the shell of a Numidium and transformed it into his own 
Brass God by powering it with his own ‘Heart of Lorkhan’, poetic wonder. Zenk 
has mentioned that some critics of New Atheism present the movement as a 
 
134 Richard Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder, 
(London: Penguin, 1999), xi. 
135 Ibid, xii. 
136 Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow, 41; Richard Dawkins, The Magic of Reality, (London: 
Transworld Publishers, 2011), 22, 87. 
137 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Dwemer.” 
138 I shall not discuss here whether Dawkins’ god can be itself considered blasphemous as that 
question lies beyond the focus of this study. 
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pseudo-religion: “According to this logic, the science at the bottom of the ‘neo-
atheist’ criticism of religion is no longer regarded as science but rather as an 
(unacknowledged) ideology or religion”.139 To say that science is an ideology is 
to compare science to the myths with which Dawkins opens each chapter of 
The Magic of Reality. I am reluctant to make this equation and would rather say 
that what Dawkins proposes is the fusion of science and poetry together and 
the ‘worship’ of the resultant amalgamation, and this is what it means for 
Dawkins’ New Atheism to be a pseudo-religion.140 Where theists speak of 
religious experiences and the wonder of them that draws them to God, Dawkins 
speaks of the poetry of science which brings him to science-inspired atheism. 
Unweaving the Rainbow and The Magic of Reality are dedicated to evangelising 
Dawkins’ New Atheism. He spends much of the former arguing that science 
should be conducted through a sense of wonder. Indeed, this sense of wonder 
should be the only inspiration behind doing science in the first place.141  
Dawkins also puts forth the thesis that poetry should be inspired by science; the 
road, it would seem, goes both ways: 
“It is my thesis that the spirit of wonder which led Blake to Christian 
mysticism, Keats to Arcadian myth and Yeats to Fenians and fairies, is 
the very same spirit that moves great scientists; a spirit which, if fed back 
to poets in scientific guise, might inspire still greater poetry”.142 
Indeed, Dawkins says, there are some parts of reality which can only be 
understood through poetry. He speaks of the ‘time’ before the Big Bang, when 
time did not exist. We mere mortals cannot conceive of such a ‘time’, and so we 
can only appreciate the wonder of such a reality through the medium of 
poetry.143 To appreciate the beauty of the universe, one need not look to 
traditional religion, God, or theism: one need only pair together science and 
poetry.144 
In the first chapter of The Magic of Reality, Dawkins defines magic thus: there 
are three kinds of magic – supernatural magic, stage magic, and poetic magic. 
 
139 Zenk, “New Atheism,” 253. 
140 I shall discuss this further when I discuss my suspicion that Dawkins’ pseudo-religious New 
Atheism was an inevitability when he was constructing his New Atheism in the manner he did. 
141 Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow, xiv. 
142 Ibid, 27. 
143 Ibid, 60. 
144 Ibid, 313. 
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Stage magic is nothing more than prestidigitation, while supernatural magic 
does not exist at all. The only ‘real’ form of magic is poetic magic. This, he 
writes, is the titular ‘magic of reality’.145 It is, therefore, the poetic magic afforded 
to us by science which enables us to transcend our mortal lives, rather than the 
supernatural magic afforded to us by theism and religion. The traditional gods 
cannot give us our self-transcendence; we must construct our own. 
The theistic wonder offered to us by religion, therefore, is only a reflection of the 
poetic wonder of which Dawkins speaks. Where theistic wonder exists only as a 
reflection of the poetic wonder, poetic wonder is true and exists in the real world 
which we all experience. In drawing this parallel, Dawkins has afforded poetic 
wonder the properties of eternity and worship-worthiness which would usually 
be ascribed to the divine. 
A key difference between the object of theistic wonder and the object of 
Dawkins’ poetic wonder is that the object of theistic wonder is classically 
defined by necessary existence and the object of Dawkins’ poetic wonder is 
classically defined by contingency (i.e. the laws of science do have to be the 
way that they are in this universe, but a universe where the laws of science 
were different from those which we experience is still logically conceivable). 
One might therefore question why the object of Dawkins’ poetic wonder is 
eternal and worship-worthy in the same way that the object of theistic wonder is. 
I would say that Dawkins would ascribe these properties to science as the 
object of poetic wonder as they are necessarily true in this universe, despite 
that they are contingently true in any given universe. We do not live in a 
universe with other laws and this universe could never have other laws, so from 
our ‘perspective’, the laws of science to which Dawkins ascribes eternity and 
worship-worthiness are as necessary as God is as the object of theistic wonder. 
Like Kagrenac, Dawkins has taken a sense of wonder (the Heart of Lorkhan), 
manipulated it using his own methodology (Keening, Sunder, and Wraithguard), 
and used it to power his New Atheist Numidium. As the Dwemer sought to form 
their own self-transcendence through technology, Dawkins seeks to form his 
own through science. Yet neither the Dwemer nor Dawkins can use either 
technology or science to achieve their self-transcendence. Both must introduce 
 
145 Dawkins, The Magic of Reality, 19-21. 
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a factor which contains features of the divine (for Dawkins, it is the eternal and 
worship-worthy poetic wonder of science; for the Dwemer, it is the literal heart 
of a divine being) before it is sufficient for the intended purpose; for the 
Dwemer, this was the Heart of Lorkhan, and for Dawkins, it is the poetic wonder 
of science. 
It is here we see the inconsistency of Dawkins’ methodology. Dawkins wishes to 
eradicate an appeal to the supernatural and immaterial, but as we have seen, 
he is unable to fully escape appeal to a form of the divine. He can only achieve 
his goal through a phenomenon to which he ascribes divine attributes, as the 
Dwemer could only bring their Brass God to life with the Heart of Lorkhan. In 
attempting to establish the non-existence of God, Dawkins has merely replaced 
the Abrahamic God with a form of divinity that is, to him, more palatable. 
Not only this, but Dawkins has effectively replaced those religions which he 
feels are dangerous to society (a view which I shall discuss in the next part of 
this chapter) with his own. It may be at the point of my writing this thesis that 
Dawkins does not have any other disciples to join him but, as I have already 
said, a cult merely requires the potential to be expressed in social practices to 
be a cult, and the potential for such social expression is present in Dawkins’ 
New Atheism.146 
There are, however, differences between the endeavours of the Dwemer and of 
Dawkins. For the former, self-transcendence included gaining immortality, 
whereas Dawkins does not seek to extend his mortal life.147 For the Dwemer, 
self-transcendence was to gain the powers of the et-Ada, one of which powers 
was immortality. For Dawkins, there is no such immortal being whose 
everlasting qualities he envies, and so his position is one that does not include 
a desire for immortality. 
 
146 One way this might happen is through cultists holding meetings to ruminate on the poetic 
wonder of science, perhaps reading or even writing poetry inspired by the natural world as 
revealed by natural science. 
147 There are, however, many who would seek to use science to gain a kind of immortality 
through the method of Whole Brain Emulation (WBE). Shanahan describes WBE as: the 
attempt “to make an exact working copy (or copies) of a particular brain in a nonbiological (e.g., 
computational) substrate”, whereby a brain is scanned, artificially simulated, then embodied in a 
robotic structure. See: Murray Shanahan, The Technological Singularity, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2015), 15-50. 
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We have seen that the Dwemer were not successful in their attempts to achieve 
self-transcendence until they had discovered the Heart of Lorkhan – that is, until 
they had discovered some element of the divine. Is Dawkins similarly compelled 
to include something akin to or possessing some of the qualities of divinity to 
‘power’ his New Atheism?148 
Inevitability of Pseudo-Religion 
In the previous section of this chapter, I argued that Dawkins has structured his 
New Atheism in such a way as to present science as a form of pseudo-religion. 
In this half of the chapter, I want to examine why Dawkins’ self-positioning, in 
effect, in Type 1 of Messer’s typology (where theology is disregarded in favour 
of science) makes it far more difficult for Dawkins to construct his argument in 
such a way that his New Atheism does not become a pseudo-religion.149 Once 
again, I shall be drawing on the story of the Dwemer from The Elder Scrolls 
video game series to illustrate this argument. 
I explained the story of the Dwemer above and how the construction of the 
Numidum can be compared and contrasted with Dawkins’ construction of his 
New Atheism.  
This assumes that Dawkins’ intentions are the same as those of the Dwemer – 
that is, that Dawkins seeks philosophical self-transcendence (or, at least, a form 
of self-transcendence). It is not obvious that Dawkins would explain his 
motivations in this way. As we shall see when I discuss some of his individual 
arguments below, Dawkins is usually attempting to reveal the issues and 
fallacies with religion and religious belief. His intention is not to self-transcend 
per se, but to truncate those areas which are detrimental to society and the self 
from our everyday lives. Self-transcendence is not a necessary component of 
this endeavour. Where Dawkins does slip into desire for self-transcendence 
analogous with those same desires of the Dwemer is in his use of poetic 
 
148 It is perhaps interesting to note that Dawkins has said that “one could make a reasonably 
respectable case” for a deist god – which he describes as “God of the physicists”, “God the 
mathematician” – but that he would not accept that case. (See: 2sedated. “Richard Dawkins – 
Deist position is a very serious one.” YouTube. Video file. November 8 2012. Accessed March 
6. 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f7kjNu9CUw0.) It would seem, from these 
comments, that Dawkins regards deism as a more respectable and defendable position than 
theism, but that deism is still less convincing than atheism. 
149 Although, as I have mentioned previously, Messer does reference Dawkins in his discussion 
of his Type 1, but only as an illustration; his focus when discussing his Type 1 is Dennett. 
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wonder to replace the same transcendent wonder that is often gained through 
and from religious belief. 
Dawkins reveals that Unweaving the Rainbow was written with the Keatsian 
rebuttal of Newton in mind:150 that Keats was wrong to say that Newton had 
taken the wonder out of the rainbow by explaining how the refraction of light can 
split the spectrum. Dawkins’ understanding of Keats’ feelings on Newton’s work 
is that Keats felt that Newton had taken the wonder out of the rainbow and thus 
left a void in its place; without that sense of wonder, something is missing from 
the human experience of the natural world. In Unweaving the Rainbow, 
Dawkins argues against this notion. 
Yet he is only arguing against the first part of Keats’ argument: that Newton had 
taken the wonder out of the rainbow by providing a scientific explanation for its 
existence. Dawkins does not argue against the notion that when that sense of 
wonder is removed from the human experience of the natural world something 
necessary and important goes missing. Dawkins still believes that wonder is 
necessarily a part of the human experience of the natural world; he merely says 
that the scientific explanations of the natural world do not detract from that 
wonder. The religiously-inspired wonder Keats longs for and feels Newton 
denied him is replaced, in Dawkins’ argument, with the scientifically-inspired 
wonder which is his ‘magic of reality’. Dawkins still needs a sense of wonder 
when the religious has been taken away and he finds it in science itself. Thus, 
Dawkins has inserted his scientific wonder into his New Atheism to perform the 
same function as religiously-inspired wonder would for a theist. As such, I would 
argue that Dawkins’ New Atheism is a form of (pseudo-)religion where those 
parts of traditional religion with which Dawkins takes issue have been removed 
and replaced with parts which perform the same function for the individual but 
which are more palatable to Dawkins himself. 
Dawkins is adamant that he is not attempting to form a religion himself. He is 
not calling people to follow him as religious people follow a religious leader. He 
is not calling anyone to believe in his ideology as religious people believe in 
their religious ideology. Dawkins’ New Atheism is an ideology in much the same 
way that Communism is a political ideology and Pentecostalism is a religious 
 
150 Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow, xii. 
47 
 
ideology. Even though ideologies function in similar ways to each other, the 
qualification of that ideology depends on several factors. What makes Dawkins’ 
New Atheism closer to a religious ideology than any other kind of ideology? 
I would say the answer can be found in Dawkins’ asking science to perform the 
same personal function as religion does in the lives of many theists. Where a 
theist may look to the divine and those aspects of reality which are religiously 
available to them in their quest for transcendence, the Dawkinsian New Atheist 
looks to the poetic wonder of science, as Dawkins describes it to be. The 
engagement with and reaction to this poetic wonder is the same for both the 
theist and the New Atheist. They are, after all, experiencing the same kind of 
thing (i.e. the natural world); the only real difference is that the theist is ascribing 
their poetic wonder to the divine, where the New Atheist is ascribing that poetic 
wonder to the natural world as explained and explored by the natural sciences. 
Just as the Numidium plays the part of affording transcendence to the Dwemer 
as the other gods worshipped on Nirn do for their respective worshippers, so 
too does science play the same part of affording transcendence to Dawkins as 
gods worshipped on Earth do for theists. In constructing his New Atheism in this 
way, Dawkins runs into the problem (at least, he would see it as a problem) of 
ending up with a religious sensibility, albeit adhering to an atheistic pseudo-
religion.151 
A discussion of Dawkins on religion in society 
It is perhaps worth noting at this point a crucial difference between Dawkins and 
the Dwemer: that being that the Dwemer did not have a problem with the 
concept of religion in and of itself; they merely did not wish to worship the gods 
that were ‘on offer’, as it were. Dawkins, on the other hand, believes that there 
is a real problem and danger with the phenomenon of religion, and dedicates 
large portions of his works to these ideas. 
 
151 I offer an interesting passage from The God Delusion about Dawkins’ perceptions of his own 
religiosity: 
 
“Let me sum up Einsteinian religion in one more quotation from Einstein himself: ‘To 
sense that behind anything that can be experienced there is a something that our mind 
cannot grasp and whose beauty and sublimity reaches us only indirectly and as a feeble 
reflection, this is religiousness. In this sense I am religious.’ In this sense I too am 
religious, with the reservation that ‘cannot grasp’ does not have to mean ‘forever 
ungraspable.’ But I prefer not to call myself religious because it is misleading. It is 
destructively misleading because, for the vast majority of people, ‘religion’ implies 
‘supernatural’.” (Dawkins, The God Delusion, 40 [sic].) 
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I shall explain and evaluate several of the arguments Dawkins gives against the 
phenomenon of religion. This will highlight Dawkins’ claim that religion is a real 
danger within contemporary Western society as well as discuss some of the 
more intricate and intimate pitfalls in Dawkins’ arguments for his version of New 
Atheism. 
First, Dawkins accuses religious believers of being content with ignorance, as 
religion encourages them to be.152 He accuses religion of driving people to do 
nonsensical things,153 and finally, he deems it childish to believe anything other 
than that one’s “life is as meaningful, as full and as wonderful as [one] choose[s] 
to make it”.154 
Dawkins ignores the generally accepted fact that religion has inspired many 
scientists to discover as much as they can about the world and the universe, the 
most famous example of which being Isaac Newton, as already mentioned. In 
this case, as in the case with many other religious scientists, religion did not 
encourage ignorance but was the inspiration behind a search for knowledge. 
Lastly, I do not see why one should be discouraged from looking outside of 
oneself to find meaning in one’s life. I am also sceptical of the importance 
Dawkins places on ‘maturity’ as opposed to ‘childishness’, given the lack of 
evidence for either the reality or the severity of the latter’s supposedly inherent 
flaws. 
Similarly, in The Magic of Reality, he discusses the story of Adam and Eve as it 
appears in Genesis 2 and 3, and YHWH’s anger at the primeval couple for 
eating of the fruit of the tree of good and evil. Dawkins claims that YHWH’s 
anger is due to Adam and Eve acquiring knowledge, or “losing their innocence, I 
suppose”.155 The use of the words ‘I suppose’ highlight one of the main issues 
common to all of Dawkins’ direct commentary on theology: that Dawkins has 
neither the knowledge of these matters, nor the desire to learn about them.156 
 
152 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 152. 
153 Ibid, 351. 
154 Ibid, 404. 
155 Dawkins, The Magic of Reality, 36. 
156 Ward has commented on Dawkins’ past refusals to acknowledge theology as a discipline 
and his ignorance thereof. See: Keith Ward, Why There Almost Certainly is a God: Doubting 
Dawkins, (Oxford: Lion, 2008), 7-8. 
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He thus offers his own interpretation and commentary thereof with no 
discussion of any other possible interpretations. 
Second, Dawkins claims that the only morality which religion encourages is that 
inspired by the fear of the punishment that would be brought on them by the 
wrath of God should they transgress His will.157 Thus, the religious are faking 
their morality, while atheists are accused of immorality despite there being no 
evidence to support such a claim.158 On the contrary, Dawkins argues, religion 
is itself a strong motivator to immorality. It would be pointless to wage a war in 
the name of atheism, but there have been many wars fought in the name of 
religion.159 Furthermore, theism motivates terrorism, for the atrocities of the 11th 
September 2001 would not have been possible if it were not for religion and the 
belief in an afterlife, and terrorists use a religiously-motivated ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
mentality to justify their violence in much the same way that Hitler did during the 
Second World War.160 
Dawkins argues that religion is the only motivation behind terrorism, and that all 
terrorism is always religiously motivated. It is invalid, however, to say that 
religion is immoral because some religious people have committed acts of 
terrorism. David Fergusson references David Martin’s work on this subject, in 
which he concludes that even religiously motivated conflicts (and, as we shall 
see, not all conflicts are religiously motivated) have other factors at play as well, 
such as political and ethnic factors. Furthermore, a religious war is no more 
violent than a secular one.161 
We have already shown that there is no necessary connection between atheism 
and immorality, and that similarly there is no necessary connection between 
religion and morality. On the contrary, both are capable of immorality. Many 
atrocities are committed with religious justification, it is true, but that does not 
mean that all atrocities are exclusively committed with religious justification. The 
dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were politically 
motivated as much as historical acts of terrorism have been religiously 
 
157 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 258-259. Dawkins illustrates this point with reference to the 
events occurring during a Montreal police strike (Dawkins, The God Delusion, 261). 
158 Ibid, 309. 
159 Ibid, 316. 
160 Ibid, 186-187. 




motivated. Terrorism is, by its definition, a political act rather than a solely 
religious one; while religion may play a part in the commitment of an act of 
terrorism, an act does not require religious motivation of any kind or of any 
amount to be an act of terrorism.162 
We can illustrate this within our fictional analogy with an event from the lore of 
The Elder Scrolls concerning the Dwemers’ interactions with another Tamrielic 
race of Elves, the Snow Elves. The Snow Elves were forced to share their 
province with a race of Men called the Atmorans, who lived in a city of their own 
building called Saarthal. On the whole, the two races lived “in relative peace”, 
until the Snow Elves attacked Saarthal.163 The war eventually tipped in the 
Atmorans’ favour, and the Snow Elves sought sanctuary with the Dwemer. The 
Dwemer agreed to give them asylum, but only if they consumed a toxic fungus, 
resulting in the deformation of the Snow Elves into the Falmer,164 a race of 
“twisted, evil creatures”165 whose name can be translated into ‘the Betrayed’.166 
The Dwemer, therefore, are responsible for the degeneration of the Snow Elves 
into the Falmer, but the Snow Elves, who, unlike the Dwemer, were religious 
and indeed worshipped the same gods as the Chimer,167 sowed the seeds of 
their own destruction when they attacked Saarthal with (seemingly) no 
provocation. I would argue, then, that just because there is no necessary 
connection between atheism and immorality, or between theism and immorality, 
both are equally capable of immorality, and Dawkins’ argument that only religion 
sows the seeds of immorality is insufficient.168 
Dawkins further supports his claim with the view that while no war has been 
waged in the name of atheism, wars have been waged in the name of religion. I 
 
162 The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition of ‘terrorism’: “The unofficial or 
unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims” (“terrorism, n..” In 
Oxford English Dictionary. n.d. Accessed April 25, 2019. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/199608.) 
163 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Atmoran.” In The Elder Scrolls Wiki. n.d. Accessed 
February 19, 2018. http://elderscrolls.wikia.com/wiki/Atmoran. 
164 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Dwemer.” 
165 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Falmer (Skyrim).” In The Elder Scrolls Wiki. n.d. 
Accessed February 20, 2018. http://elderscrolls.wikia.com/wiki/Falmer_(Skyrim). 
166 The Elder Scrolls Wiki contributors, “Snow Elf.” In The Elder Scrolls Wiki. n.d. Accessed 
February 20, 2018. http://elderscrolls.wikia.com/wiki/Snow_Elves. 
167 Ibid. 
168 It should further be noted that the Snow Elves’ motivations for attacking Saarthal were 
primarily political. There is, however, a theory that the Snow Elves were seeking the Eye of 
Magnus, a powerful magical artefact, which was buried beneath Saarthal; this theory is given in 
the fictional in-game book Night of Tears (See: The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim Special Edition, 
directed by Todd Howard. [2016; Rockville, Maryland: Bethesda Softworks], PlayStation 4.) 
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am not denying that there have been religious wars. To draw from our analogy, 
the War of the First Council was a result of the religious differences between the 
Chimer and the Dwemer. Nor am I denying that a war has never been fought in 
the name of atheism. Yet Dawkins is implicitly arguing that religion is the 
motivation behind all wars, and that a secular war has never been fought. Here 
we see evidence of the New Atheists’ positive view of human nature (as noted 
by Southgate), 169 for in Dawkins’ description of morality the only thing driving us 
to violence, selfishness, and immorality is religion. Without religion, he argues, 
we would be ‘perfectly’ moral. 
Dawkins similarly claims that as society becomes more secular, the less violent 
it becomes and the less conflict there is. This, Eagleton recognises, is not true: 
“We have it, then, from the mouth of Mr. Public Science himself [Dawkins] that 
aside from a few local hiccups like ecological disaster, ethnic wars, and 
potential nuclear catastrophe, History is perpetually on the up”.170 
Finally, the accusation that the religious base their morality on nothing more 
substantial than fear seems misleading at best. To say that theists act morally 
because they fear punishment shows great ignorance of the beliefs of many 
theists. While it is true that there are some who make a show of morality for fear 
of damnation, this cannot be used to generalise to all theists. I would argue that 
Jesus’ teachings explicitly condemn such ‘empty’ displays of righteousness: 
““And whenever you pray, do not be like the hypocrites; for they love to 
stand and pray in the synagogues and at the street corners, so that they 
may be seen by others. Truly I tell you, they have received their reward. 
But whenever you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to 
your Father who is in secret; and your Father who sees in secret will 
reward you.”171 
Augustine, too, teaches similarly: “We cling to Christ, then, by love, not by fear 
of punishment”.172 
Furthermore, this argument assumes that there are no atheists who act morally 
out of pure fear either. By his own analogy, Dawkins equates God with a 
 
169 Christopher Southgate, “The new atheism,” in God, Humanity and the Cosmos: A Textbook 
in Science and Religion, ed. Christopher Southgate (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 321. 
170 Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate (New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2009), 87-88. 
171 Matthew 6:5-6 [NRSV]. 
172 Augustine, Letter CXLV, trans. J. G. Cunningham, NPNF1 (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Eerdmans, 1956, 497). 
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policeman: a figure who inspires fear of breaking the law. An atheist is just as 
capable of acting morally out of pure fear of prison as a theist is of acting 
morally out of pure fear of hell. 
In River Out of Eden, Dawkins claims that many religious people often come to 
faith through experiencing some wonder of nature and “have decided that this 
particular phenomenon … cannot have evolved by gradual stages, because the 
intermediate, half-formed stages could not have been good for anything”.173 
This shows a misunderstanding of religious experiences and their effect on 
inspiring people to religious faith. Dawkins claims that a person having a 
religious experience inspired by the wonders of nature will automatically 
assume that God is the reason behind that phenomenon and that science has 
played no part in it.174 This is not true. A person who has had a religious 
experience of a wondrous natural phenomenon and becomes theistic as a 
result does not automatically renounce any scientific beliefs they may have had 
before. A person who looks up at the stars on a cloudless night, knowing that 
stars are collections of gas and dust left over from the Big Bang which have 
been compressed due to the immense power of gravity to the point where the 
amalgamation becomes hot enough for nuclear fusion to take place,175 and then 
has a religious experience and becomes a believer in some form of the divine, 
does not suddenly no longer believe all that they already knew about the 
formation of stars. 
Fourth, Dawkins argues in several places that science is self-regulating and 
does not hesitate to correct itself when it discovers that it has made a mistake 
Whereas religion will instead bend the truth to fit its traditions rather than 
altering its traditions to accord with the truth.176 In Unweaving the Rainbow, he 
describes the difference between scientists and those he describes as ‘mystics’ 
thus: mystics look at mysteries and say that we are not supposed to understand 
their meaning; scientists revel in those same mysteries but seek to understand 
 
173 Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), 61. 
174 Dawkins does not use this terminology himself, but one can infer that he is referring here to 
religious experiences. For a detailed examination of religious experiences, see: Mark Webb. 
“Religious Experience.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N Zalta. Stanford 
University Metaphysics Lab, Winter 2011. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/religious-experience/. 
175 bill wurtz. “history of the entire world, I guess.” YouTube. Video file. May 10, 2017. Accessed 
December 15, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xuCn8ux2gbs. 
176 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 319. 
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them: “‘But we’re working on it”.177 While “Science progresses by correcting its 
mistakes, and makes no secret of what it still does not understand”, religion is 
static and unchanging, never seeking to progress for everything that needs to 
be known is known and everything that is not known does not need to be 
known.178 In the essay ‘Viruses of the Mind’, Dawkins provides a list of the 
virtues that science has that faith lacks: “testability, evidential support, precision, 
quantifiability, consistency, intersubjectivity, repeatability, universality, 
progressiveness, independence of cultural milieu, and so on”.179 
I hold that relying on sacred texts for physical, scientific, and historical truths is 
naïve, and while it is true that there are many aspects of religious belief that are 
not supported by empirical evidence, there are several critiques I can levy 
against this argument. First, Dawkins is talking about “Fundamentalists”.180 
Fundamentalism is arguably a part of almost every ideology, religion included, 
but in focusing on the ‘fundamentalists’, Dawkins is ignoring those who do not 
behave as they do. 
Furthermore, Dawkins implies that religious people claim to know everything of 
importance. This is not true. Polkinghorne argues that religion has its own form 
of the scientific method which differs only in the terminology it uses: rather than 
beginning with a phenomenon and ending with a theory, the ‘theological 
method’ begins with an assertion and ends with a doctrine.181 The key 
difference between the two endeavours – the scientific and the theological – is 
that the natural world is a passive object of scientific study, whereas God is not 
a passive object of theological study. 
 
177 Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow, 17. 
178 Ibid, 31. 
179 Richard Dawkins, “Viruses of the Mind,” in A Devil's Chaplain: Selected Essays by Richard 
Dawkins, ed. Latha Menon (London: Phoenix, 2004), 171. Two further statements in support of 
this argument can be found in: Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow, (esp. 33); Richard Dawkins, 
“Good and Bad Reasons for Believing,” in A Devil's Chaplain: Selected Essays by Richard 
Dawkins, ed. Latha Menon (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003), 242-248; and Dawkins, The 
Magic of Reality, (esp. 186, 319). 
180 Dawkins, The Magic of Reality, 319. 
181 John Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief: Theological Reflections of a Bottom-Up 
Thinker (London: SPCK, 1994), 30-51 (esp. 36). A similar argument can be found in: Ian G 
Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (New York City, New York: 
Harper Collins, 1997), 106-136, wherein he argues that among the similarities of religion and 
science are “the interaction of data and theory … the historical character of the interpretive 
community; the use of models; and the influence of paradigms” as well as the lack of proofs, 
where religious data is religious experience. 
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Second, there are many things in Dawkins’ list of scientific virtues with which we 
can take issue. With this list, Dawkins argues that religion lacks the scientific 
method and therefore the truth claims it makes are insufficient. I would argue 
that the scientific method is not itself infallible, and therefore it does not 
necessarily follow that truth claims made by science are sufficient either. Faith 
does not lack these traits, especially testability, precision, and consistency. It is 
also unclear why faith cannot be considered ‘progressive’, particularly when 
Dawkins does not define what he means by ‘progressiveness’. Science is not 
independent of cultural milieu, for no aspect of human experience truly can be. 
Faith is a universal trait just as much as science: for in this paragraph, Dawkins 
does not limit faith to theistic faith. He is using faith, as many New Atheists do, 
as “unevidenced belief”.182 Poole recognises that this is not the only definition of 
faith, as faith can also mean trust.183 Additionally, as we have already seen 
throughout this chapter, science can itself be an object of faith.184 
Furthermore, theology, like science and most other disciplines, is 
intersubjective.185 An academic discipline must be so to function. As I have 
mentioned, Ward holds the view that Richard Dawkins does not understand 
theology and that this hinders his arguments. Haught examines this 
methodological issue further as a problem shared by most of the New Atheists. 
He accuses them of learning all their theology from Young Earth Creationists 
and advocates of the Argument from Intelligent Design,186 arguably those 
‘fundamentalists’ whose behaviour Dawkins so happily generalises to all 
 
182 Michael Poole, The ‘New’ Atheism: 10 Arguments That Don’t Hold Water? (Oxford: Lion, 
2009), 78 [sic]. 
183 Ibid, 21. 
184 Furthermore, as Moritz notes, the scientific pursuit as it is understood in the contemporary 
context cannot function without certain presuppositions; these include a belief in the rationality 
and order of the natural world and indeed the existence of the external world itself. These 
presuppositions are themselves a priori, and so are necessarily dependent on a certain level of 
faith (Joshua M Moritz, Science and Religion: Beyond Warfare and Toward Understanding 
[Winona, Minnesota: Anselm Academic, 2016], 69-71). In this sense, the scientific pursuit itself 
rests on a certain level faith. 
185 The Oxford English Dictionary defines that which is intersubjective as “Existing between 
conscious minds” (“intersubjective, adj..” In Oxford English Dictionary. n.d. Accessed June 24, 
2019. https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/98368.). In this way, by accusing religion of not being 
intersubjective as opposed to science, Dawkins is arguing that religion does not exist between 
conscious minds. This is intelligible, as religion and religious beliefs are deeply personal and as 
such each individual may hold slightly different perspectives on the same religion. In this way, 
one could say that each individual has their own religion which is not intersubjective. This, 
however, would be a concept anathema to most religious believers, who would maintain that 
their religion and their religious beliefs do not exist just for themselves as individuals but are 
shared between the conscious minds of fellow believers. 
186 Haught, God and the New Atheism, xi. 
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religious believers. Furthermore, the New Atheists wilfully ignore theologians 
who have written on the matters they themselves are discussing.187 Haught’s 
basic evaluation of this matter is that the New Atheists would benefit from taking 
some undergraduate theology modules.188 
Finally, this argument is grounded in the claim that scientific beliefs are 
supported by evidence. Yet in wandering into the territory of philosophy, as 
Ward notes,189 Dawkins leaves himself open to philosophical rebuttals. It is a 
scientific belief that the external world exists, but there is no evidence derived 
from a position of empirical neutrality for such a conclusion (which would be 
itself subject to the Problem of Induction), and indeed in the field of philosophy 
many arguments have been made against such claims.190 
I wish to end this enquiry with a discussion prompted by Unweaving the 
Rainbow. I have discussed that Dawkins believes that there are good reasons 
and bad reasons for believing something, in that a ‘good’ reason is when that 
something is supported by empirical evidence, and a ‘bad’ reason is any reason 
other than that something being supported by empirical evidence. In Unweaving 
the Rainbow, Dawkins fears that it is not only religion that is teaching the public 
to trust in ‘bad’ reasons for believing in things, but science fiction also – namely, 
‘bad’ science fiction.191 He illustrates his point with a discussion of the science 
fiction television show, The X Files.192 Dawkins describes the basic plot of every 
episode of The X Files: there is a mystery, and the two main characters, Mulder 
and Scully, differ in their views on the nature of the mystery. Mulder believes it 
is supernatural,193 while Scully believes in a natural (or scientific) explanation. 
Often, Mulder is revealed to have been correct in his assumption that the 
 
187 Ibid, xii. 
188 Ibid, 32. 
189 Ward, Doubting Dawkins, 10. 
190 A notable exponent of this view is George Berkeley, who argued that ordinary objects are 
nothing more than a collection of ideas which therefore do not exist externally to minds and 
particularly the mind of God, and only when this is accepted can one save oneself from constant 
discourse on the nature of such objects. For a detailed description of Berkeley’s view, see: Lisa 
Downing, “George Berkeley.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N Zalta. 
Stanford University Metaphysics Lab, Spring 2013. 
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191 Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow, 28-29. 
192 I wish to note at this stage that Dawkins casts no aspersions on The X Files as a television 
show. His description of The X Files as ‘bad’ science fiction is directly correlated to its alleged 
evangelisation of ‘bad’ reasons for believing, as Dawkins understands them. 
193 It should be noted that in the case of The X Files, supernaturality is usually related to extra-
terrestrial rather than divine life or powers. This is an idea to which we shall return in Chapter 2 
with the Thor case study. 
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supernatural was involved.194 This, Dawkins argues, is dangerous, as it teaches 
viewers to trust supernatural explanations over scientific ones.195 It is this that 
makes The X Files ‘bad’ science fiction. He argues that “Science fiction may 
tinker with the laws of nature, advisedly and preferably one law at a time, but it 
cannot abolish lawfulness itself and remain good science fiction”.196 
It is interesting to note that Dawkins believes that science fiction which deals 
with the supernatural is ‘abolishing lawfulness’. I do not believe this to be the 
case. The fantasy writer Brandon Sanderson has written three articles on his 
Three Laws of Magic, which are guides for writers creating systems of magic for 
their fictions. Sanderson’s First Law concerns itself primarily with giving any 
magic system rules which regulate how the magic can work within the fictional 
world and narrative. Sanderson claims to treat his own magic as if it is a 
science, in which the readers are made aware of how the magic works before it 
can be used to solve any problems within the narrative.197 Throughout his 
articles, he makes mention not just of fantasies but of science fictions as well.198 
Science fiction is bound by Sanderson’s Laws as much as fantasy is, and thus it 
is not the case that science fiction dealing with the supernatural is ‘abolishing 
lawfulness’ altogether. Rather, it is clearly defined within the laws of nature and 
makes perfect sense as far as its own world is concerned. This is what it means 
for science fiction to be ‘good’, and it is completely in line with Dawkins’ ‘good’ 
reasons for believing. 
Two points emerge from our discussion. First, the arguments Dawkins gives for 
his New Atheism are often limited and easily criticised. Second, Dawkins is 
advocating a removal of religion from society for the reasons I have discussed 
above as well as many others. If this is the case, then it becomes increasingly 
detrimental to Dawkins’ position if he cannot portray his New Atheism as 
something other than a pseudo-religion. This is particularly pertinent 
considering the first of Dawkins’ criticisms here discussed: that of religion 
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breeding ignorance and quelling questioning. Dawkins takes issue with 
congregations following the word of religious authority figures without question. 
Dawkins himself, however, seemingly expects those religious readers of The 
God Delusion to accept his arguments without question and thus ‘convert’ to 
New Atheism by the time they reach the last page.199  
On replacing religion with New Atheism 
It would seem that Dawkins cannot help himself. He seeks to remove all forms 
of religious belief from society and in his attempt to do so, he creates, in effect, 
his own form of religion. There have been several works on the seeming 
necessity of religion within human society. Some cite that religion has an 
evolutionary advantage.200 Indeed, Dawkins himself notes that there is “high 
survival value” in the development of the idea of God: 
“Consider the idea of God. We do not know how it arose in the meme 
pool. Probably it originated many times by independent ‘mutation’. In any 
case, it is very old indeed. How does it replicate itself? By the spoken 
and written word, aided by great music and great art. Why does it have 
such high survival value? Remember that ‘survival value’ here does not 
mean value for a gene in a gene pool, but value for a meme in a meme 
pool. The question really means: What is it about the idea of a god which 
gives it its stability and penetrance in the cultural environment? The 
survival value of the god meme in the meme pool results from its great 
psychological appeal. It proves a superficially plausible answer to deep 
and troubling questions about existence. It suggests that injustices in this 
world may be rectified in the next. The ‘everlasting arms’ hold out a 
cushion against our own inadequacies which, like a doctor’s placebo, is 
none the less effective for being imaginary. These are some of the 
reasons why the idea of God is copied so readily in by successive 
generations of individual brains. God exists, if only in the form of a meme 
with high survival value, or infective power, in the environment provided 
by human culture.”201 
If this is the case, then humans as Homo sapiens would be in some way 
necessarily prone to develop the kind of beliefs that we understand and define 
as religious, just as Dawkins has done in his construction of his New Atheism. 
 
199 Admittedly, this may be due to over-confidence on Dawkins’ part with regard to the veracity 
of his arguments. I thank Hatty Walker for this suggestion. 
200 Sosis and Alcorta offer an overview of several arguments pertaining to the evolution of 
religiosity in Homo sapiens, albeit from an anthropological rather than a strictly biological point 
of view. See: Richard Sosis and Candace Alcorta, “Signaling, Solidarity, and the Sacred: The 
Evolution of Religious Behavior.” Evolutionary Anthropology, 12 (2003): 264-274. 
201 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 207. 
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One cannot remove religion or religious belief from society without replacing it 
with something else. 
Dawkins often accuses anti-evolutionists of forgetting that evolution does not 
start from scratch. He writes that the attackers of evolution through natural 
selection are wrong to say that new features should appear in response to new 
problems almost ‘out of thin air’, because evolution does not work that way: 
evolution takes properties that an organism already has and develops that 
aspect in response to, for example, environmental changes. If it was no longer 
advantageous for a bird to be able to have wings, said bird would not lose their 
wings overnight through the process of Darwinian evolution; rather, the 
characteristic of smaller and smaller wings would be selected for until the bird 
no longer had wings. Evolution never goes ‘back to the drawing board’, as it 
were, and thus ‘start again’. Dawkins similarly forgets that he himself is not 
starting from scratch with regards the creation of a society without religion. 
Dawkins is writing in the contemporary West: an intellectual and social climate 
in which religion and theistic beliefs already exist. Dawkins’ ideal society is one 
where religion is completely missing, but this is a difficult feat to achieve when 
beginning from a society where religion already exists. We can see an 
awareness of this problem in those thinkers which Haught describes as the ‘old 
atheists’.202 For Dawkins and the New Atheists, God and religion can be 
removed seamlessly from society. For thinkers such as Nietzsche and the other 
‘old atheists’, any attempt to do so would result in the necessary restructuring of 
Western society. Hyman describes the argument put forward by Nietzsche in 
The Gay Science whereby “such notions as truth, progress, history and 
absolute presence … are all profoundly theological notions that depend upon 
the secure foundation that God provides”, and “the death of God brings with it 
the death of metaphysical truth”.203 Similarly, Haught recognises that for 
thinkers such as Nietzsche, embracing true atheism meant facing “up honestly 
to the logical, ethical, and cultural implications of a godless world”.204 To 
truncate religion from our society would be to remove the bedrock upon which 
much of our social structure is placed. If Dawkins wishes to remove such a core 
 
202 Haught, God and the New Atheism, 22-27. 
203 Gavin Hyman, A Short History of Atheism (London, I.B. Tauris, 2010), 171. 
204 Haught, God and the New Atheism, 23 [sic]. 
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concept from our society, then it must be replaced with something else – 
something which functions in the same way to preserve that which makes our 
society as it is. In Dawkins’ formulation of a solution to this ‘problem’, he ends 
up replacing religion with science, and thus his form of scientism becomes a 
pseudo-religion, which he hopes will perform an analogous societal function. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with Type 1 of Messer’s typology: that of 
science-inspired atheism. In contemporary Western society, Richard Dawkins’ 
New Atheism is perhaps one of the most famous and influential iterations of 
such a position, directly due to the popular success of his 2006 monograph The 
God Delusion. Over the course of this chapter, I have used as an analogy to 
Dawkins’ New Atheism the attempts of the Dwemer and of Kagrenac to achieve 
self-transcendence through a manipulation of a religious concept into an 
atheistic body, to identify it as a quasi-religion. I have also undertaken a 
systematic critique of Dawkins’ New Atheism, with the intent to apply my overall 
question to the position as a whole: can Richard Dawkins’ New Atheism, as an 
example of Type 1 on Messer’s typology, give us a satisfactory formulation of 
the relationship between science and Christian theology in the contemporary 
West? 
The answer is not strictly ‘no’. As we have seen, Dawkins attests vigorously to 
science, and is the (unwitting) founder of a pseudo-religion. In this sense, we 
can believe in science and follow a religion under New Atheism. Yet the religion 
we would be following is a pseudo-religion, a sort of travesty of theism, and 
therefore while Dawkins’ New Atheism can give us a satisfactorily accurate 
representation of the science side of the science/Christian theology relationship, 
it cannot give us a satisfactorily accurate representation of the Christian-
theological side of that same relationship. 
We have not, then, discovered a satisfactory answer to our question. If Type 1 




Chapter 2 – Intelligent Design and 
the Thor of the Gaps 
Introduction 
Intelligent Design theory exists in many ways as the converse of Richard 
Dawkins’ New Atheism. Where Dawkins is writing in the context of the UK, 
Intelligent Design theorists are writing mainly in the US. Where Dawkins has 
seated himself firmly on one end of Messer’s spectrum of the possible solutions 
to the ‘problem’ of the compatibility of science and religion, where all Christian 
doctrine is rejected in favour of science, Intelligent Design theorists are almost 
at the opposite end, where all of science is rejected in favour of Christian 
doctrine. They do not, however, fit neatly into Messer’s fifth and final Type. 
Intelligent Design theorists do not wish to remove science from society, but 
rather wish to promote religious ideas as science while simultaneously 
discrediting scientific theories as unscientific, particularly the Darwinian theory 
of evolution through natural selection. 
As with New Atheism as a whole, there exist many different views and opinions 
within the Intelligent Design Movement,205 though, unlike New Atheism, 
Intelligent Design theorists do claim to be disciples of the same cause, following 
Philip Johnson, “the architect of the intelligent design movement”.206 As such, 
there are a few central tenets which are shared by most Intelligent Design 
theorists, and which distinguish the Movement as a distinct entity in and of itself. 
Intelligent Design theorists are adamant that ‘naturalists’, i.e. evolutionists, are 
yet to demonstrate that evolution is correct.207 William Dembski, in a dialogue 
with the anti-Intelligent Design thinker Michael Ruse, criticises the Miller/Urey 
experiment, an attempt to simulate a possible atmosphere of the early Earth 
 
205 Abby Hafer, The Not-So Intelligent Designer: Why Evolution Explains the Human Body and 
Intelligent Design Does Not (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2015), 10. 
206 Niall Shanks, God, the Devil, and Darwin: A Critique of Intelligent Design Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 11. Hafer argues that those within the Intelligent Design 
Movement “couldn’t agree that gravity makes things fall down”, and that the only similarities 
shared between Intelligent Design’s exponents is their political agenda (Hafer, Not-So Intelligent 
Designer, 22). The reader can find the sense of camaraderie in the Intelligent Design Movement 
in: William A Dembski, ed. Darwin's Nemesis: Phillip Johnson and the Intelligent Design 
Movement. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity, 2006. 
207 William Dembski, “Who’s Got the Magic?” in Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: 
Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives, ed. Robert T Pennock (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 644. 
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with the aim of seeing if the correct amino acids, the building blocks of life, 
could have emerged in those conditions, to this end. Dembski says that the 
experiment was able to produce nothing more than the most basic building 
blocks of life, and so the naturalists are still lacking in their explanatory support 
for the theory of evolution.208 As we shall see throughout this chapter, the 
nature of complex life is one with which Intelligent Design theorists often 
wrestle. 
A second objection that the Intelligent Design theorists often raise against the 
theory of evolution is that there is nothing particularly special about it as a 
scientific theory: many theories which were like the theory of evolution in many 
respects have already risen and fallen over the centuries, and there is no 
reason to suppose that this will not eventually happen to the theory of evolution 
as well.209 Dembski speaks of Darwinism’s “imminent demise”, arguing that not 
only does the scientific community defend Darwinism to its last breath and 
thereby treats the theory as unfalsifiable (which makes the theory unscientific), 
but that there is much for which Darwinism cannot account.210 Dembski does 
not mention that Darwinism has been and continues to be tested and is 
consistently found to accurately describe the world across numerous 
disciplines. Instead, he maintains that it cannot be said that future endeavours 
will not provide a ‘proof’ of Intelligent Design and a concrete ‘disproof’ of 
Darwinism,211 and also does not consider the possibility that explanations for 
those phenomena which he lists as unaccounted for by Darwinism, such as the 
origin of life and the Cambrian explosion,212 may in fact be worked into a 
 
208 William Dembski and Michael Ruse, “Intelligent Design: A Dialogue,” in Intelligent Design: 
William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse in Dialogue, ed. Robert B Stewart (Minneapolis, Minnesota: 
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Miller/Urey experiment; he says that the experiment was successful in producing the 20 
naturally-occurring amino acids, but that this is a simple task for chemists in a lab and instead 
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(Michael Behe, Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution [New York City, 
New York: Free Press, 2006], 146-147). 
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210 William Dembski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science & Theology (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 113. 
211 Ibid, 117. 
212 Ibid, 113. 
62 
 
Darwinian framework using evidence collected by scientific experimentation in 
the future. Similarly, Michael Behe says: 
“When foundations are unearthed, the structures that rest on them are 
shaken; sometimes they collapse. When sciences such as physics finally 
uncovered their foundations, old ways of understanding the world had to 
be tossed out, extensively revised, or restricted to a limited part of 
nature. Will this happen to the theory of evolution by natural 
selection?”213 
That this argument lacks validity, as the perceived failure of some scientific 
theories does not entail the failure of any given scientific theory, does not seem 
to bother Behe, who, along with other Intelligent Design theorists, defends the 
Movement from accusations of creationism. 
Several thinkers have branded Intelligent Design as a new or updated form of 
creationism: Barbara Forrest describes it as “the most recent – and most 
dangerous – manifestation of creationism”;214 Brauer and Brumbaugh call it 
“neo-creationist”;215 and Philip Kitcher dismisses the Movement as nothing more 
than creation science ‘making a comeback’ after it failed in its first attempt to 
overcome the theory of evolution.216 Behe writes that supporting Intelligent 
Design is not the same as “espousing creationism”, which is the exclusive 
purview of Young Earth Creationists with whom neither Behe nor Dembski wish 
to identify.217 Dembski is adamant that to lump Intelligent Design and 
creationism in the same camp is a grave mistake, for Intelligent Design is 
“entirely separable from creationism”.218 
 
213 Behe, Darwin’s Black Box, 13. 
214 Barbara Forest, “The Wedge at Work: How Intelligent Design Creationism Is Wedging Its 
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215 Matthew J Brauer and Daniel R Brumbaugh, “Biology Remystified: The Scientific Claims of 
the New Creationists,” in Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, 
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216 Philip Kitcher, “Born-Again Creationism,” in Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: 
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217 Behe, Darwin’s Black Box, 15; William Dembski, The End of Christianity: Finding a Good 
God in an Evil World (Nashville, Tennessee: B&H, 2009), 48ff. Dembski does note that there 
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The Intelligent Design theorists have taken great pains to distinguish 
themselves as espousing a distinct position capable of a) scientifically 
disproving the adequacy of the theory of evolution to properly and fully explain 
the origin and complexity of living organisms and organic systems; and b) 
proving that an Intelligent Designer had a hand in the formation of the universe 
and of the life which inhabits it. One of the ways in which they do this is to 
invoke two types of evolution: microevolution and macroevolution. Behe 
describes the difference between the two thus: “Roughly speaking, 
microevolution describes changes that can be made in one or a few small 
jumps, whereas macroevolution describes changes that appear to require large 
jumps”, before going on to say that microevolution is ‘easy’ to believe, while 
macroevolution is more ‘difficult’ to believe as there is no evidence to suggest 
that the large jumps required by Darwinian evolution (macroevolution) can be 
achieved through lots of smaller jumps (microevolution).219 Allene Phy-Olsen 
argues that microevolution can easily be proved, for we can observe its effects 
and results in such evolution as is achieved by selective breeding, whereas 
macroevolution is much more difficult to prove because it cannot be observed in 
a single human lifetime.220 As such, Intelligent Design theorists do not forsake 
all of science, and neither do they dismiss the theory of evolution entirely out of 
hand, and so they cannot be placed in Type 5. Yet their position is far too 
dependent on religious doctrine to be placed in Type 4. Rather, they exist in a 
middle Type between these two: Type 4.5, if you will. We have seen in Chapter 
1 that Type 1 does not give us a satisfactory answer to the question of the 
relationship between science and Christian doctrine, and so in this chapter I 
shall be discussing whether Intelligent Design – existing as it does between 
Types 4 and 5 – can offer a better answer. 
I shall discuss two Intelligent Design thinkers: Michael Behe and William 
Dembski, who are often contended with by scholars discussing Intelligent 
Design theory. Both have offered support for Intelligent Design though their 
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approaches are different from one another. As such, I shall begin by describing 
and evaluating their individual positions. First, however, I shall explore the 
background and history of Intelligent Design theory and its roots in teleology. I 
shall then describe my analogy for this chapter: the Thor franchise within the 
Marvel Cinematic Universe (hereafter MCU). This analogy will be used 
throughout the chapter to illustrate both that the Intelligent Design Movement is 
guilty of the fallacy of the God of the Gaps, and that Hafer is correct to say that 
the Intelligent Design theorists are unscientific in their methodologies. 
Ultimately, I shall find Intelligent Design theory wanting, due to the weakness of 
its arguments and its committing the fallacy of the God of the Gaps. 
Intelligent Design Theory’s Teleological Tradition 
The most famous iteration of the argument from design was given by William 
Paley. He tells the parable of someone discovering a watch on the road, 
concluding that it must have had a designer, and extrapolating that reasoning to 
the natural world as a whole: 
“the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a 
maker: that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or 
another, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we 
find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and 
designed its use”.221 
Paley’s example has been much discredited. Indeed, David Hume argued 
against Paley’s reasoning before Paley had even put pen to paper, arguing that 
the analogy between a mechanical artefact such as Paley’s watch and the 
natural world is invalid: “But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears 
such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a 
similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect.”222 
While this is arguably one of the weaker arguments Hume gives against the 
reasoning which is later employed by Paley, Hume has many other criticisms to 
draw upon, including the idea that seeing God as designer of the universe in the 
same way that a clockmaker is the designer of a watch is to make God too 
much like human beings: 
 
221 William Paley, “An especially famous design argument,” in Philosophy of Religion: A Guide 
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“I was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this 
resemblance, which is asserted, between the Deity and human 
creatures; and must conceive it to imply such a degradation of the 
supreme Being as no sound theist could endure. With your assistance, 
therefore, Demea, I shall endeavour to defend what you justly call the 
adorable mysteriousness of divine nature,”223 
Where the watch’s design involved much trial and error before it was finalised 
as the exquisite artefact found by Paley’s wanderer, Hume argues, if God so 
designed the universe in such a way then this too would have involved much 
trial and error: many lesser universes would have been designed and scrapped 
before ours was finally created; the existence of such lesser universes would 
mean that God is not only capable of making mistakes and is therefore not 
perfect as classical theism would paint Him, but that He has made mistakes, 
and has done so on a cosmological level.224 I would add an additional 
consequence, in that our universe could also be one of the ‘mistakes’ and that 
God will go on designing better and better universes throughout eternity. Not 
only this, but this could lead to a problem of infinite regress where God is 
continually making ‘better’ universes ad infinitum. 
Similarly, where human construction is collaborative, the analogy Paley draws 
could imply that the universe was not designed and constructed by one divine 
being but by many, which would conflict with the monotheistic worldview Paley 
supports.225 Finally, the analogy runs the risk of making God anthropomorphic, 
which many would wish to avoid.226 
Paley’s watch example is no longer taken seriously as an argument for 
teleology, but it is important to understand the tradition of which he was 
representative, and that Intelligent Design theorists are in a sense continuing. 
As with Paley, they fall foul of one of the more common criticisms of this type of 
inference to divine teleology: that of the God of the Gaps. Before I level this 
criticism against the Intelligent Design theorists, I wish to examine and evaluate 
each of our two thinkers individually. My evaluation of these thinkers, however, 
will draw upon the Thor franchise and the MCU, and so I shall begin by giving 
the reader an explanation of the case study at hand. 
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Thor and the MCU 
The MCU was launched in 2008 and boasts several franchises which overlap 
and intersect. One such franchise is the Thor franchise, which at the time of 
writing consists of three films: Thor, Thor: The Dark World, and Thor: Ragnarok. 
These films are based on the original Marvel comics which in turn are based on 
Norse mythology. Within the MCU, those characters based on Norse deities are 
shown to have apparently supernatural powers, which are nevertheless 
described as nothing more than advanced science. 
For clarity, I shall provide the reader with a brief description of the first two Thor 
films: Thor and Thor: The Dark World.227 Thor introduces the world and 
characters. Thor, son of Odin and prince of Asgard, is to be named crown 
prince when Asgard is infiltrated by its long-time nemesis, the Jötunar. Against 
his father’s wishes, Thor seeks revenge, and as a result is banished to Earth 
and relieved of both his powers and his mythical hammer, Mjølnir. Thor’s 
brother, Loki, remains on Asgard and subsequently becomes regent when Odin 
falls into a coma-like state known as the Odinsleep. Eventually, Thor proves his 
worthiness to wield Mjølnir and can return to Asgard. During his time on Earth, 
Thor is studied by and begins a relationship with Dr Foster, as well as 
befriending her colleague, Dr Erik Selvig, and her intern, Darcy. Much of the film 
is dedicated to Dr Foster reconciling the existence of ancient Norse deities with 
her knowledge of astrophysics.228 
Set two years after Thor, Thor: The Dark World centres on an event known as 
the Convergence and its awakening of Asgard’s ancient rivals, the Dark Elves. 
During the film, Dr Foster absorbs a powerful cosmic force known as the Aether 
and is taken to Asgard to receive diagnosis and treatment. Much as in Thor, the 
apparently magical technology of Asgard is redefined as advanced science 
which is possible but not yet actual on Earth.229 
There are many instances during these two films in which the nature of 
Asgardian ‘magic’ as advanced science is explored. I wish to focus on two 
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which appear in Thor and Thor: The Dark World respectively: the Rainbow 
Bridge and the Bifrost, and the Soul Forge. 
The Rainbow Bridge exists on Asgard and leads to the Bifrost. The Rainbow 
Bridge and the Bifrost are used by Asgardians to travel between Realms. In her 
initial research, before speaking with Thor, Dr Foster studies the photos she 
took of Thor arriving to Earth via the Bifrost upon his banishment and 
determines that “the lensing around these edges is characteristic of an Einstein-
Rosen Bridge”. Dr Selvig explains that an Einstein-Rosen Bridge is “a 
theoretical connection between two different points of spacetime”, while Dr 
Foster uses the more familiar terminology “wormhole”, to explain the 
phenomenon to Darcy.230 
This scene is the first of three in Thor discussing the nature of Asgardian magic 
as advanced science. In the second, Dr Foster, Dr Selvig, and Darcy are 
contemplating the original Norse mythology and how it can relate to the events 
they are experiencing. During this discussion, Dr Foster invokes Arthur C 
Clarke’s famous Third Law, that any suitably advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic. She then claims that, if the Rainbow Bridge is an 
Einstein-Rosen Bridge, ‘advanced beings’ could have crossed it even if humans 
could not. In agreement, Darcy says, “A primitive culture like the Vikings might 
have worshipped [such advanced beings] as deities”.231 In the opening narration 
of Thor, the Asgardians are shown warring with the Jötunar in 10th Century 
Norway, and Odin explains that humans at that time were aware that they were 
‘not alone’ but believed that the other worlds of the universe were home to their 
gods.232 Darcy’s comment here harks back to the sentiment given in the 
narration at the beginning of the film. In this later scene we not only see a direct 
invocation of Clarke’s Third Law, but a demonstration of Shermer’s Last Law. In 
his book, Why Darwin Matters: The Case Against Intelligent Design, Michael 
Shermer creates a Law of his own based on Clarke’s Third Law. Where Clarke 
is focusing on technology, Shermer says, his Law focuses on intelligent extra-







advanced Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence is indistinguishable from God”.233 
Shermer’s Last Law is put directly into play in the Thor franchise, where the 
members of the advanced alien race of Asgardians are transformed in Earthen 
mythology from extra-terrestrial life to deities.234 
The third and final important scene shows Thor and Dr Foster discussing the 
matter of the apparent supernaturality of Asgardian technology and magic. Thor 
explains that: “Your ancestors called it magic, and you call it science. I come 
from a place where they’re one and the same thing.”235 Once again, we see a 
demonstration of Clarke’s Third Law in relation to Asgardian technology. 
The Einstein-Rosen Bridge is the most important of the aspects of the Thor 
franchise for the matter at hand, yet I shall also give a brief description of a 
similar artefact from Thor: The Dark World. 
Throughout the events of Thor: The Dark World, Dr Foster absorbs a power 
known as the Aether, which has adverse effects on her body. Thor takes her to 
Asgard to diagnose her, and in the healing rooms she is placed on a table 
which creates an incorporeal ‘copy’ of her body floating above her. Upon seeing 
this ‘copy’, Dr Foster enquires of her diagnostician if the table upon which she is 
lying is a quantum field generator. The diagnostician replies that it is a Soul 
Forge. Dr Foster then asks if the device ‘transfers molecular energy from one 
place to another’, to which the diagnostician replies in the affirmative, and Dr 
Foster concludes that the device is a quantum field generator.236 In this scene, 
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we see that the Asgardians are aware of and understand the science behind 
their ‘magic’, and therefore Clarke’s Third Law is present again: to the 
Asgardians, the Soul Forge is mere science; yet to an Earthling, it would 
(initially) appear as magic. 
That the Asgardians’ ‘magic’ is nothing more than advanced science which is 
understood as such by Asgardians is made clear in the third film in the Thor 
franchise, Thor: Ragnarok. In Thor: Ragnarok, Thor meets another character 
from the wider MCU, Doctor Stephen Strange, an actual sorcerer who uses 
actual magic and sorceries. In Thor’s meeting with Doctor Strange in Thor: 
Ragnarok, it becomes clear that Thor is not acclimatised to the use of actual 
magic and sorceries despite the ‘magic’ with which he grew up on his home 
world of Asgard. 
The scene where Thor and Doctor Strange interact is relatively short, though 
Doctor Strange demonstrates many magical talents during the short time he is 
on screen. The scene begins with Thor knocking on Doctor Strange’s door, and 
rather than the door being opened for him Thor is transported inside the building 
mid-knock. Such transportation is used multiple times throughout the scene, 
and Thor’s body language and facial expressions reveal that he is not used to 
such techniques and does not quite understand how they work. This contrasts 
with the diagnostician’s treatment of the Soul Forge, which although is referred 
to using different terminology than Dr Foster would use, is still understood in a 
scientific matter. Later in the scene, Doctor Strange conjures a stein of beer for 
Thor to drink and refills it before Thor’s eyes when he is running low: Thor’s 
reaction to this is one of both amazement and confusion.237 
Thor and Loki (who meets Doctor Strange at the end of this scene) call Doctor 
Strange a “wizard” and a “sorcerer” respectively.238 Thus, they are aware of 
such magical talents existing, but Thor’s reactions imply that he has never seen 
them himself. This scene is very telling in that it shows that that Asgardian 
technology which Earthlings described as ‘magic’ was nothing more than 
science to Asgardians, while real magic still astonishes Asgardians. The 
relationship between Earthlings and Asgardians is, therefore, the one described 
 





by Clarke’s and Shermer’s Laws, wherein the gap of knowledge is filled with 
invocations of magic and deity.239 
This is displayed practically in the Thor franchise with which phenomena are 
investigated by the characters and which are not: where a phenomenon is 
described as magical or supernatural, investigation is not carried out any 
further, whereas where something is described as within the purview of science 
investigation continues. We can see this in the examples I have given. Those 
artefacts and beings which are treated as within the realms of scientific study 
are investigated throughout the franchise. Thor, no longer seen as a god, as 
Odin was by the 10th Century Norwegians, but recognised as an extra-terrestrial 
intelligent life-form by Dr Foster, Dr Selvig, and Darcy, is studied using the 
scientific method so that Dr Foster can more clearly understand his biology and 
how he managed to survive his trip to Earth via the Rainbow Bridge. The 
Rainbow Bridge, similarly, is recognised not as magic but as an Einstein-Rosen 
Bridge, thus bringing it into the realm of scientific investigation from the realm of 
magic and the supernatural and thus can be studied using the scientific method, 
which Dr Foster proceeds to do. In much the same way as the 10th Century 
Norwegians did not investigate what they believed to be supernatural but the 
21st Century physicists in Thor do investigate that which at first appears to be 
supernatural but is then brought within the realm of science, so too do the 
Asgardians themselves act in this way. Thor does not attempt to investigate 
Doctor Strange’s abilities once he has deemed Doctor Strange to be a wizard 
who uses actual magic and not just advanced science. In contrast, Dr Foster’s 
diagnostician in Thor: The Dark World shows knowledge of the scientific 
workings of the Soul Forge, and thus it is clear that the investigation has 
happened. We were not party to this investigation, but that the diagnostician 
and Dr Foster can speak to each other about the workings of the Soul Forge 
using the same scientific language shows that this investigation has occurred. 
 
239 Similar events occur in the most recent film in the MCU, Avengers: Endgame. When 
discussing the six cosmic artefacts known as the Infinity Stones, Thor (mistakenly) assumes 
they have the power to bring the dead back to life and attributes this ability to the Stones being 
“space magic”. Furthermore, Thor’s mother Frigga, can inexplicably notice when Thor has time 
travelled and attributes this to the skills she learned from having been “raised by witches”; when 
Thor is reminded of this, he ceases questioning her ability to “see with more than eyes” and 
understand that he has time travelled. (Avengers: Endgame, directed by Anthony Russo and 
Joe Russo. [2019; Burbank, California: Marvel Studios], Film.) 
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I shall use these elements from the Thor franchise as comparisons in my 
evaluations of the arguments of Behe and Dembski. 
Michael Behe and Irreducible Complexity 
Behe’s contribution to Intelligent Design theory is the idea of irreducible 
complexity: that there exist in the natural world biological systems which are 
complex in such a way that if any individual component of that system were to 
be removed, the system would cease to function properly.240 From this position, 
Behe draws the conclusion that such supposedly irreducibly complex biological 
systems “were designed not by the laws of nature, not by chance and necessity. 
Rather, they were planned. The designer knew what the systems would look 
like when they were completed; the designer took steps to bring the system 
about.”241 Behe never gives an explanation as to what steps the designer took 
to bring about these irreducibly complex systems, but nevertheless does give 
examples of systems which he considers to be irreducibly complex. 
The first example is that of the human eye. Behe mentions that 19th Century 
scientists discovered that the human eye would not work if any single part of it 
was removed, and that if such a thing were to happen the vision of that eye 
would be either impaired or obliterated.242 
This example is a curious one, for it highlights the issue within Intelligent Design 
theory that, if the universe and all its processes therein are the work of an 
Intelligent Designer, it might be presumed that there would be no inefficiencies 
in those processes. There are many examples we can cite where this is not the 
case, including that of the human eye. Dennett,  Dingley, and Hafer all mention 
the ‘blind spot’, whereby blood vessels and nerve fibres go through the retina in 
such a way that there exists a part of the human eye which cannot see anything 
at all.243 Dingley even goes so far as to say that, had God been the designer of 
a system with such an inability to function optimally in its intended manner, then 
 
240 Behe, “Molecular Machines,” 242. 
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New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 37; Stephen Dingley, “A Blind Watchmaker? A Christian 
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“God’s not a very good engineer”.244 Hafer describes this set-up of blood 
vessels and fibres as “like punching a hole in the imaging chip of a camera”,245 
and says that if a designer were to submit the human eye as a final project in a 
design class, they would receive an F grade.246 Ann Druyan, too, picks up on 
the example of the evolution of the eye in her documentary Cosmos: A 
Spacetime Odyssey, presented by Neil DeGrasse Tyson. While not directly 
mentioning the arguments of thinkers such as Behe, Tyson, on behalf of 
Druyan, explains that the eye has been used as an example of things in nature 
which are so complicated that it does not seem possible that they could have 
arisen through the chancy method of evolution through natural selection. She is 
adamant, however, that the eye is the result of evolution, and that biology as a 
field of study does not make sense without the theory of evolution.247 
As well as discussing the example of the human eye, Hafer examines other 
examples within nature where the ‘design’ seems less than optimal. One such 
example is that of human testicles: because normal human body temperature is 
too high for sperm production, human testicles must exist on the outside of the 
body, which puts those in possession of testicles at “all sorts of inconvenience 
and risk severe pain and worse”.248 Other examples given by Hafer include the 
birth canal,249 the human throat,250 human teeth,251 and the human genome.252 
In all these examples, Hafer returns to the idea that evidence of sub-optimal 
design in nature implies that there is no Intelligent Designer; or, at least, that if 
there is an Intelligent Designer, “One would think that [they] could do better”.253 
She says, simply, that human bodies are too ‘badly’ put together for an 
intelligent designer to have had any part in the process of their formation.254 
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Not only this, but Hafer also points out that there are instances where other 
animals seem to have been designed ‘better’ than humans and says that in 
those cases God might be presumed to love those animals more than humans. 
She says, for instance, that many mammals can ‘keep’ their testicles ‘inside’ 
their bodies to keep them safe when not in use, and ‘bring’ them ‘outside’ when 
they are. Elephants, moreover, are warm-blooded mammals who keep their 
testicles inside at all times without compromising their sperm production.255 
Hafer says, “You’d think that the Designer would try to give us humans, who 
were made in his image, the best deal that he could manage, wouldn’t you? But 
he didn’t.”256 Dembski does have a rebuttal to this argument from bad design, 
where he writes: “My own view is that it is much more shaky to speculate about 
what God would have done or what the world might in principle reveal than 
simply to go to the world and see what it actually does reveal”.257 Unfortunately, 
this is not sufficient to counter the damning evidence Hafer provides, because it 
barely constitutes more than simply sweeping the issue under the rug of the 
infamous ‘mysterious ways’ in which God is said to work. We shall see later in 
this chapter that such a methodology is not scientific as it bars the way to any 
further scientific investigation by appealing to the supernatural and/or the divine. 
Behe’s second example of an irreducibly complex system is that of a 
mousetrap. While a mousetrap is not a biological system, Behe argues that as a 
mousetrap cannot function properly if any of its parts are removed, a mousetrap 
is irreducibly complex, and it can be said that there exist similarly irreducibly 
complex biological systems, which therefore could not have arisen by 
evolutionary processes.258 The issue with his use of a mousetrap, however, as 
noted by Michael Ruse, is that mousetraps need not be irreducibly complex – 
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indeed, they are not even necessarily complex, for a mousetrap can be made of 
a single part.259 
Further on in his essay, ’Molecular Machines: Experimental Support for the 
Design Inference’, and his later monograph Darwin’s Black Box, Behe gives an 
organic example of an irreducibly complex system: cilia. 
Behe explains that a cilium is a ‘hair’ on a cell which can move the cell like an 
oar when in a liquid or allow liquid to move over the cell; they are found in 
sperm and on cells involved in the human respiratory system. Cilia require three 
parts to function: microtubules, a motor, and linkers; without these, they would 
not be able to perform their function.260 Behe uses this example to argue that 
the nature of cilia to cease proper function when just one of its proteins are 
removed indicates that cilia cannot be the product of evolution through natural 
selection, but rather were designed in their final form by an Intelligent 
Designer.261 
Again, we see a flaw in Behe’s argument. Behe claims that because the cilia, as 
it presently exists, could not function without one of its parts this indicates that it 
could not have formed through the process of natural selection. This, I would 
argue, does not follow. Dingley discussed Behe’s irreducible complexity in his 
2018 talk, ‘A Blind Watchmaker? A Christian answer for the origin of the world’ 
and argued that those individual parts without which a supposedly irreducibly 
complex system cannot function did not come into existence to contribute to the 
function of that system. It is far more likely that those parts performed a different 
function before they became a cog in that system’s machine.262 If we apply this 
to Behe’s cilia example, we form the position that the parts that make up the 
cilia and allow it to function can (or could in the past) perform other functions 
when they are not in the cilia system, and it was these functions that they 
performed before they became part of the cilia. Such ‘co-option’ of other 
functions is widespread in evolving systems. 
The same can be said for Behe’s more famous example of the bacterial 
flagellum, which Dembski refers to as having become “the icon of intelligent 
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design”.263 Behe compares the flagellum to the cilium, saying that “the bacterial 
flagellum acts as a rotary propeller – in contrast to the cilium, which acts more 
like an oar”.264 The bacterial flagellum, like the cilia, has three parts which make 
it irreducibly complex; in the case of the former, these parts are “a paddle, a 
rotor, and a motor”.265 Behe argues that because the bacterial flagellum cannot 
function without any one of these parts, and because the motor itself cannot 
function unless it comprises its fifty required proteins,266 “Gradual evolution of 
the flagellum, like the cilium, therefore faces mammoth hurdles”.267 Yet just as 
Behe argues that the bacterial flagellum is irreducibly complex in much the 
same way that he argues the same of cilia, it is similarly vulnerable to the same 
argument as his cilia example. 
The original examples Behe gives for irreducible complexity are, then, 
insufficient to support his argument. Yet even with supporting examples, there 
are still issues with the concept of irreducible complexity. 
Brauer and Brumbaugh compare the systems of Behe’s argument to that of a 
city, and in particular New York. They argue that New York evolved just as 
much as organic organisms such as cilia and bacterial flagellum did, and that 
the individual parts contribute to the running and working of the city in as much 
the same way as the microtubules, motors, and linkers do in cilia and as 
paddles, rotors, and motors do in bacterial flagellum. To that end, if you were to 
remove the sewer system from New York, the city would cease to function 
properly. Yet this does not mean that New York was placed on the land on 
which it currently stands complete with a sewer system; the individual parts of 
the city were added as they were needed: “The fact that the system now 
operates as a cohesive whole, dependent on all its parts, does nothing to refute 
the evolution of the system”.268 
Dembski here comes to Behe’s aid, arguing that a city is an example of 
cumulative complexity rather than irreducible complexity: “It is possible 
successively to remove people and services from a city until one is down to a 
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tiny village – all without losing the sense of community, which in this case 
constitutes its function”.269 This is to assume that the function of a city is this 
‘sense of community’ (which, incidentally, Dembski does not define), and does 
not mention the infrastructure of a city which Brauer and Brumbaugh discuss in 
their refutation of Behe’s argument. What’s more, Dembski is equating 
complexity with size rather than the number of parts of a complex system: in his 
example, a tiny village (which would contain the amenities of a city such as a 
sewer system just on a smaller scale) is less complex than a city. There are no 
fewer parts, however, just a smaller size, and it does not follow that this would 
make a village less complex than a city. 
Michael Behe and his irreducible complexity is but one facet of Intelligent 
Design theory. Another influential member of the Movement is William Dembski, 
who, although he seemingly agrees with Behe’s argument from irreducible 
complexity, provides his own argument for Intelligent Design in the form of the 
Design Inference. 
William Dembski and the Design Inference 
William Dembski’s Design Inference concerns explaining events considering 
their probability. Dembski’s aim is to show that there are events which are so 
improbable without outside help that they must be the result of design and that 
one can infer the presence of design from such events. 
In his book, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small 
Possibilities, Dembski lays out the Design Inference and his support for it. One 
of the ways in which he does this is by what he calls the Explanatory Filter,270 
the argument of which he sums up thus: 
“Premise 1: E has occurred. 
Premise 2: E is specified. 
Premise 3: If E is due to chance, then E has small probability. 
Premise 4: Specified events of small probability do not occur by chance. 
Premise 5: E is not due to a regularity. 
Premise 6: E is due to either a regularity, chance, or design. 
Conclusion: E is due to design.”271 
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The first question that arises considering this argument is that of the definition of 
‘specified’. Dembski does not give a definition of this term but does provide 
examples of specified events. One such example is that of ink being applied to 
paper: if it is applied by someone accidentally knocking over an ink well, then it 
is not specified; if it is applied by someone dipping a quill into the ink well and 
writing words onto the paper, then it is specified.272 Yet this example is so 
vague as a definition of specificity that it is no easier to infer the meaning of 
‘specified’ from it than it is to infer design from the specified probability of an 
event. Dembski gives a different example of a specified event in Intelligent 
Design: The Bridge Between Science & Theology. Rather than ink on paper, 
Dembski talks about Scrabble tiles. Natural causes can create the unspecified 
event of several Scrabble tiles falling onto a Scrabble board, but it is highly 
unlikely that those tiles will fall in such a way as to spell a word. Intelligent 
causes, on the other hand, can arrange the tiles in such a way as to spell an 
intended word. The former event is not specified, while the latter is specified. 
Dembski goes on to write that he wishes to eliminate chance as an explanation 
for events with small probabilities.273 Again, the reader is given an example 
which Dembski uses to support his point, this time of a statistician conducting 
an experiment to determine the effectiveness of a fertiliser on crop yield.274 The 
statistician begins her experiment with the assumption that the fertiliser will 
have no effect, either favourable or unfavourable, on the crop yield, as without 
prior knowledge of the effectiveness of the fertiliser this is “the safest 
assumption to make”.275 After the experiment is conducted, the statistician does 
not eliminate the possibility that a result of the fertiliser increasing crop yield 
was not down to the fertiliser at all but down to chance.276 Even after having 
conducted her experiment, Dembski argues, the statistician does not eliminate 
chance from their list of possible explanations for a given event. Dembski sees 
explaining any phenomenon with chance as insufficient in all cases and argues 
that not only is the possibility of offering such an explanation ruled out when one 
uses the Design Inference, but also that the possibility of offering such an 
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explanation cannot be ruled out when one uses the methodology applied by his 
analogical statistician.277 
As with Behe’s examples, Dembski’s tale suffers in many ways. The first failing 
is in Dembski’s diagnosis of what the statistician will assume prior to the 
conduct of her experiment, i.e. that the fertiliser will have no effect on the crop 
yield. I do not see how this would be the ‘safest assumption to make’, as 
conducting an experiment to see the effectiveness of a supposed fertiliser with 
no knowledge that it could work as a fertiliser would seem to be a waste of time 
and materials. Experiments are conducted with a hypothesis in mind that the 
experiment will serve to either prove or disprove. 
Second, Dembski places the experiment within the field of statistics, which is 
rather odd. Statisticians do not often conduct experiments; they are the purview 
of scientists. Indeed, a reader who is given Dembski’s example with all 
references to the protagonist being a statistician omitted could be forgiven for 
assuming that the protagonist is a scientist of some sort. While I cannot say for 
certain why Dembski has chosen to make his experimenter a statistician, I 
cannot help but be suspicious of his terminology. 
Hafer holds that Dembski and other Intelligent Design theorists wish to replace 
science and scientific investigation with creationist Intelligent Design.278 
Intelligent Design is not itself science, but its advocates must disguise it as such 
so that it can be seen as a legitimate alternative to science.279 The problem 
Intelligent Design theorists face in this pursuit, Hafer says, is that Intelligent 
Design is not science, because it is inherently untestable.280 In light of Hafer’s 
comments, the cynic in me is far more in favour of viewing Dembski’s 
rebranding of the character in his example, who is obviously a scientist, as a 
statistician, so as to disguise the fact that he is creating an ‘us and them’ 
dichotomy where science is on one side and Intelligent Design is on the other, 
effectively admitting that Intelligent Design is not science. 
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Furthermore, Hafer’s analysis of Intelligent Design theory as unscientific 
because it is untestable gives us cause to compare Dembski (and Behe, to the 
extent that he, too, is guilty of being unscientific in this way) with the 10th 
Century Norwegians from the beginning of Thor. By choosing to believe that 
those beings which they knew were extra-terrestrial were their gods, the 10th 
Century Norwegians prevented the scientific method from being used to discern 
any other information about those beings. The divine is outside the realm of the 
methodology of experimental science, whereas extra-terrestrial life is not. Thus, 
it would be the case that the Asgardians could be studied using the scientific 
method (and, indeed, Dr Foster studies Thor using the scientific method during 
the film), but not if they were truly gods. 
In much the same way, Dembski and Behe, in their denotation of phenomena 
such as the bacterial flagellum as the products of intelligent design, are 
preventing the scientific method from being used to discern any other 
information about them. They are taking such phenomena and placing them 
outside the realm of the methodology of experimental science by giving them a 
direct divine cause. Just as the 10th Century Norwegians were being unscientific 
by postulating the untestable claim that the Asgardians were divine, so too are 
the Intelligent Design theorists being unscientific by placing biological 
phenomena outside the realm of experimental science by postulating that they 
have one (sole) direct divine cause. The 10th Century Norwegians in the 
opening scene of Thor were as much ‘science stoppers’ as Hafer accuses the 
Intelligent Design theorists of being. 
Lastly, and perhaps most damning as it dismisses Dembski’s reason for 
including this example in the first place, scientific investigation does not allow 
the possibility of chance if it can help it.281 Experiments are repeated to ensure 
that the results were due to the original hypothesis either being correct or 
incorrect. Science seeks answers as much as Dembski does and is just as 
unwilling to accept that any phenomenon can be explained only by chance. To 
say that those engaged in the scientific pursuit are content to give chance as an 
explanation for a phenomenon is to fall foul of Richard Dawkins’ argument, 
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mentioned in Chapter 1, concerning the mysteries which some are content to 
leave unsolved but which science is not: the idea that there are currently areas 
of the unknown, “‘But we’re working on it”.282 A scientist would not be content to 
leave the matter at the stage in which Dembski’s statistician does, but continue 
to work at the issue until they have achieved a satisfactorily conclusive result 
which does not hark back to chance. 
Putting aside Dembski’s crop yield analogy and returning to his Scrabble 
analogy, we can provide another argument against the Design Inference using 
Dawkins’ METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL experiment, conducted in The 
Blind Watchmaker.283 He begins with the famous story that an infinite number of 
monkeys given an infinite amount of time and an infinite number of typewriters 
should, statistically, eventually produce the entire works of Shakespeare. 
Dawkins scales the experiment down to seeing how long it would take a 
monkey to type a single phrase from Hamlet: ‘Methinks it is like a weasel’. In the 
first iteration of the experiment, the monkey gets 28 random ‘bashes’ at a 
keyboard (the number of characters in the phrase) until he manages to 
generate the desired phrase. To save time, Dawkins designs a computer 
program to act on behalf of the monkey and found that the chances of the 
computer generating the phrase given these rules to be astronomically small. 
He then alters the computer program to instead take the first randomly-
generated phrase and ‘mutate’ it: “The computer examines the mutant 
nonsense phrases, the ‘progeny’ of the original phrase, and chooses the one 
which, however slightly, most resembles the target phrase, METHINKS IT IS 
LIKE A WEASEL”.284 This system so increased the odds that on the first run of 
the program the target phrase was achieved in 43 generations. On successive 
runs, it never took more than 65 generations to produce the target phrase. 
Dawkins uses this program as an analogy for the process of evolution through 
natural selection, in that natural selection does not, as Ann Druyan put it, “start 
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from scratch”,285 but works with what it already has and adapts based on that 
which is nearer to the short-term goal of survival.286 
In Dembski’s Scrabble analogy, the specified event is where Scrabble tiles on a 
board form an intended word. This, Dembski argues, could not have come 
about by chance but must be the result of the action of an intelligent agent. 
Similarly, the specified complexity of certain biological systems could not have 
arisen from chance but must have been the result of the action of an intelligent 
agent. Using Dawkins’ experiment, however, we can see that even though it is 
unlikely that what Dembski would deem to be an unspecified event could 
produce something complex in the way Dembski understands complexity on its 
first attempt to do so, a sequence of events which build upon the previous 
events can indeed produce the intended complex result. We can therefore place 
the emergence of the complexity of certain biological systems neither in the 
realm of chance nor in the realm of design, but in the realm of regularity (to use 
Dembski’s terminology). Natural selection does not start from scratch, and 
Dawkins’ experiment shows how it can be explained through regularity. Thus, 
even though Dembski is probably correct in that there are not many ways in 
which to explain phenomena (though if it is indeed only the three that he gives 
is open to discussion), it does not follow that complex biological systems must 
be explained by design. 
Just as Behe’s irreducible complexity is fraught with issues, so too is Dembski’s 
Design Inference. Yet the entire position of Intelligent Design falls foul of an 
even greater problem, that of the God of the Gaps. 
Intelligent Design and the God of the Gaps 
The God of the Gaps is a problem within philosophy of religion that has been 
discussed by many over a long period of time. The first description of a God of 
the Gaps argument was given by Henry Drummond: 
“There are reverent minds who ceaselessly scan the fields of Nature and 
the books of Science in search of gaps—gaps which they will fill up with 
God. As if God lived in gaps? What view of Nature or of Truth is theirs 
whose interest in Science is not in what it can explain but 'in what it 
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cannot, whose quest is ignorance not knowledge, whose daily dread is 
that the cloud may lift, and who, as darkness melts from this field or from 
that, begin to tremble for the place of His abode?”287 
A more famous description of the argument is that given by C.A. Coulson: 
“a God who is obliged to conceal His actions of providence so that we 
cannot see Him, a God who hides His presence in Nature behind the law 
of large numbers, is a God for whom I have no use; He is a God who 
leaves Nature still unexplained, while He sneaks in through the 
loopholes”.288 
Such arguments inspire strong negative feelings in many thinkers. David Snoke, 
for instance, makes the bold claim that no matter what differences exist 
between any two thinkers, they will both agree that God of the Gaps arguments 
are not good arguments.289 
The Traditional Refutation 
Where Paley committed the God of the Gaps fallacy is in his comparison of the 
design of the watch to the ‘design’ of the universe. Where the universe needs to 
be explained as the work of a designer, Paley says, that designer must be God. 
He has identified the gap in human knowledge that is the unknown origin of the 
‘order’ perceived within the universe and invokes the divine to fill that gap. Both 
Behe and Dembski can similarly be accused of committing the fallacy of the 
God of the Gaps. 
Behe accuses science of being unable to sufficiently account for molecular life, 
saying that nothing has been published which describes the evolution of 
molecules into life.290 He uses the same argument when discussing cilia.291 
Behe claims that such gaps in scientific knowledge are indicative of irreducibly 
complex systems being incompatible with the theory of Darwinian evolution and 
therefore subject to design. Such an argument is a classic example of God of 
the Gaps reasoning, where a gap is identified in human knowledge, in this case 
the evolution of molecules into life and of protein complexes into motile cilia, 
 
287 Henry Drummond, The Ascent of Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1894], 
2009), 426-427. 
288 C A Coulson, Science and Christian Belief (London: Fontana Books, 1960), 34. 
289 David Snoke, “In Favor of God-of-the-Gaps Reasoning,” Perspectives on Science and 
Christian Faith 53 (2001), accessed January 23, 2018, URL: 
http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2001/PSCF9-01Snoke.html.  
290 Behe, Darwin’s Black Box, 163. It should be noted that Behe is referring to those publications 
prior to 2006; it may be the case that a theory has been put forward on the evolution of 
molecules since. 
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and an appeal to the divine without evidence is invoked as an explanation for 
that which is as yet unknown. 
In the Thor franchise, a man travels light years and through two separate 
atmospheres from one planet to another and survives the journey unscathed: 
such a phenomenon might be put down to magic or the supernatural, until it is 
described as an Einstein-Rosen Bridge and enters the realm of science, with 
the previous gap in knowledge filled. Such is the case with Behe’s examples. 
The traditional refutation of the God of the Gaps is that wherever a gap is 
identified in human knowledge and is filled with an appeal to God, the divine, or 
the supernatural, it has been shown in past experience that it is only a matter of 
time before human knowledge catches up with itself and fills in the gap. As 
Coulson says, any gaps in human knowledge “have the unpreventable habit of 
shrinking”.292 Indeed, it is the purpose of science to explain phenomena in the 
world around us, and to find explanations which do not involve an appeal to the 
supernatural.293 Susskind says that although there are gaps in the theory of 
evolution such as those Behe describes, the scientific pursuit is to find natural 
fillers for those gaps.294 
If this is indeed the case, then the gaps Behe has identified will only remain 
open for him to fill with appeals to Intelligent Design if the scientific pursuit is 
halted. Indeed, Hafer argues throughout her book that the cessation of science 
appears to be one of the agendas of the Intelligent Design Movement. She 
argues that Intelligent Design thinkers “want to squash science as a method of 
investigation”,295 that they wish to replace science rather than practise science 
themselves,296 and that they wish to “defeat” science.297 Such claims are 
certainly bold, but where areas exist within Intelligent Design that do not seem 
to be viable within the currently accepted model of the scientific method, one 
could forgive the suspicion that they wish to redefine that model so that those 
areas can be validated. Ultimately, Behe’s appeals to gaps in human knowledge 
 
292 Coulson, Science, 32. 
293 Again, we can hark back to Dawkins’ phrase, “‘But we’re working on it” (Dawkins, Unweaving 
the Rainbow, 17). 
294 Leonard Susskind, “The Good Fight,” in Intelligent Thought: Science versus the Intelligent 
Design Movement, ed. John Brockman (New York City, New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 30. 
295 Hafer, Not-So Intelligent Designer, 7. 
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will become more and more difficult to justify when the time comes that science 
fills them in and deems Behe’s designed irreducible complexity nothing less 
than untrue. 
It is tempting to say that the traditional refutation of the God of the Gaps has 
gone unchallenged, but this too is untrue. Several thinkers have offered 
counters, including Behe himself in anticipation of being accused of committing 
the God of the Gaps fallacy. 
Behe says that scientists are often saying that they will fill in the gaps in human 
knowledge but gives the point that there is no real reason to believe that.298 
Indeed, as Larson says, the traditional refutation of God of the Gaps arguments 
is based on “an inflated view of what naturalistic science is likely to 
accomplish”.299 This is certainly an interesting counter-argument, and one 
worthy of consideration. In this sense, the God of the Gaps is turned on its head 
and becomes something more like the Science of the Gaps, where gaps in 
human knowledge are filled with hypothesised future human scientific 
discoveries without evidence to suggest that such discoveries will be made. We 
could look upon the magic used by the Asgardians and claim that because 
some of it has been explained as science far more advanced than anything that 
is found on Earth then all of it must be so explained, even if we lack the 
explanations for all of it at this point in time. 
Thor’s reaction to Doctor Strange’s magic shows that not all the magic within 
the MCU can be explained as advanced science. Yet we have already seen that 
the gaps into which God is inserted are only truly safe if the scientific pursuit is 
stopped in its tracks, and this is unlikely to happen. Rather than the limits of the 
ability of science itself to fill in those gaps in human knowledge where it might 
seem rational to appeal to the divine or the supernatural, the limits lie in those 
doing the science. Science, emerging in its current form (by which I mean 
experimental science conducted using the scientific method) around 400 years 
ago, has consistently outlived all its practitioners and there is no reason to 
suppose that it will not continue to do so. While, then, it is unlikely that any 
given scientist will be able to fill in those gaps in human knowledge during their 
 
298 Behe, Darwin’s Black Box, 8. 
299 Ronald G Larson, “Revisiting the God of the Gaps.” Perspectives on Science and Christian 
Faith 61, no. 1 (2009): 21. 
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own lifetime, their work can be passed on to successive generations of 
scientists and built on through the ages, so that eventually the discipline of 
science finds an explanation for the gap. Science, as a collaborative and 
cumulative pursuit of knowledge of the natural world, is unlikely to be stopped or 
redefined any time soon, and so I would argue that there is no reason to believe 
that it is not capable of eventually filling in those gaps that currently exist in 
knowledge of regular natural phenomena without appeal to the divine or the 
supernatural.300 If such naturalistic explanations exist, then they are likely to be 
found through naturalistic science, and the gaps will be filled. 
The Ultimate God of the Gaps 
We have already seen Hafer accuse the Intelligent Design theorists of being 
‘science stoppers’ by proposing premises which are inherently untestable. To 
shut down further investigation in this way is to ascribe it to magic or the 
supernatural, while a testable premise is within the realm of science and can be 
investigated using the scientific method. In much the same way as Asgardian 
science is confused as magic by Earthlings within the MCU, Intelligent Design 
theorists confuse gaps in scientific knowledge with evidence of Design, and go 
one step further, in that they create gaps for God within existing human 
knowledge. While still working within the frame of God of the Gaps reasoning, 
where gaps in human knowledge are filled with an appeal to the supernatural or 
the divine, the Intelligent Design theorists forsake looking for gaps to fill with the 
divine or the supernatural, and instead take human knowledge and tear new 
gaps in it which they then fill with explanations appealing to the divine. 
Dembski says: “The “gaps” in the god-of-the-gaps objection to supernatural 
agency denote putative gaps in human knowledge (i.e., ignorance) about 
underlying physical causes. A supernatural agent, however, might act so that 
the resulting discontinuity in the chain of physical causes could never be 
removed by appealing to ordinary physical explanations”.301 With this argument, 
Dembski says that there are some areas of human knowledge which cannot be 
filled with science, and that the ‘supernatural agent’, or the Intelligent Designer, 
could have created the universe in such a way that some areas of that which it 
is possible to know cannot be known without appeal to the divine, even those 
 
300 An exception may be found where the science itself declares the ‘gap’ unclosable, as with 
the precise moment of decay of a radioactive particle. 
301 Dembski, End of Christianity, 115. 
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areas which appear to be explainable using scientific means. In this, Dembski 
takes human knowledge and says that even those areas which are the purview 
of science are not truly the purview of science, and instead can be explained 
with appeals to the divine. One could say that Polkinghorne does a similar thing 
when discussing what he regards as ‘uncloseable’ gaps of chaotic dynamics, 
but Polkinghorne does not argue that such gaps can only be filled with an 
appeal to the divine; by describing such gaps as ‘uncloseable’, Polkinghorne 
removes any possibility to fill those gaps in with any kind of knowledge, whether 
that is knowledge obtained through the scientific method or by an appeal to the 
divine. Dembski, on the other hand, is specifically saying that these gaps can 
only be filled by appealing to the divine. In this way, Dembski is not filling in 
existing gaps with the divine but creating new gaps to be filled with the divine. 
Behe, similarly, does this in his discussion of Dawkins’ METHINKS IT IS LIKE A 
WEASEL experiment. Behe says that the purpose of the experiment is to show 
how complex systems could have evolved, but that “The analogy is offered in 
lieu of actual evidence that these or other complex systems could have evolved 
in a Darwinian fashion”.302 Dingley similarly pointed out the irony in Dawkins’ 
use of a system of which he was the intelligent designer to refute Intelligent 
Design theory.303 Behe’s argument is contradictory, however, for he offers no 
evidence to suggest that a lack of Darwinian explanation entails that design is 
integral in creating the irreducibly complex system that is the phrase 
METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL. In this sense he creates the gap of a lack of 
evidence for Darwinian evolution and inserts Intelligent Design as the 
explanation, without giving any evidence as to why Intelligent Design should fill 
the gap other than that the gap exists. 
When Dr Selvig finds a book on Norse mythology aimed at children in the local 
library and shows it to Dr Foster, he wants to make her understand that Thor is 
either mistaken or lying about who he really is: the Asgardians, as godlike 
beings, do not exist. Dr Foster’s response is an appeal to Arthur C Clarke’s 
Third Law, and in doing so asks Dr Selvig to take a leap of faith to believe that 
Thor is who he says he is and such beings could exist, if only an explanation 
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could be found.304 As we have already seen, the explanation given for the 
existence of the Asgardians and their supposed magic is advanced extra-
terrestrial intelligence and technology. In the same way the Intelligent Design 
theorists ask their readers to take a leap of faith to believe that the Intelligent 
Designer does exist, if only an explanation can be found; and, as it can with the 
Asgardians’ existence, the Intelligent Design theorists argue that the Intelligent 
Designer’s existence can be explained with science. 
Such arguments are constructed negatively, in that both Dembski and Behe are 
arguing that certain scientific processes, usually the theory of evolution through 
natural selection, are lacking something. It is into this lack that they insert the 
divine, their Intelligent Designer. By saying that scientific processes are lacking, 
they are creating a gap in human knowledge, and they argue that this gap is the 
place wherein their Intelligent Designer exists. In this way, they are not only 
guilty of the fallacy of the God of the Gaps, but they are committing the ultimate 
God of the Gaps argument, whereby they create gaps in human knowledge and 
insert the divine within those gaps that they themselves have created. Hafer 
argues that because the claims made by Intelligent Design theorists are 
inherently untestable, they cannot be arrived at through use of the scientific 
method but can only be accessed via “a leap of faith”.305 Hafer is arguing that 
one must take a leap of faith across a void of unscientific methods, which 
cannot be tested using scientific experiments, to the claims which the Intelligent 
Design theorists are making. I would argue that, rather, one must take a leap of 
faith into the gap which theorists such as Dembski and Behe make in human 
knowledge to accept the claims that they have placed within that gap. 
Dembski and Behe may have anticipated that they would be rightly accused of 
the God of the Gaps fallacy and respond to such an accusation. They do not do 
so satisfactorily, however. Instead they use a different version of the God of the 
Gaps argument, whereby the gaps are created by them rather than ignorance 
and are then filled with their Intelligent Designer without any satisfactory 
evidence suggesting either why such gaps should be created nor why they 
should be filled with the Intelligent Designer. 
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Intelligent Design theorists such as Dembski and Behe would answer the 
question of the compatibility of science and Christian theology positively. 
Indeed, the thinkers we have discussed in this chapter believe that the actions 
of the divine can be found within the realm that atheistically is seen to belong 
solely to science. The problem lies, for these thinkers, not in an inherent mutual 
exclusivity between science and Christian theology but in the tyranny of 
Darwinism and naturalistic atheistic science which have and continue to 
systematically remove all theistic possibilities from the scientific pursuit. 
Yet this does not mean that they have provided a satisfactory formulation of the 
relationship between science and Christian theology in the contemporary West. 
If we are to find a position where science and Christian theology are compatible 
with each other then we could turn to Intelligent Design theory, but only if we 
are willing to jettison one of the cornerstones of modern scientific endeavour in 
the process. Not only that, but Intelligent Design theory would ask us to forgo 
one of the most consistently sustained scientific theories in favour of a 
hypothesis for which no evidence nor an experiment to discover any evidence 
has ever been proposed by any of its adherents. As such, Intelligent Design 
theory mirrors Dawkins’ New Atheism in another way: where Dawkins was 
unwittingly asking us to join a pseudo-religion while claiming that it was not a 
religion, the Intelligent Design theorists are asking us to believe in a pseudo-
science while maintaining that it is a legitimate form of science. 
We are left with a similar problem to the one Dawkins left us with. While 
Intelligent Design theory tells us that science and Christian theology can be 
compatible, in fact they are only telling us that pseudo-science and Christian 
theology can be compatible. If we wish to find a worldview which allows us to sit 
comfortably with both science and Christian theology, we shall need to find an 
accurate representation of science (which must follow the scientific method to 
be a satisfactorily accurate representation), and a satisfactorily accurate 
representation of Christian theology (which avoids becoming a pseudo-religion 
as was the case with Dawkins’ New Atheism) which can be compatible with that 
representation of science. When discussing Type 3, the Type where science 
and Christian doctrine are treated with equal regard, Messer invokes the name 
89 
 
of John Polkinghorne as a prime example of this kind of Type. Could 




Chapter 3 – John Polkinghorne, 
Final Fantasy XV, and the Ultimate 
Reality 
Introduction 
John Polkinghorne began his career as a physicist before becoming an 
Anglican priest.306 Over the last thirty years, he has written many books 
exploring the relationship between science and Christian theology from his 
position as having trained in both physics and Christian theology. Wishing to 
keep both of these parts of his life together, Polkinghorne describes himself as 
a “scientist-theologian, seeking to combine the perspectives of science and 
Christianity in a stereoscopic world view”.307 Polkinghorne believes that it is 
possible to understand reality as containing both the truths of science and the 
truths of theology, neither in conflict with the other, and both working together to 
uncover the ultimate truths of the ultimate reality. 
Due to this attempted synthesis of science and theology as equal parts of the 
exploration of a single ultimate reality, Messer placed Polkinghorne in Type 3: 
where science and Christian doctrine are considered equal with one another 
and neither one is forced to give way to the other.308 Unlike Dawkins, 
Polkinghorne does not wish to jettison either science or theology. Unlike the 
Intelligent Design theorists, Polkinghorne does not wish to disguise either 
science or theology as the other. In Polkinghorne’s view, science and Christian 
theology are distinct from each other and can perform different duties in the 
search for truth, but the findings of both are crucial for building our 
understanding of the reality in which we exist. Thus, reality becomes an ultimate 
reality – wherein both science and theology are required for true understanding. 
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As with Chapters 1 and 2, I shall be illustrating the position of the thinker with a 
case study from popular culture which portrays a relationship between magic 
and technology. In this chapter, my case study will be Final Fantasy XV 
(hereafter FFXV), a video game which features both magic and technology 
coexisting in the game world. The worldbuilding and lore of FFXV takes care to 
interweave technology and magic together, so that they can exist within the 
same world while not being at ontological odds with one another. 
Polkinghorne’s idea of the ultimate reality is preferable to the directions taken by 
either Dawkins or the Intelligent Design theorists. Yet it is far from perfect. In the 
second half of this chapter, I shall explore the failings of Polkinghorne’s position, 
namely his treatment of nonhuman animals within his framework. I shall argue 
that such a position is not only limited but is also unnecessary and can be 
removed from the framework of the ultimate reality with the use of soul-
language. Ultimately, I shall conclude that while Polkinghorne’s position in the 
middle of Messer’s spectrum is the lesser of five evils, it should not be adopted 
without some revisions. 
Final Fantasy XV 
FFXV was released in 2016 by Japanese games development company Square 
Enix. The game is the fifteenth main title in the perhaps now redundantly-named 
Final Fantasy series. Each game in the series follows different characters and 
different stories and each is set in a different world from its predecessors. 
Unlike the MCU, discussed in Chapter 2, each title in the series is narratively 
distinct.309 
FFXV follows the tale of Noctis Lucis Caelum, prince of the kingdom of Lucis on 
the planet Eos. For the purposes of this thesis, the story of the game is not 
important. Rather, I wish to discuss the worldbuilding and lore of the game and 
of Eos.310 Unlike many fantasies (such as the previously discussed Elder Scrolls 
series), FFXV features ‘modern’ technology. The four main characters spend a 
 
309 Where characters and places from different titles meet, these meetings are usually 
considered non-canon (i.e. they are not considered as ‘real’ events which have happened to 
those characters or in those places). This being said, while all fifteen entries into the Final 
Fantasy series are narratively distinct from each other, FFXV itself has been made part of a 
sub-franchise called the Final Fantasy XV Universe, which consists of a multitude of multi-media 
entries which expand the story and the lore of the world in which FFXV is set. 
310 Throughout the chapter, I will refer to individual story events from the game and other entries 
in the Universe, but only where they enlighten aspects of the world and the lore. 
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large portion of the game driving around the kingdom of Lucis in a convertible, 
and in several cases the plot is advanced through the use of mobile telephones. 
Other advanced technology includes genetic engineering, airships, robotic 
humanoids, CDs, speedboats, electric lightning, power generators, elevators, 
lasers, and many more. In contrast to previous Final Fantasy titles, FFXV “is 
meant to be a "fantasy based on reality," thus its look is derived primarily from 
present-day Earth”.311 Were someone from our world to find themselves on the 
planet of Eos, they would not find its infrastructure and technology 
unrecognisable – that is, until they encountered magic. 
There are two types of magic within the world of FFXV: elemental magic and 
arcana. The latter can only be used by Noctis as it is only possible via an 
artefact known as the Ring of the Lucii which is passed down through the 
Lucian royal line.312 Elemental magic, however, also referred to as Elemancy, 
requires no special artefact for any of the characters to use it, nor is it exclusive 
to Noctis. Elemancy consists of the process of manufacturing elemental spells 
through the blending of elemental energies found in deposits around the game 
world. Elemental spells can be crafted by the player through the game menu, 
where they fill a magic flask. These magic flasks can be given to any of the four 
main characters to use as weapons and the flasks themselves are reusable.313 
The treatment of the relationship between magic and technology in FFXV differs 
from the treatment of that same relationship in our previous case studies. 
Where the Elder Scrolls series maintains a pseudo-medieval aesthetic and 
advanced technology is hard to come by and almost impossible to craft since 
the disappearance of the Dwemer, technology is rife on Eos and is used 
alongside magic, though not all in Eos have the innate ability to use magic.314 In 
 
311 Final Fantasy Wiki contributors, “Final Fantasy XV.” In Final Fantasy Wiki. n.d. Accessed 
August 21, 2018. http://finalfantasy.wikia.com/wiki/Final_Fantasy_XV. 
312 The Ring of the Lucii can only be equipped by Noctis, and therefore the arcana magic which 
it affords can only be used by Noctis in the game (Final Fantasy Wiki contributors, “Ring of the 
Lucii.” In Final Fantasy Wiki. n.d. Accessed September 21, 2018. 
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313 Final Fantasy Wiki contributors, “Final Fantasy XV.” 
314 A notable character in this regard is Crowe Altius, who appears in Kingsglaive: Final Fantasy 
XV. As a member of the Kingsglaive, Crowe is tasked with protecting the royal line and has 
been gifted the ability to use royal magic to aid her in this pursuit (Final Fantasy XV: 
Kingsglaive, directed by Takeshi Nozue. 2016. Budapest: Digic Pictures, Film). She is unique 
among the Kingsglaive, however, for her impressive natural talent with regards to wielding 
magic. She is described as “an exceptionally gifted wielder of magic”. A non-canon entry into 
the Final Fantasy series, Final Fantasy Brave Exvius, describes Crowe thus: “Although the 
Kingsglaive members borrow their magical power from the king himself, Crowe is especially 
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battle, Noctis (the character usually controlled by the player) can switch 
between Elemancy spells, arcana, and the various types of weaponry available 
in the game, some of which would not be out of place in works of science-
fiction.315 Where in the Thor franchise, magic is simply science more advanced 
than that which is currently understood on Earth and therefore is capable of 
more advanced technology than we are able to produce on Earth (such as the 
Bifrost and the Soul Forge, which, at first appearing as magic, are eventually 
described through the language of science and technology once they are 
understood as such by the Earthling characters), magic in FFXV is entirely 
separate from technology. The technology of Eos was developed independently 
by the inhabitants of a world who already had the power to wield magic. In such 
a way, the magic and technology of Eos complement each other rather than 
exist in dichotomy with one another. They co-exist as equal parts of the reality 
of Eos and are not in conflict with one another.316 
Polkinghorne and the Ultimate Reality 
We have seen that Richard Dawkins believes there to be only one reality, and 
that reality can only be understood through scientific pursuits. We have also 
seen that the Intelligent Design theorists understand there to be one reality, but 
they believe that truths which are accessible by Christian theology alone are a 
part of that reality in the same way that truths accessible by science are. John 
Polkinghorne also believes that there is one reality, but he understands this 
reality to consist of both the truths of science and the truths of Christian 
theology existing side by side, distinct from each other but equally helpful in the 
 
adept in magic”. Indeed, Crowe was “allowed to join the Kingsglaive when she showed skill with 
magic”, showing that she had magical talent even before she was granted the ability to wield 
royal magic (Final Fantasy Wiki contributors, “Crowe Altius.” In Final Fantasy Wiki. n.d. 
Accessed November 2, 2018. http://finalfantasy.wikia.com/wiki/Crowe_Altius) [sic] (the king 
referenced here is King Regis, Noctis’ father). 
315 Weapons in FFXV are categorised; these categories include swords and great swords, but 
also firearms and machinery. In the latter, one can find impressive science-fiction weapons such 
as the Gravity Well, which has a special attack which “pulls foes in with a gravity sphere” (Final 
Fantasy Wiki contributors, “List of Final Fantasy XV weapons.” In Final Fantasy Wiki. n.d. 
Accessed September 21, 2018. 
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316 The main difference between magic and technology and science and theology is that the 
former are ways of doing things while the latter are ways of understanding things. Yet in many 
fantasies, and particularly in FFXV, the latter precedes the former. Just as technology is borne 
out of science, magic is borne out of theology and the supernatural. This is not to say that 
Christian theology is a form of magic, or even entails magic, but the relationships between the 
concepts remain. In FFXV, magic is bestowed upon mortals by the gods, as is described in the 
Cosmogony lore books. 
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pursuit of understanding that one reality. For Polkinghorne, it makes no sense 
to talk about those aspects of reality which are ‘natural’ and those which are 
‘supernatural’; rather, we must understand all aspects of reality as just that: 
nothing more and nothing less.317 This is not to say that we will be able to 
understand reality in its entirety – “Our understanding of the physical world will 
never be total but it can become progressively more accurate”318 – but such a 
reality does exist around us. 
Polkinghorne argues that it is the quest of both science and theology to seek 
this ultimate reality. Science and theology, he writes, are not so different from 
each other – they are, in effect, two sides of the same coin, exploring ultimate 
reality in different ways but still contributing to our understanding of the same 
ultimate reality. It is because of this that the two pursuits should not be pitted 
against one another but should be engaging in “fruitful interaction with each 
other”.319 Science and Christian theology are only asking different questions 
about the same thing, and the answers to each of those questions will, together, 
broaden our understanding of that thing. As such, Polkinghorne cannot 
conceive of a conflict between science and Christian theology, because they 
are seeking different aspects of the same reality. 
Imagine science and theology as two individuals. They are distinct from each 
other, existing as two different people. Both people are seeking answers to 
questions about the same thing. Let us say that these questions take the form 
of rats in a sewer, and the death of a rat signifies the answering of that 
question. In seeking the answers to their questions – the deaths of the rats – 
the person of science and the person of theology both come down to the sewer 
armed with guns. In Dawkins’ understanding of this situation, the person of 
science would shoot all the rats dead while the person of theology attempts to 
kill some of the rats only to find that they (the person of theology) suffer from 
great inaccuracy in their firing. In the Intelligent Design theorists’ understanding 
of this situation, the person of science would believe that they have shot dead 
several of the rats, only to realise that their gun was filled largely with blanks 
and that the rats were mainly killed by the person of theology. For Polkinghorne, 
 
317 John Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology (London: SPCK, 
1986), 78. 
318 Ibid, 17. 
319 John Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World (London: SPCK, 2002), xix. 
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however, the person of science and the person of theology are standing back-
to-back and shooting in semi-circles around them. Half of the rats are killed by 
the person of science and the other half are killed by the person of theology, 
and the answers to all their questions are obtained through their cooperation. 
This is because science and theology are, in Polkinghorne’s view, asking 
different questions about reality.320 Indeed, Polkinghorne believes that they are 
asking the two different kinds of questions that we have seen Dawkins write 
about – ‘how’ questions and ‘why’ questions. Science, Polkinghorne argues, is 
answering the ‘how’ questions, while theology is answering the ‘why’ 
questions.321  
In FFXV, magic and technology have two different origins. Magic – both 
Elemancy and arcana – is derived from natural resources: Elemancy from 
natural elemental deposits around the game world, and arcana from the magical 
abilities gifted to the Lucian royal line by the gods. Technology, however, is 
created and developed by humans in much the same way that technology in our 
world has been developed. Magic has always existed on the planet of Eos, but 
technology had to be invented by the inhabitants of Eos. Yet they are both used 
as tools in the same way and can often be used for the same things: magic can 
be used for combat just as guns and lasers can, and magic can be used for 
healing as much as first aid kits can. Polkinghorne similarly argues that it is 
reasonable to pray for healing, though prayer is a more personal endeavour 
than medical science and so the results of such prayer must be dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis; they are also inherently anecdotal.322 Science and theology 
are not opposing sides in Polkinghorne’s understanding of the ultimate reality: 
they are just two different ways of achieving that goal. 
 
320 This analogy is, of course, lacking in that it suggests that once an answer has been obtained 
for a question, the question is considered complete and never needs to be revisited. This is not 
the case, as answers to any question can be further nuanced and even prove to be wrong. 
Perhaps, then, for this analogy to more accurately depict the pursuit of knowledge and answers 
to questions on the ultimate reality, the answering of questions cannot stop at the initial shooting 
of the rats but continue through to the dissection of those rats and further studies of their 
anatomy. This analogy is simplistic, but for the purposes of describing the differences between 
the approaches of our three positions, I believe it is sufficient. 
321 John Polkinghorne, Serious Talk: Science and Religion in Dialogue (London: SCM Press, 
1995), viii. 
322 John Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God's Interaction With the World (West 
Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Templeton Foundation Press, 2005), 85-86. 
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But perhaps the ‘dichotomy’ between ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions is not as binary 
as I have made it seem. Magic and technology do not need to be kept separate 
in the world of FFXV. Certain technological items, such as Reflex Enhancers 
and Magitek Boosters, can be added to elemental energies in the process of 
Elemancy to grant different and additional effects to otherwise purely elemental 
spells.323 Weapons created by the humans of Eos can be empowered with 
magic: a notable example would be the Royal arms of the Lucian royal line, 
which Noctis is tasked with collecting throughout the game. These weapons 
originally belonged to former Lucian monarchs, and were buried with them 
when they died. Noctis, as the heir to the Lucian throne, can travel to the tombs 
of the former monarchs and absorb their Royal arms and wield them as magical 
weapons: “The weapons have a transcendental presence, as they can be 
wielded by more than one person at once, essentially being in more than one 
location simultaneously”.324  Polkinghorne says that the distinction between the 
two types of questions, ‘how’ questions and ‘why’ questions, is only helpful up to 
a point, because the answers to ‘how’ questions and the answers to ‘why’ 
questions eventually blur into one: “there is not a simple dichotomy between 
science and theology. They interact upon each other in various ways”.325 In this 
way, it is conceivable that the shootout in the sewer is more of a free-for-all, 
with both persons shooting whichever rat they see, rather than keeping to their 
personal semi-circle created by their standing back-to-back. It is perfectly 
possible to use Elemancy and technology entirely and exclusively separately 
 
323 Final Fantasy Wiki contributors, “Elemancy.” In Final Fantasy Wiki. n.d. Accessed September 
21, 2018. http://finalfantasy.wikia.com/wiki/Elemancy; Final Fantasy Wiki contributors, “List of 
Final Fantasy XV items.” In Final Fantasy Wiki. n.d. Accessed September 21, 2018. 
http://finalfantasy.wikia.com/wiki/List_of_Final_Fantasy_XV_items. 
324 Final Fantasy Wiki contributors, “Royal arms.” In Final Fantasy Wiki. n.d. Accessed 
September 21, 2018. http://finalfantasy.wikia.com/wiki/Royal_arms_(Final_Fantasy_XV). The 
reference to more than one person being able to use the same Royal arms at the same time is 
likely a reference to the final battle of the game, where Noctis and Ardyn, the main antagonist of 
the game, each use their respective Armigers (collections of Royal weapons) against each 
other; both Noctis’ and Ardyn’s Armigers contain some of the same weapons, thus indicating 
that the weapons can be used by two different people at the same time (Final Fantasy Wiki 
contributors, “Royal arms”). 
325 Polkinghorne, One World, 62. It is perhaps interesting to note that Peacocke, who is often 
associated with Polkinghorne, does not believe that the two types of questions can ‘blur’ 
together at all. He is adamant that science cannot provide answers to ‘why’ questions by any 
stretch of the imagination, and that it is not possible for science to provide explanations for 
phenomena in this way. (Arthur Peacocke, Paths From Science Towards God: The End of All 
Our Exploring [Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2001], 39.) For Peacocke, the dichotomy 
between ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions remains very real. Messer recognises that there is less 
accuracy in equating the arguments of Polkinghorne and Peacocke to this degree, for he places 
Peacocke in a different Type on his spectrum (Type 2) than he does Polkinghorne (Messer, 
Selfish Genes, 54-58). 
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throughout an entire playthrough of FFXV, but this will mean ignoring the 
benefits gained through the interaction of both; similarly, it is perfectly possible 
to investigate the ultimate reality using only scientific methods or only 
theological methods, but it is not a necessity, and indeed you will gain a greater 
and better understanding of the ultimate reality if you pursue knowledge using 
both. 
Hence, not only are science and theology asking different questions about 
ultimate reality and therefore are not in competition with each other but are 
working together, but Polkinghorne maintains that the two are required in equal 
measure to understand the ultimate reality. Both science and theology need to 
be studied side-by-side: they cannot do without each other.326 If we return to the 
sewer, had either the person of science or the person of theology gone down to 
shoot rats alone, they would not have been successful in answering all their 
questions by shooting all the rats. Either they would have successfully killed half 
of the rats and then been overpowered by the other half, or – and perhaps 
Polkinghorne would consider this to be the worse of the two options – they 
would have successfully killed half of the rats while only injuring the other half, 
and left the sewer believing that they had the answers to all of their questions 
without realising that they only had the answers to half of them. Polkinghorne 
develops Einstein’s claim that “‘Religion without science is blind. Science 
without religion is lame’” to: “‘Religion without science is confined; it fails to be 
completely open to reality. Science without religion is incomplete; it fails to 
attain the deepest possible understanding.’”327 If only the person of science 
went down into the sewer, they would emerge having answered the ‘how’ 
questions but not the ‘why’ questions. If the person of theology went down into 
the sewer, they would have answered the ‘why’ questions but not the ‘how’ 
questions. This, for Polkinghorne, will simply not do, for a complete 
understanding of reality requires the answers to both the ‘how’ questions and 
the ‘why’ questions. We have seen this play out in historical debates, says 
Polkinghorne. He points to perhaps the two most famous science/religion 
debates – the Galileo and Darwin Affairs – and says that the outcomes in both 
cases were beneficial for both science and religion. In showing religion that it 
 
326 John Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief: Theological Reflections of a Bottom-Up 
Thinker (London: SPCK, 1994), 44. 
327 Polkinghorne, Science and Creation, 97. 
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was wrong in the cases of the movement of celestial objects and the physical 
emergence of mankind, science freed theology to study those areas for which 
science itself is unqualified to explore, such as “the faithfulness of God which 
finds its pale reflection in the regular laws of nature; the sustaining power of 
God maintaining the world in existence and achieving his purposes through its 
development”.328 In much the same way as you could not describe the planet of 
Eos accurately without talking about both its technology and its magic, so too 
you cannot talk about our own reality accurately without speaking of both the 
truths of science and the truths of theology. 
Polkinghorne describes his search for ultimate reality as “the ultimate search for 
a Grand Unified Theory – a GUT, as we say in physics”. Yet rather than seeking 
just a unification of General Relativity and String Theory, the “theological quest” 
seeks the unification of the findings of science and theology.329 Polkinghorne 
does not understand reality as a dichotomy: the truths of science and the truths 
of theology exist together, side-by-side, as equal parts of our understanding of 
the ultimate reality. Neither one is favoured over the other and both are equally 
important. 
Just as FFXV differs from our previous two case studies, Polkinghorne’s 
understanding of the normative relationship between science and Christian 
theology differs from those of both Dawkins and the Intelligent Design theorists. 
We have already seen that Messer has chosen to place Polkinghorne in his 
third and most ‘middle-of-the-road’ Types on his spectrum,330 where I have 
argued that Dawkins and the Intelligent Design theorists occupy Types 1 and 4 
(or 4.5) respectively. Where Dawkins wishes to completely rid society of religion 
and its influences, Polkinghorne embraces religion and theology – specifically 
Christian theology. Similarly, where the Intelligent Design theorists wish to 
promote religious and theological concepts as science, Polkinghorne wishes to 
retain a distinction between the two, albeit one where science and theology are 
intertwined in such a way that reality cannot be truly understood with only one of 
 
328 Polkinghorne, One World, 62-63. 
329 Polkinghorne, Serious Talk, 3. 
330 Messer uses Polkinghorne as an example of Type 3 (Messer, Selfish Genes, 58-60). Yet in a 
recent article (Neil Messer, “Evolution and Theodicy: How (Not) to do Science and Theology,” 
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 53 no. 3 [2018]), he points out that he does not wish to 
use his typology to describe individuals as far as is possible, but rather to describe types of 
views (824). He does not mention Polkinghorne in this article, but does mention both Dawkins 
and Dembski as being indicative of Types 1 and 5 respectively (824-825). 
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them. Unlike our previous two positions, Polkinghorne wishes to integrate both 
science and theology into our ability to understand the ultimate reality, rather 
than rid ourselves of one or disguise one as the other. 
But what does it mean for science and theology to be so intertwined? How 
should we go about understanding reality as a place where science and 
theology can exist in harmony with each other, not only merely coexisting but 
actively working together to deepen our understanding of reality? Polkinghorne 
points to three areas of study to describe how this integration of science and 
theology might be understood: mathematics, quantum mechanics, and chaotic 
dynamics. 
Polkinghorne uses the example of mathematics to argue for a multi-dimensional 
aspect of reality. He says that the truths of mathematics are considered to be 
“true discoveries, explorations of an already-existing reality”.331 This means that 
the truths of mathematics are like the infamous tree in the forest falling with no 
one around to hear but still making a sound: they would exist even if no one had 
discovered them.332 Pythagoras’ Theorem would still hold true even if no 
intelligent life emerged in the universe to discover that it is true. Because of this, 
only mathematics can afford its practitioners absolute certainty of their 
results.333 Polkinghorne says: “If these convictions of the mathematicians are 
correct (as I believe them to be), then in addition to the physical world that the 
scientists investigate, there must be an everlasting noetic world of mathematical 
entities that the mathematicians investigate.”334 This takes on an even more 
Platonic symbolism, for now not only are the truths of mathematics akin to 
Platonic Forms, but the ‘everlasting noetic world’ is akin to the Platonic 
Intelligible World. This noetic world in which the truths of mathematics exist, 
Polkinghorne says, indicates that the ultimate reality does not consist of merely 
one dimension, but at least two, and if the ultimate reality can be divided into 
different dimensions, then there is no reason to disregard completely the 
possibility that “there might also be a destiny beyond the temporal ending of this 
 
331 Polkinghorne, God of Hope, 20. 
332 Ibid. Such a description of mathematic truths runs the risk of turning them into Platonic 
Forms, a risk which Polkinghorne recognises (20-21). 
333 Polkinghorne, Science and Creation, 11. 
334 Polkinghorne, God of Hope, 20. 
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world”, especially considering the mathematical dimension’s noetic existence as 
an “[element] of reality beyond the flux of time”.335 
Mathematics, then, for Polkinghorne, is indicative of a separate dimension of 
the ultimate reality from the physical dimension which we inhabit. I am unsure 
whether we can take this noetic dimension to be a representation of some kind 
of heaven or paradise, as I do not think that this is what Polkinghorne wishes to 
suggest. I do, however, believe that we can infer the possibility of a heaven or 
paradise separate from both the physical world which we inhabit and the 
dimension of the ultimate reality which the truths of mathematics inhabit from 
the multi-dimensional character of the ultimate reality as Polkinghorne is 
describing it. Polkinghorne does not believe that God – and he is speaking of 
the Christian God – is that transcendent deistic god who does not involve 
Godself with God’s Creation: God is not the ‘man in the sky’ watching over us 
but not interfering. Rather, God does interact with the world, but from the top 
down rather than the bottom up. 
Polkinghorne argues that quantum mechanics has shown us that scientific truth 
is truly stranger than fiction.336 In allowing us to discard an ‘either/or’ type of 
thinking when it comes to physical events, “Quantum theory delivers us from an 
undue tyranny of common sense”.337 Whereas before the introduction of 
quantum theory to the scientific canon, scientists could conceive of entities 
existing as either waves or as particles but never as both, the introduction of 
Dirac’s quantum field theory allows scientists to “know that light and all other 
quantum entities … sometimes behave in a wavelike way and sometimes in a 
particlelike way … without a taint of paradox”.338 
Where quantum mechanics is beneficial for theology is in this ability to free us 
from the confines of ‘common sense’ and classical Aristotelian logic.339 One of 
the contentions between science and Christian theology, as we have seen 
earlier in this thesis, is that science appears to ‘make sense’ where theology 
does not. Polkinghorne argues that quantum mechanics shows us that we do 
not need to be overly worried with what ‘makes sense’ in the same way that we 
 
335 Ibid, 21. 
336 Polkinghorne, Serious Talk, vii. 
337 Ibid, 42. 
338 Ibid (sic). 
339 Polkinghorne, Exploring Reality, 90. 
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did when we were operating with classical logic. While theology will never be 
completely compatible with what people understand as common sense,340 
neither will quantum mechanics,341 and if one accepts that quantum mechanics 
will forever defy ‘common sense’, so too must one accept that there are aspects 
of theology which will do so. Polkinghorne uses the example of the Resurrection 
as a Christian claim which goes against our understanding of what constitutes 
‘common sense’ as one such aspect. It is inconsistent, for Polkinghorne, to 
accept the counter-intuitive claims of quantum mechanics while rejecting the 
counter-intuitive claims of Christian theology. 
Mathematics and quantum mechanics are, for Polkinghorne, indicative of the 
existence of parts of our ultimate reality which do not correspond directly with 
our experience of our physical and ‘logical’ world. It is in these parts of the 
ultimate reality where we can find God. As I have said, I do not think that the 
‘dimension’ of reality where Polkinghorne is housing the truths of mathematics 
is itself a kind of paradise in the same way that Plato’s Intelligible World is, for 
Plato’s Intelligible World is home to all of the Forms, including the Form of the 
Good, whereas Polkinghorne’s mathematical dimension is home only to the 
truths of mathematics, but by postulating the existence of a dimension which is 
home to the truths of mathematics we can theorise the existence of a dimension 
of reality which is a heaven or a paradise as we will have shown that there is a 
multidimensional aspect to reality; if we can have two dimensions (the material 
and the noetic), why can we not have a paradisiacal dimension as well?342  
In FFXV, the Astral Realm (wherein the gods reside) is a distinct plane of 
existence distinguished from the ‘mortal’ plane of existence. This kind of 
 
340 Ibid, 55. 
341 Wolpert (Lewis Wolpert, The Unnatural Nature of Science [London: Faber and Faber, 1992]), 
interestingly, does not limit the incompatibility of scientific concepts with common sense to 
quantum mechanics, but argues that many scientific concepts do not accord with what we 
understand to be common sense. He says that while it is often argued that “science and 
common sense are closely linked” (1), this is not necessarily the case. Theories such as 
quantum mechanics and the Big Bang can sound magical to those lacking the relevant scientific 
training (7), and while common sense is “intuitive”, many scientific concepts and principles are 
not (8). Children, he says, must be taught the scientific understanding of the world, because 
they inherently and naturally learn the ‘common sense’ understanding of the world, which differs 
from the scientific (13) and is usually an inaccurate depiction of the way the world works (15). 
For Wolpert, then, quantum mechanics are not the only scientific concept which seem to defy 
what we understand as common sense, and if this is the case, Polkinghorne’s argument could 
perhaps be strengthened further. 
342 What this heaven or paradise might look like is far beyond the limits of this thesis. For the 
purposes of my argument, I shall focus not on the normative reality of such a heaven or 
paradise, but on the descriptive understanding of its theoretical existence. 
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distinction is what I mean when I refer to the existence of a divine dimension 
which exists as a separate ontological reality to the dimension in which we 
reside.343 
If mathematics is the key to finding God’s ‘location’, then chaotic dynamics are 
the key to discovering God’s action within the world. Polkinghorne points to the 
“intrinsic openness” of chaotic dynamics,344 wherein God’s actions can be 
found. Murphy describes Polkinghorne’s position as finding within chaos and 
complexity futures which are “truly “open,” and hence … God can operate within 
them without contravening the laws of nature”.345 Bottom-up causation, such as 
finding God’s action in quantum mechanics, is problematic for Polkinghorne: 
“There is particular difficulty in using quantum indeterminacy to describe 
divine action. Conventional quantum theory contains much continuity and 
determinism in addition to its well-known discontinuities and 
indeterminacies. The latter refer, not to all quantum behavior, but only to 
those particular events which qualify, by the irreversible registration of 
their effects in the macro-world, to be described as measurements. In 
between measurements, the continuous determinism of the Schrödinger 
equation applies. Occasions of measurement only occur from time to 
time and a God who acted through being their determinator would also 
only be acting from time to time.”346 
Polkinghorne’s use of mathematics and chaotic dynamics in this way can be 
criticised. This understandably risks falling into a God of the Gaps argument of 
the type which we saw in Chapter 2. The ‘open futures’ which Polkinghorne 
argues can allow God to act without contravening the laws of nature sound 
uncomfortably like gaps in scientific knowledge within which God and God’s 
action can be said to be found. These gaps may be uncloseable in 
Polkinghorne’s view, and so immune to the traditional refutation of the God of 
the Gaps argument, but they are still gaps that science might theoretically close.  
Overall, Polkinghorne’s synthesis of science and theology into a cohesive whole 
in which the two cooperate to uncover the truths of the ultimate reality makes far 
 
343 This is not to say that God is transcendent in this framework. I shall discuss this further when 
considering divine action. 
344 John Polkinghorne, “Metaphysics of Divine Action,” in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific 
Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke 
(Vatican City: Vatican Observatory, 1997), 151. 
345 Nancey Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order,” in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific 
Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke 
(Vatican City: Vatican Observatory, 1997), 327. 
346 Polkinghorne, “Metaphysics of Divine Action,” 152-153 (sic). 
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more sense than the approaches of either Dawkins or the Intelligent Design 
theorists. Dawkins’ attempts to rid society of theistic religion by (admittedly 
inadvertently) creating his own pseudo-religion which demonises theology 
beyond its due are unsustainable, while the Intelligent Design theorists’ 
attempts to turn aspects of theology into a form of science cannot work, for 
theological concepts cannot be subject to the scientific method in the same way 
as ‘true’ scientific concepts can and must.347 Polkinghorne’s ‘middle-way’ 
position, then, affords both science and theology equal place within our 
understanding of the world around us. Furthermore, the concept of an ultimate 
reality makes far more sense than separating science and theology in any way, 
such as in Gould’s NOMA. If God exists, then all the theological consequences 
of God’s existence also exist in the same reality as we do: the ultimate reality. 
We have seen two aspects of Polkinghorne’s ultimate reality so far: the inferred 
dimension of reality wherein God resides, and the actions of God which 
Polkinghorne problematically confines to chaotic dynamics. These are, 
however, not the only aspects of the ultimate reality which Polkinghorne 
explores. In the next section of this chapter, I shall discuss the theological 
position of nonhuman animals in Polkinghorne’s understanding of the ultimate 
reality. 
Polkinghorne and Non-human Animals 
Polkinghorne’s ultimate reality is strikingly anthropocentric. While 
acknowledging that biology does not find much difference between humans and 
nonhuman animals,348 Polkinghorne believes that theologically there are 
differences between the two that cannot be ignored. One such difference is the 
ability to reflect on our own existence in such a way that allows biologists to 
consider the differences and similarities between humans and nonhuman 
animals. This reflective capacity, Polkinghorne convincingly says, must have a 
biological origin. While the biologists can find little difference between humans 
and nonhuman animals, then, Polkinghorne says that their very ability to find 
little difference is itself a significant difference with theological consequences.349 
 
347 The method of investigation for science and theology are different from each other. Theology 
is not reducible to experimental science; if it were, we could talk about reality as nothing more 
than reality, and language of the ultimate reality would be redundant. 




It is these cognitive differences which Polkinghorne seizes on as the location of 
the theological gulf between humans and nonhumans, particularly when it 
comes to the eschaton. Polkinghorne points to our ability to self-reflect as 
indication of our ability to be God-conscious,350 which, if we follow the 
consequences of this line of argument, would deny God-consciousness to 
nonhuman animals on the basis that they are unable to self-reflect in the same 
way as humans can due to their inferior cognitive abilities.351 Indeed, 
Polkinghorne says that humans seem to be the only created creature with God-
consciousness,352 and our acquisition of God-consciousness is directly linked to 
our acquisition of self-consciousness, which, Polkinghorne argues, no other 
created being has achieved.353 Another difference Polkinghorne draws between 
humans and nonhuman animals is that of morality. Polkinghorne argues that 
only humans are truly capable of morality because only humans have the 
capacity for wilful and intentional sin.354 
The reasons which Polkinghorne gives for the existence of a gulf between 
humanity and nonhuman animals is not, however, as relevant to this thesis as 
the reasons for his postulating such a gulf in the first place. Polkinghorne 
dedicates a considerable portion of his 2002 monograph The God of Hope and 
the End of the World to discussing the place of nonhuman animals in the 
eschaton. There are plenty of reasons, he argues, for believing that nonhuman 
animals will have a place in the eschaton. A Biblical reason can be found in the 
book of Job, wherein God concerns himself with nonhuman animals as well as 
with humans, and God explicitly reminds Job that God concerns Godself with 
things other than humanity.355 There is also the issue of time: humanity’s 
existence within the cosmos is little more than a blink of the astronomical 
eye:356 
 
350 Polkinghorne, God of Hope, 45. 
351 The link between cognitive ability and God-consciousness is a much wider topic and 
Polkinghorne is not the only writer who assumes this, nor is he the only writer who follows 
through with the consequences of such a line of argument which seemingly deny God-
consciousness to most if not all nonhuman animals. I hope to study this further, but it is far 
beyond the remit of this thesis. 
352 Polkinghorne, God of Hope, 44. 
353 Polkinghorne, One World, 69. 
354 Polkinghorne, Exploring Reality, 45. 
355 Polkinghorne, Science and Creation, 5. 
356 Polkinghorne, Serious Talk, 105. 
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“Because the whole of the creation matters to God – this vast universe is 
not here just to be the backdrop for the human drama being played out 
on a speck of cosmic dust after an overture lasting fifteen billion years – 
it too must have an everlasting destiny within God’s faithful purposes”.357 
As a result, Polkinghorne concedes that nonhuman animals cannot but have 
some form of eschatological hope but says that this hope looks radically 
different from the eschatological hope shared by all of humankind. Polkinghorne 
believes that each individual human will have their own individual eschatological 
hope, but the same will not be afforded to nonhuman animals. As such, 
Polkinghorne has individual eschatological hope, but the same cannot be said 
for any ants which he has stepped on throughout his lifetime. Rather, 
Polkinghorne believes in a type-eschaton for nonhuman animals: “It is 
conceivable that this eschatological dilemma can be resolved by according 
significance in non-human creatures more to the type than to the token”. He 
illustrates this with the idea of lions: “Perhaps there will be lions in the world to 
come but not every lion that has ever lived”. As such, the individual ants which 
Polkinghorne has crushed beneath his shoes throughout his lifetime will 
probably not appear as themselves in the eschaton, but the essence of antkind, 
representing all the ants who have ever lived, will. The issue gets less clear still 
when Polkinghorne considers pets. Polkinghorne is reluctant to deny pets a 
place in the eschaton and admits that it is possible that they will be afforded a 
place within it, though he is clearly unsure about this and deliberately uses 
conditional language when discussing the issue.358 
I find this line of argument problematic and uncomfortable. From a logical point 
of view, it is inconsistent to say that not all nonhuman animals will have 
individual eschatological hope but that some individual pets might. The greater 
source of my discomfort, however, is theological. The consequence of this 
ideological framework is that God’s care for the creatures in God’s creation is 
itself anthropocentric. Polkinghorne’s God does not care about individual 
nonhuman animals in the same way that God cares about individual humans 
unless that individual nonhuman animal has been cared about by a human. One 
of the side quests in FFXV is called ‘Savior of the Species’ and involves the 
 
357 Ibid. 
358 Polkinghorne, God of Hope, 122-123. C.S. Lewis also distinguished between the theological 
position of wild and ‘tame’ animals. See: Andrew Linzey, “C.S. Lewis's Theology of Animals.” 
Anglican Theological Review 80 no. 1 (1998): 60-81. 
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rescue of an orphaned Chocobo egg. Chocobos are ostrich-like creatures which 
are used within the world of FFXV in much the same way that horses are in the 
real world. The quest involves retrieving a Chocobo egg which has yet to hatch 
but whose mother has been killed by predators. Once the egg has been 
retrieved, the party takes it back to Wiz’s Chocobo Post, a Chocobo ranch 
where domesticated Chocobos are raised, looked after, and hired out for 
transportation purposes.359 In Polkinghorne’s eschatological model, the rescued 
Chocobo chick can expect some eschatological hope, whereas its mother, a 
wild Chocobo killed in the wild by predators, could not. I see no reason to 
believe that God would care ‘more’ for the Chocobo chick because it was 
domesticated and looked after by a human than it would for its mother who 
happened to be a wild Chocobo. Perhaps an even murkier example from FFXV 
involves yet another Chocobo-related side quest given to Noctis by Wiz, the 
owner of the Chocobo ranch. In ‘Where the Wild Chocobos Are’, Noctis is 
tasked with seeking a wild Chocobo which Wiz has not seen for a while. While 
the Chocobo in question is indeed wild and is not under Wiz’s care at the ranch, 
Wiz continues to care for its wellbeing and wishes for Noctis to provide proof 
that it is okay in the form of a photograph showing it alive and well.360 This 
Chocobo is not domesticated but is still cared about by a human being. What, if 
any, eschatological hope could this Chocobo expect under Polkinghorne’s 
framework? 
Aside from concerns surrounding Polkinghorne’s treatment of pets versus wild 
and undomesticated nonhuman animals, however, issues can also be raised 
against Polkinghorne’s ideas of tokenness when it comes to eschatological 
representation. Polkinghorne believes that not every individual lion will be 
represented in the eschaton, but the ‘essence of lionness’ will. One problem 
with this is discerning the reasons for humans to have individual eschatological 
hope but nonhuman animals only enjoying type-eschatological hope. 
Polkinghorne might say that the issue lies in the differences between humans 
and nonhumans with regards to self-consciousness and God-consciousness, 
which in turn are related to cognitive ability. If we assume that the cognitive 
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differences between humans and nonhuman animals are indeed instrumental in 
the difference between nonhuman animals and humans with regards to self-
consciousness and God-consciousness, then we run into yet another problem, 
this time an evolutionary one. At what point in the evolutionary line of Homo 
sapiens does the cognitive ability of the species become sufficient for God-
consciousness? Polkinghorne mentions that there is evidence of Neanderthal 
death rituals,361 which would surely imply some form of self-consciousness. If 
self-consciousness is the key ingredient for the ability to develop God-
consciousness (or, indeed, if they are one and the same), and God-
consciousness is all that is required for individual representation in the 
eschaton, then why can we not believe that Neanderthals are not individually 
represented in the eschaton? Indeed, if we wish to cite God-consciousness as 
the means by which creatures are afforded individual places in the eschaton, 
we need look no further than Psalms 148 and 150: 
7 Praise the Lord from the earth, 
    you sea monsters and all deeps, 
8 fire and hail, snow and frost, 
    stormy wind fulfilling his command! 
9 Mountains and all hills, 
    fruit trees and all cedars! 
10 Wild animals and all cattle, 
    creeping things and flying birds!362 
6 Let everything that breathes praise the Lord! 
Praise the Lord!363 
Perhaps, even, we do not need to present Biblical images of nonhuman animals 
engaging in the same kinds of worship as humans do to present them as 
engaging in creaturely praise. Christopher Southgate writes: 
“The hyena pack that seize a newborn impala calf and tear it apart before 
extracting with great skill every last bit of nutrition from the bones is not in 
any conventional sense acting beautifully, but is acting characteristically, 
praising God in its action, manifesting its creatureliness in a way that is a 
sign of the work of its Creator. Even a more magnificent creature like an 
orca acts in a way most would call ugly when two orca toss a sea lion 
between them, apparently just for fun, before killing it. But that too is 
 
361 Polkinghorne, God of Hope, 36. 
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characteristic action, orca being themselves, and so part of creaturely 
praise, part of the manifestation of Gloria mundi.”364 
Here, creatures are seen to be manifesting glory by doing nothing except being 
themselves. Acting according to one’s nature, then, is a way of manifesting 
glory as it is a reflection of what God made those things to be.365 Similarly, 
Edwards writes: “Theologically, every species is an expression of God in our 
world, a word of God spoken on our planet”.366 
Furthermore, there is reason to doubt that we need to believe that the cognitive 
differences between nonhuman animals and humans are instrumental in the 
differences between the two regarding God-consciousness. I find it a 
remarkable claim to make that nonhuman animals cannot be aware of their 
creator in some way simply because they lack the same sophisticated cognitive 
functions which humans have.  
Polkinghorne’s views on nonhuman animals are, then, not without issue. If one 
wishes to see all nonhuman animals individually represented in the eschaton, 
one cannot agree with Polkinghorne’s view on the subject. If, then, we wish to 
maintain a cognitive distance between humans and nonhuman animals but 
retain the eschatological hope of nonhuman animals, we must seek the seat of 
that eschatological hope outside of God-consciousness born of self-
consciousness. This, I believe, can be achieved through soul-language. 
Soul-Language 
Polkinghorne is a physicalist. He claims that “human beings look much more 
like animated bodies than like incarnated souls”,367 a point which he illustrates 
with the famous story of Phineas Gage and the railway spike.368 He reasons 
that physicalism is superior to body/soul dualism in a Darwinian world, because 
in a dualistic, soul-based theory, one must identify the point in evolutionary time 
when humanity received its soul to distinguish it from nonhuman animals.369 I 
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have already given a similar argument with regards to the reliance of God-
consciousness on cognitive ability, and here we see Polkinghorne use the same 
logic to defend a physicalist point of view in opposition to a dualist one. The 
issue, Polkinghorne maintains, is that Darwinian evolution of human beings 
requires the dualist to locate a temporal point at which human beings were 
ensouled: a difficult feat by which most people are not convinced.370 This, to 
me, however, seems to only be a problem if one is determined to deny souls (or 
some equivalent) to nonhuman animals. If living creatures have souls from the 
beginning of their evolutionary journey, then it becomes unnecessary to locate a 
temporal point when humans were ensouled because they would already have 
had souls passed on to them through the evolutionary line. In this sense, the 
soul is less a religious or spiritual ontological reality and more the life essence 
itself – that which distinguishes animate beings from inanimate objects, rather 
than that which distinguishes humans from nonhuman animals. 
If this is to be the case, then, what would being ensouled look like? The simple 
answer would be to say that being ensouled is being alive, but this would imply 
that there is no difference between a dead creature which was once alive and 
an inanimate object which was never alive. While physically we could make that 
claim – a dead body is no more animate than a stone – this has issues for 
eschatology and the next life. If a dead body is no more eschatologically 
relevant than a stone, how can we say that anything has eschatological hope? 
We could, of course, say that stones also have eschatological hope, but this is 
to ignore the real difference which exists between animate creatures and 
inanimate objects.371 
One possible solution is to say that the soul ‘survives’ death, or that death is the 
‘removal’ or ‘loss’ of the soul from the body. This is the answer a Cartesian 
dualist would provide and is one which theologians and philosophers alike have 
recently tended to reject. Ray S Anderson notes that “Contemporary 
theologians have become uncomfortable with the concept of an abstract 
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runs into the difficulties of pinpointing both a temporal moment and a scientifically measurable 
ontological reality where life begins to exist where it did not before. Studies of the ultimate origin 
of life are yet to deliver an answer to these questions and so it is difficult to reflect on them 
theologically in dialogue with science. Issues of the ultimate origin of life are tangential to this 
thesis and I lack the space in this study to discuss them in further detail. 
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body/soul dualism that has its modern roots in the thought of René 
Descartes”.372 Polkinghorne, too, wishes to avoid such a conclusion, denying 
Cartesian embodiment.373 To do this, he opts for a more Hebraic holistic 
embodiment, such that resurrection into the next life involves the “reconstitution 
of the whole man in some other environment of God’s choosing”.374 I am 
inclined to agree with Polkinghorne on this point, but I am reluctant to deny this 
Hebraic holistic embodiment to nonhuman animals. 
We have already seen Polkinghorne argue that humans appear much more like 
animated bodies than embodied souls. Such a statement shifts the locus of 
identity from the soul to the body: we are not our souls, we are our bodies. I 
would say that we are necessarily both: we are the amalgamation of our souls 
and our bodies into one. If we lost either one of them, we would cease to be 
ourselves.375 In the penultimate Chapter of FFXV, Noctis is tasked with 
acquiring the power necessary to defeat the immortal Ardyn. To do this, he 
must ruminate with the gods in the Astral Realm, absorbing divine power until 
he has enough to face and defeat Ardyn. Noctis accesses the Astral Realm via 
the Crystal, a gift from the gods to the Lucian royal line wherein Bahamut, one 
of the gods, resides. Noctis touches the Crystal and is sucked inside it, 
completely disappearing inside it and emerging in the Astral Realm. It is not 
enough for Noctis’ soul or mind to be transferred through the Crystal into the 
Astral Realm – he must be entirely absorbed by the Crystal to make the journey 
and retain himself. Eschatological hope, then, lies in the reconstitution of the 
entire whole – body and soul – of the creature in question, as Polkinghorne 
says. Joel Green notes that this amalgamation of body and soul is the accepted 
reading of the Hebrew Bible: “there is a general agreement that, in the Hebrew 
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Bible, human beings are depicted as body and soul – that is, humans do not 
possess a body and soul, but are human only as body and soul”.376 At this 
point, however, we run into the problem of chain consumption. 
Peters explains the issue of chain consumption in his essay, ‘Resurrection of 
the Very Embodied Soul?’ The issue is directly related to a reductive point of 
view where each individual atom and molecule is considered: which atoms can 
we say belong to us when they have belonged to and contributed to the makeup 
of countless living creatures before us and undoubtedly will for countless 
creatures after us? Much like the question of to which brother the wife belongs, 
to which living creature does an atom belong at the eschaton?377 Peters 
convincingly concludes that the issue should be solved through re-creation 
rather than resurrection: the eschaton does not involve individuals being 
resurrected as they are, but being re-created, such that resurrection 
encompasses the whole of a being or person, including within it the holistic 
whole of body-and-soul.378 At the very end of the game, Noctis returns to the 
Astral Realm with Ardyn, having defeated him in the mortal plane, to deal the 
final death blow. For both Ardyn and Noctis to arrive in the Astral Realm for this 
final showdown, both need to die – Ardyn by Noctis’ hand, and Noctis by the 
previous monarchs of Lucis who exist in the Astral Realm through the Power of 
Kings. In much the same way as Christian traditions have often taught that 
death allows an individual to pass through to a paradisaical afterlife, so too must 
Noctis and Ardyn die before they can meet in the Astral Realm. Their bodies are 
destroyed and a part of them can travel to the Astral Realm. There seem to be 
two ways of travelling to the Astral Realm, then: one is to fully transport there, 
body included; the other is to die. The only way to remain alive throughout a 
journey to the Astral Realm is for both body and soul joined to make the 
journey. In such a way, I would argue that we can see a more holistic version of 
embodiment portrayed in FFXV, and it is this version of embodiment which I 
believe can offer a convincing solution to some of the problems raised by 
Polkinghorne’s line of argument, particularly considering nonhuman animals. 
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When all living creatures are seen as holistic wholes, including the physical and 
the soulful in the continuation of their identities, there is no barrier to the 
eschaton for nonhuman animals. What is more, there is no need to pinpoint a 
temporal ensoulment of Homo sapiens to distinguish their ensoulment from the 
soullessness of nonhuman animals, because nonhuman animals are not 
soulless. If, then, we wish to include nonhuman animals in a Polkinghornean 
eschatology, I believe viewing all living creatures as holistic wholes, both 
physical and soulful ontological realities, allows for the individual eschatological 
hope of nonhuman as well as human animals.379 
If we assume that living creatures are holistic wholes of physical and soulful 
ontologies, we must ask ourselves what the difference between the two of these 
ontologies is, and indeed ‘where’ we might locate that part of ourselves which is 
not the physical as opposed to the soulful within ourselves. Where is the soul? 
Indeed, what is the soul? 
Such questions are undoubtedly massive, and I do not have the space to give a 
satisfactory answer considering all the relevant minutiae here. Instead, I shall 
discuss why the soul should be thought of as separate from the mind and from 
the body. 
The quick answer to this question is that the soul is what differentiates between 
that which is alive and that which is not. A stone does not possess a soul 
because it is not alive, and a cat does possess a soul because it is alive. 
Similarly, a stone is not alive because it does not possess a soul. Does that 
mean that a dead cat does not possess a soul? I would argue that a dead cat is 
no longer a cat, at least not in the same way as it was when it was alive. To die 
is to lose something of one’s identity; one cannot retain their continuity of self if 
they lose their soul, but neither can they do so if they lose their body. There is 
no intelligibility behind the idea of a soul ‘leaving’ the body and the self-
contained within and constituting that body-and-soul continuing as its-self. 
Therefore Noctis’ body must enter the Astral Realm if he is to make the journey 
while still alive; when he enters the Astral Realm as a dead man, he has lost 
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himself. As such, recreation rather than resurrection is imperative for us to 
retain our selves in the eschaton; we cannot lose our body and go to paradise 
as souls, because those souls alone would not keep their identity – they would 
not be us. Neither can we lose our souls and merely have our bodies enter 
paradise for the same reason. The holistic whole needs to go to paradise, and 
as such that holistic whole needs to be recreated after it was lost in death. This 
is different from the mind; the soul as life-force is separate from the mind as 
cognitive ability. Both exist within the body but are not reducible to the physical. 
Thus, one should not equate soul and mind any more than one should equate 
soul and body or mind and body. 
We could, at this point, adopt the position of non-reductive physicalism 
(hereafter NRP), a popular position held by philosophers and theologians alike 
when considering these kinds of problems. A particularly prominent non-
reductive physicalist is the philosopher Nancey Murphy, who describes the 
position thus: 
“Applied to the specific area of studies of consciousness, it [NRP] denies 
the existence of a nonmaterial entity, the mind (or soul) but does not 
deny the existence of consciousness … or the significance of conscious 
states or other mental … phenomena. In brief, this is the view that the 
human nervous system, operating in concert with the rest of the body in 
its environment, is the seat of consciousness (and also of human spiritual 
or religious capacities).”380 
Such a position allows us to assume that the human person is an undivided 
whole; there are no divisions between mind and body, mind and soul, soul and 
body, or mind and soul: all is one entity which it itself the seat of identity. While 
mental activities and consciousness are grounded in physicality, NRP seeks to 
escape the ‘nothing buttery’ of material reductionism, such as that espoused by 
Francis Crick of DNA fame.381 The key difference between NRP and the 
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position I wish to put forward is mentioned in the Murphy quote above: “it [NRP] 
denies the existence of a nonmaterial entity, the mind (or soul)”. While 
consciousness cannot be reduced absolutely to the physical, non-reductive 
physicalists do not believe that there is a nonmaterial element to 
consciousness. To explain how such a thing is possible, they evoke the concept 
of supervenience. Murphy, for instance, says: “Although all human behavior 
supervenes on the biological (genetic and neurobiological), little of it is reducible 
to biology”.382 She expands on what she means by supervenience in this 
context in the following footnote: “I suggest that the better way to make this 
point is to say that every mental event is realized by some physical event, not 
identical to it”.383  
We could say that it makes more sense to say that there is something other 
than the physical which acts as a ‘life force’ – a distinguisher between the 
animate and the inanimate. Paul Churchland points out that for many, such a 
‘common sense’ argument was by far the most palatable.384 Yet, as we have 
already seen, we do not have to adhere to common sense: Polkinghorne 
illustrated this with the counter-intuitiveness of quantum mechanics. 
Furthermore, Murphy points out that there is plenty of scientific evidence for 
NRP,385 namely within evolutionary biology and genetics.386 Why, then, should 
we still believe in a soul? What is the concept of the soul bringing to the table 
that NRP cannot? 
For Susan Schneider, the problem lies in NRP’s supposed inability to 
sufficiently explain minds. Schneider claims that NRP suffers from a ‘mind 
problem’, because the properties non-reductive physicalists apply to the mind 
imply that the mind cannot be a physical thing. She writes, “the mere 
commitment to property irreducibility threatens to lead to substance dualism”, 
while the absence of a physicalist answer to the mind problem jeopardises NRP 
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as a physicalist position.387 Where the non-reductive physicalist might, here, 
point to supervenience to explain the mind, Schneider notes that 
“supervenience is generally agreed to be too weak for physicalism”,388 and so 
the problem of NRP as a truly physicalist position remains. Schneider concludes 
that the ‘mind problem’ damages NRP as a physicalist position, and if it cannot 
find a satisfactory answer to the problem, NRP is risking losing itself to 
substance dualism.389 I would be inclined to agree with Schneider that these 
issues are damaging to NRP as a physicalist position. The mind cannot be both 
physical (in the sense that mental properties and events are directly related to 
physical properties and events) and nonphysical (in such a way that it 
supervenes on the physical and so must be in some way separate from the 
physical).  
In response to these issues, I would be inclined to accept NRP with revisions: 
rather than allowing the mind to be of two substances at once (both physical 
and nonphysical), I would separate the mind and the soul so that the mind can 
perform those functions which are physical (thus, the mind is expressed in 
mental properties and events which are identical to the physical properties and 
events extant in the brain) and the soul those which are not physical (thus, the 
soul is the life force, having no bearing on mental or cognitive activity but 
existing as the differing substance between that which is alive and that which is 
no longer or never has been). The issue lies in identity. NRP cannot give us a 
seat of identity in the same way that soul-language can. If we find our identities 
– and the continuation of those identities beyond this life – in a holistic whole of 
mind/body/soul, we can distinguish between that which is alive and that which is 
not, that which is us and that which is not, and include nonhuman animals in our 
eschatology. In this way, we can embrace Polkinghorne’s ultimate reality while 
leaving behind his speciesism.390 
Conclusion 
Polkinghorne’s understanding of an ultimate reality is far more palatable than 
Dawkins’ rejection of all things supernatural to the point of following a pseudo-
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religion or the Intelligent Design theorists’ rebranding of religious ideas as 
science. The ultimate reality allows for both the truths of science and the truths 
of the theological consequences of the existence of God to exist within the 
same reality, without conflicting with one another. Where Polkinghorne fails is in 
his treatment of nonhuman animals in denying individual nonhuman animals a 
place in the eschaton. This, I believe, is too narrowly anthropocentric. The issue 
can, however, be resolved if one jettisons Polkinghorne’s reluctance to 
understand nonhuman animals as souled creatures, and to understand 
ensoulment as being a holistic whole of soul and body, with the mind as 
cognitive ability.391 
Throughout the three main chapters of this thesis, I have discussed three 
different thinkers who can be positioned at different points on Messer’s 
typology. Dawkins is firmly in Type 1; the Intelligent Design theorists are in Type 
4.5; and Polkinghorne is firmly in Type 3. Do any of these thinkers/schools of 
thought offer us a satisfactory formulation of the relationship between science 
and Christian theology in the contemporary West, or should we look elsewhere 
for a solution to our problem? 
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In 2007 Neil Messer provided a typology of the possible positions on the 
relationship between science and Christian theology. His typology included five 
Types, ranging from those who disregard Christian theology for the sake of 
science to those who disregard science for the sake of Christian theology. In 
between these two Types, we see three more, where science is taken as more 
important than Christian theology but Christian theology is not disregarded out 
of hand, where the opposite is true, and where both Christian theology and 
science are taken in equal regard. In 2018, Messer commented on his typology 
saying that although it was still relevant, he was reluctant to place any individual 
into these Types which he identified back in 2007. Rather, he writes, he is 
describing views and positions on a wider scale than ascribing these Types to 
individuals.392 
In this thesis, I have taken a different tactic. In my discussion of Messer’s 
Types, I have placed individual thinkers/schools of thought into three of the five. 
I have focused on alternate Types on the typology: Type 1 (where Christian 
theology is disregarded in favour of science), Type 5 (where science is 
disregarded in favour of Christian theology), and Type 3 (where both are taken 
in equal regard). Though, in all fairness, I have not spoken about Type 5 
specifically but what I have called Type 4.5, where Christian theology is seen as 
much more important than science, yet science itself is not entirely discarded. 
In my discussion of Type 1, I used Richard Dawkins and his New Atheism as a 
depiction of the view that Christian theology should be disregarded in favour of 
science. Dawkins argues that science can tell us all we need to know about the 
world and that the poetic wonder of science means that it can afford us a kind of 
transcendence similar to that which is available to us through religion. Dawkins 
prefers this scientistic option as he believes that religion is dangerous for, and 
should be removed from, society. I illustrated Dawkins’ position with the 
Dwemer society from the video game series, The Elder Scrolls. The Dwemer 
society disregarded the gods of that universe and instead placed all their faith in 
logic, science, and technology. They sought self-transcendence through these 
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means, and went as far as constructing their own god, the Numidium, in order 
to achieve this goal. I argued that Dawkins, in constructing his version of New 
Atheism, had himself constructed his own Numidium. Where the Dwemers’ 
Numidium was powered by the Heart of Lorkhan, a divine artefact, Dawkins’ 
‘Numidium’ is powered by what he describes as the poetic wonder of science. In 
this way, Dawkins has turned his version of New Atheism into a form of pseudo-
religion and scientism. Furthermore, I argued that just as the Dwemer could not 
realise their ambitions of self-transcendence without some aspect of the divine 
(the divine artefact the Heart of Lorkhan), neither can Dawkins escape 
inadvertently turning his version of New Atheism into a pseudo-religion using 
some aspect of the divine (the poetic wonder of science). 
Having found Type 1 unsatisfactory, I moved on to discuss Type 4.5, identifying 
the Intelligent Design Movement as typifying this Type. Where Intelligent Design 
theorists mostly disregard science in favour of theology, they do not do so 
entirely. Rather, they attempt to commandeer science for their own evangelistic 
purposes, claiming that certain areas of science, particularly within evolutionary 
biology, are in fact theological rather than scientific questions. Science is still 
relatively important for the Intelligent Design theorists, but it can be used to 
indicate the divine and the work of the divine in evolutionary history. 
I discussed two prominent Intelligent Design theorists, Michael Behe and 
William Dembski, and their individual contributions to the Movement. I explained 
that Intelligent Design theorists attempt to ‘prove’ that certain areas of the 
biological world could not have been brought forth through the process of 
Darwinian evolution and that consequently they must have been the specific 
work of a designer. While it is not a necessity that the Intelligent Design 
Movement ground this intelligent designer within any religious tradition, the 
Intelligent Design theorists I have discussed (and indeed many of the Intelligent 
Design theorists I have not discussed) identify this intelligent designer as the 
Christian God. In my discussion of the relationship between science and 
Christian theology as understood by Behe and Dembski, I illustrated a major 
critique of their views with an analogy from the Thor franchise within the Marvel 
Cinematic Universe. 
Within the Thor franchise, that which is understood by the human characters to 
be magic is eventually revealed to be advanced science and technology of the 
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kind that is possible but not yet actual on Earth. One character, Dr Foster, 
describes this using Arthur C Clarke’s Third Law. Furthermore, the beings which 
were described by 10th Century Norwegians as gods (Thor, Odin, etc.) are 
revealed to be nothing more than advanced intelligent aliens. Shermer 
describes this phenomenon, similar but not identical to Clarke’s Third Law, as 
Shermer’s Last Law, where intelligent aliens become indistinguishable from the 
divine. Shermer’s Last Law is not itself uncriticised, but the analogy is logical. 
The primary problem which Clarke’s Third Law and Shermer’s Last Law 
presents to Christian theology is that it accuses Christian theology of committing 
the God of the Gaps – where God is inserted into those gaps in scientific 
knowledge which will inevitably be filled in as science progresses, thus 
squeezing God out of the picture until God is no longer needed to explain 
anything. I used the analogy of the Thor franchise to accuse the Intelligent 
Design theorists, and specifically Behe and Dembski, of the God of the Gaps. I 
went on to argue that the Intelligent Design Movement is not just guilty of 
committing the God of the Gaps, but that they go one step further, committing 
what I termed the ultimate God of the Gaps. In ‘traditional’ God of the Gaps 
arguments, a gap in scientific knowledge is identified and God is inserted into 
the gap as an explanation for the phenomenon which is yet to be understood 
scientifically. In an ultimate God of the Gaps argument, of which I argued the 
Intelligent Design theorists are guilty, a gap is created in existing scientific 
knowledge and God is inserted into that gap as an explanation for the relevant 
phenomenon. 
In the case of Behe’s irreducible complexity, Behe creates a gap in the 
explanation of the emergence of certain biological phenomena such as the 
bacterial flagellum. Where the emergence of these phenomena can be 
explained using Darwinian evolution, Behe claims that they cannot, and in doing 
so creates a gap where one does not exist. Behe’s solution to this gap which he 
has created is to place God inside it: the bacterial flagellum must have been the 
product of the work of an intelligent designer, which, as we have seen, Behe 
identifies with the Christian God. Similarly, Dembski offers his Design Inference 




Where Dembski creates gaps where there are none is in his definition of 
improbable. He claims that certain events are less probable than others. 
Considering the events he discusses are within the realm of scientific 
investigation, saying that they are implying design by virtue of their improbability 
is saying that improbability is itself a gap in our knowledge and it is within this 
gap that we need to place God. I argue that the gap which Dembski here 
identifies is not a gap at all, but rather he is creating a gap and using the gap 
which he himself creates to insert God into the picture. I further argue that the 
ultimate God of the Gaps is just as problematic as the traditional God of the 
Gaps argument. 
Another criticism I levelled at Intelligent Design theory is the criticism espoused 
by Abby Hafer: that Intelligent Design theory is unscientific. Outside of 
controversies involving allegedly financially-influenced editors of peer-reviewed 
journals, the hypotheses given by the Intelligent Design theorists are inherently 
untestable, and therefore cannot be subject to the scientific method. In our 
understanding of what constitutes science in the contemporary West, that a 
hypothesis be subject to the scientific method is crucial to its inclusion within the 
realm of scientific investigation. Scientific investigation consists of the scientific 
method, and that which does not use the scientific method (or, in the case of the 
hypotheses of Behe and Dembski, cannot use the scientific method), is outside 
the realm of science. Furthermore, there is far more evidence supporting the 
evolutionary biological account of the emergence of natural phenomena such as 
bacterial flagellum than there is supporting the Intelligent Design account of 
their being designed by an intelligent designer and placed ‘within’ evolved 
creatures in their entirety. Hafer notes that there is far more evidence against an 
intelligent designer being involved in the process of Darwinian evolution than 
there is evidence for it, citing examples of what could only be described as ‘bad 
design’ if we were to ascribe their design to an intelligence and those areas 
where humanity – allegedly the pinnacle of Creation and therefore of evolution – 
suffers in relation to nonhuman animals in terms of its particular biology as 
Homo sapiens. In both their use of God of the Gaps reasoning and in their 
twisting of science into something which is outside of scientific investigation and 
the scientific method, the Intelligent Design theorists are an unsatisfactory 
alternative to Dawkins’ New Atheism. In the case of Richard Dawkins’ New 
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Atheism, we were left with a pseudo-religion. In the case of Intelligent Design, 
we are left with a pseudo-science. 
In Chapter 3, I moved on from Types 1 and 4.5 to discuss Type 3. I have said 
that Messer does not wish to identify any one individual within his typology but 
wishes to be broader in his descriptions of the Types he describes in his 
typology. Yet in 2007, when he first introduced his typology to the field, he 
identified John Polkinghorne as an example of Type 3, where Christian theology 
and science are given equal regard. Polkinghorne’s understanding of the 
relationship between science and Christian theology is that they are both 
investigating the ultimate reality: reality which includes within it both the physical 
universe that we experience and the noetic, spiritual world that God inhabits 
and where such objective truths such as the laws of mathematics can be found. 
I illustrated this with an analogy from the video game Final Fantasy XV, where 
magic and technology exist side by side without conflict, and can be used for 
the same things, such as healing and in combat. For Polkinghorne, reality 
encompasses both the physical and the divine, and we can ask different 
questions about the ultimate reality within the different disciplines of science 
and Christian theology. The two are, in effect, asking different questions about 
the same thing, i.e. the ultimate reality. I argued that Polkinghorne’s position 
was by far the most satisfactory of the three that I have discussed in this thesis, 
though it is by no means without fault. I argued that if the laws of science are 
true, which I believe them to be, and if God exists, which I believe God does, 
then both explanations of the nature of reality must be true within the same 
reality. It is not the case that God exists removed from our reality in some 
deistic fashion, but God is both transcendent and immanent and works within 
our reality, alongside the physical world which we can investigate using the 
scientific method. 
The first area where I disagreed with Polkinghorne is on this subject of divine 
action. Polkinghorne believes that God acts within the causal indeterminacies of 
chaotic dynamics, which he sees as uncloseable gaps where science can never 
know or discover what is really going on. I found this explanation of divine 
action to be unsatisfactory, and instead opted for Russel’s NIODA or Non-
Interventionist Objective Divine Action. Polkinghorne admits to being speciesist 
in his theological treatment of nonhuman animals, and this is where I once 
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again differ from his views. Given the evidence we now have from evolutionary 
biology, we are finding it increasingly difficult to distinguish Homo sapiens from 
other creatures, at least in terms of a biological timeline. The issue remains that, 
if we wish to view Homo sapiens as theologically different from other creatures, 
then we must explain what it is about the transition of a species which was not 
Homo sapiens to a species that is Homo sapiens which changed that species’ 
theological position so dramatically as to be afforded a place in the eschaton 
where one was not given before. I drew on my case study analogy, FFXV, in 
this discussion, referencing the creatures within that universe known as 
Chocobos and the quests wherein the player character interacts with them. The 
distinction between wild and domesticated Chocobos allowed me to highlight 
the intricate difficulties involved in Polkinghorne’s view of nonhuman animals, 
including their place or lack thereof in the eschaton, where ambiguity of the 
position of a nonhuman animal in relation to humans or a human makes the 
conclusions Polkinghorne draws less obvious and more problematic. This has 
further consequences for the historical emergence of the possibility of sin, as 
well as creaturely praise. This is a question far too wide to be discussed in this 
thesis, and so further study is necessary. 
Where Polkinghorne’s view is the most satisfactory of the three discussed (and, 
arguably, the five on Messer’s typology) is that both divine action and the 
physical world are said to exist within the same reality. While this does not 
mean that both the divine and the physical are open to the same kind of 
investigation, that the effects of both exist within the same reality means that 
they can both impact on each other: God can act within the world, divine 
revelation remains intelligible, and prayer too remains intelligible. Yet 
Polkinghorne’s position cannot be adopted without revision. I would argue that a 
position where the divine and the physical are included within the same ultimate 
reality and where divine action is described through NIODA and where 
nonhuman animals are given a greater theological standing does best in 
describing the reality in which we live, and paints a more accurate view of both 
science and of the Christian God. Science in this view is given permission to 
investigate the entire physical world, though it is probably too ambitious to say 
that science will be able to investigate and explain every aspect of the physical 
world. God, in this view, is not only a part of the reality which we experience 
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every day but is a dynamic reality, working in the everyday and with whom we 
can coherently communicate and interact. Our reality is ultimate, containing 
both the effects of the divine and the physical, and we have access to it through 
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